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JARED C. SCHROEDER: Considering a framework for how the Supreme Court should 
conceptualize the press clause of the First Amendment in the Network-Society Era 
(Under the direction of Professor Robert L. Kerr) 
 
The Internet has made it possible for anyone to become a publisher, thus challenging 
traditional conceptualizations of the press and the press clause of the First Amendment, 
which has historically been understood in terms of the institutional media. The changes 
in the way members of a democratic society communicate have raised questions 
regarding how the courts should interpret the press clause in the network era. This 
dissertation utilized David Altheide’s qualitative document-analysis process to 
systematically assess three bodies of discourse in order to propose a unified framework 
in which the courts can ground questions concerning the future of the press clause in the 
network era. That method of qualitative document analysis was applied to the narratives 
represented within lower-court rulings concerning cases in which citizen publishers 
argued for press-related protections, Supreme Court decisions regarding Internet 
questions that relate to the First Amendment, and essential theoretical 
conceptualizations of the role of communication in a democratic society. Drawing upon 
the thematic insights that emerged through the analysis of the bodies of discourse, this 
dissertation proposes that courts focus on the process through which messages are 
composed and delivered. Such an approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
press-clause jurisprudence and the dominant philosophical conceptualizations that 
emerged in the analysis regarding the role of the press in a democratic society, while at 
the same time relating with understandings regarding the unique dynamics of 
communication in the network era. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The emergence of the network society has made defining who qualifies as “the 
press” a more difficult task. When the Framers of the Bill of Rights penned the First 
Amendment, commanding that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press,” defining “the press,” was relatively simple.1 Those who 
owned a press — the means to communicate messages to mass audiences — qualified 
as the press.2 That definition of the press, a technologically and economically rooted 
approach, served as a reasonably reliable one through the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as radio, television, cable, and satellite technologies emerged.3 Those who 
held a broadcast license or the financial resources to begin and maintain a cable news 
network, for example, qualified as the press. Today, however, those standards no longer 
provide a clear delineation. The Internet has introduced a medium through which 
anyone with access to the Internet in effect can be a publisher. As a result, courts 
throughout the nation increasingly must face difficult questions as individuals and 
groups, such as bloggers, web magazine publishers, and political advocates, claim rights 
that have traditionally been associated with the institutional press.4 The massive, 
paradigmatic shift created by the emergence of what scholars such as Manuel Castells,5 
                                                
1 U.S. Const. amend. I.  
2 Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know 
and the Public Should Expect (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007), 11. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Obsidian Financial Group v. Cox, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43125 (P.D. Or., 2012); Too Much 
Media v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209 (N.J. 2011); Johns-Byrne Co. v. TechnoBuffalo, 40 Med.L.Rptr. 2619 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Cook County 2012); Nexus v. Swift, 785 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); and Bailey v. State, 
900 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2012) represent examples of instances when lower courts have made rulings 
regarding challenges by citizen publishers who claimed rights press-related rights. 
5 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55. Castells 




who explores sociology and communication-technology questions, have termed the 
“network society” has placed the power to publish in the hands of many, increasingly 
blurring the once-obvious line between the press and its audience in many contexts.6  
 The changes have resulted in an era of uncertainty in society’s understanding of 
what journalism is and in the nature of related legal considerations.7 Journalists, and 
those who study journalism, have been forced to reevaluate the mission, values, and 
practices of their field.8 Concepts such as increased transparency, connectivity, and 
interactivity are transfiguring traditional journalistic roles such as gatekeeping, access to 
sources of power, and the complete vetting and reporting of stories as finished 
products.9 As journalists consider their shifting, uncertain place in the network society, 
so too must legal scholars consider conceptual rationales that courts may utilize to 
interpret the press clause in an era when the definition of “the press” has become less 
clear. The Supreme Court has not addressed the press clause in the network era.10 With 
an undercurrent of lower-court cases pushing, questioning, and examining the very 
definition of who qualifies for the Constitutional protections of the press clause — a 
cornerstone of the First Amendment — it is reasonable to anticipate that the Supreme 
Court will examine the issue in the future.11  
  
                                                
6 Jane Singer, “Journalism and Digital Technologies,” in Changing the News: The Forces 
Shaping Journalism in Uncertain Times, eds. Wilson Lowrey and Peter J. Gade (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 214-215. 
7 Peter J. Gade and Wilson Lowrey, “Reshaping the Journalistic Culture,” in Changing the News, 
22-23. 
8 Singer, “Journalism and Digital Technologies,” 214. 
9 Steven H. Chaffee and Miriam J. Metzger, “The End of Mass Communication,” Mass 
Communication & Society 4, no. 4 (2001): 366; Kovach and Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism, 18-
19; Wilson Lowrey and Peter J. Gade, “Connective Journalism,” in Changing the News,” 214-215. 
10 Lee C. Bollinger, “A Free Press for a Global Society,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 26 
Feb. 2010, B6. 
11 Robert W. McChesney, “Freedom of the Press for Whom? The Question to be Answered in 
Our Critical Juncture,” Hofstra Law Review 35 (2006-2007): 1434.   
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 With these changes in mind, this dissertation contributes a well-supported 
framework that moves away from the historically problematic questions that arise with 
approaches that seek to determine who is or is not a journalist.12 Instead, this 
dissertation proposes a process-based framework that focuses on how a message is 
composed and delivered, rather than on who communicated it. Such an approach aligns 
both with historical conceptualizations of the press clause and with the unique 
characteristics of the network society. In composing this framework, this dissertation 
was designed theoretically and methodologically to arrive at conclusions that provide a 
conceptual basis in which courts can ground such challenging questions concerning 
interpretations of the press clause in the network society. As fuller background, roughly 
the first half of this chapter is devoted to substantial discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
body of rulings to date regarding the press clause, as well as to legal scholars’ work 
considering the meaning of the clause. That is followed by discussions of scholarly 
literature addressing questions concerning how journalism and its role traditionally have 
been defined in relation to protections of the press clause, concepts regarding the nature 
and meaning of the rapidly emerging “network society,” and finally assertions of 
journalism’s identity in that evolving society. 
 The next three chapters utilize the methodological approach to document 
analysis conceptualized by David Altheide to develop thematic theoretical insights into 
three bodies of discourse relevant to the ultimate objective of this dissertation 
                                                
12 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966). 
See also Rem Rieder, “Media Shield Law Moves Forward,” USA Today, 12 Sept. 2013, which reports 
that much of the most recent congressional debate regarding a federal shield law revolved around creating 
a definition of who is a journalist, and William E. Lee, “The Demise of the Federal Shield Law,” Cardozo 
Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 30 (2012): 27-30, which examines the problems Congress faces in 
attempting to define who is a journalist in the era of bloggers and citizen publishers. 
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concerning how courts in the network society may most effectively interpret the press 
clause. Altheide’s method of document analysis is detailed near the end of this chapter. 
Chapter Two applies that method to determine understandings that lower courts 
have articulated in asserting conceptual rationales they have developed for deciding 
cases in which bloggers or other citizen publishers have argued for protections 
historically more associated with the institutional press under the press clause. The 
lower courts are the focus of that analysis because the Supreme Court has yet to decide 
a case involving such questions. Chapter Three similarly utilizes Altheide’s document 
analysis to identify understandings the Supreme Court has articulated in asserting 
conceptual rationales it has developed for deciding Internet questions that relate to the 
First Amendment. Then Chapter Four applies the document-analysis method to an 
essential body of philosophical conceptualizations of the role of communication in a 
democratic society.  
Finally, drawing upon the body of essential understandings and representations 
that the results of those respective studies identify as significant in terms of the ultimate 
objective of this dissertation, the final chapter proposes a unified framework in which 
the courts can ground complicated questions concerning interpretations of the press 
clause in the network society. That framework is constructed on the basis of the 
essential components derived through the analysis just summarized in the context of a 
conceptual rationale that integrates historical understandings with those of a 
dramatically transformed media environment. 
In that process, this dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge that has 
developed through the course of debates on the meaning of the press clause that began 
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well before the emergence of the network-society era, as discussed more fully later in 
this chapter.13 The Framers’ intent for the press clause is not clear.14 Historical records 
from their discussions on the matter and the personal journals from the amendment’s 
authors do not contain clear evidence regarding how the press clause was intended to be 
interpreted, especially as it relates to the speech clause.15 The Court’s rulings to date 
regarding the press clause also are not clear on whether the press clause belongs to the 
people or the press.16 Indeed, the Court has often conflated speech and press, using 
them interchangeably or together, as if their meanings are connected.17 When the Court 
has focused on the press clause specifically, it has often upheld its value in protecting a 
democratic mission for the media,18 but has declared that journalists should receive no 
more and no fewer protections and access rights than other citizens.19 Nevertheless, the 
Court has also drawn upon journalistic practices as an important influence in its rulings 
regarding the press clause.20 
                                                
13 Katherine W. Pownell, “Defamation and the Nonmedia Speaker,” Federal Communications 
Law Journal 41 (1988-1989): 195. 
14 Leonard W. Levy, “On the Origins of the Free Press Clause,” UCLA Law Review 32 (1985): 
202-203; Melville B. Nimmer, “Introduction — Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it 
Add to Freedom of Speech,” Hastings Law Journal 26 (1975): 640; Pownell, “Defamation and the 
Nonmedia Speaker,” 195. 
15 Levy, “On the Origins of the Free Press Clause,” 202-203; Nimmer, “Is Freedom of the Press 
a Redundancy,” 640.  
16 John C. Merrill, The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy (New 
York: Freedom House, 1990), 60.  
17 In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 
and Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court placed the speech and press clauses of the 
First Amendment together, or used them interchangeably. 
18 In Near, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); New York Times v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); and Cox v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court related the press clause to 
the democratic mission of the institutional media. 
19 Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978); and Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) are examples of instances when the Court declined to extend 
rights to journalists that go beyond those available to others. 
20 Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967); and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) represent instances when the Court incorporated 
considerations of journalistic practices and processes into its deliberations. 
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 Much like the Court’s justices, legal scholars have debated the meaning and 
value of the press clause. They have discussed whether the clause was the result of 
redundant wording or a deliberate choice by the Framers.21 Scholars have debated 
whether the clause was created to protect the press as an industry,22 the act of any 
person communicating through a form of media,23 or the media as entity that acts as an 
independent watch on government.24 Legal scholars have also debated in particular law 
professor Jerome Barron’s access theory of the press clause, which argues that the 
clause was created to protect the public from government and private actions that limit 
the ability of people to express ideas.25  
 The move from the mass-media era to the network society is the fundamental 
dynamic driving this dissertation’s examination of the press clause and its future. That 
shift in paradigms is characterized by the move from the mass-media model of 
communication — in which a few communicators send messages to large, relatively 
inactive audiences — to an era in which communication is many-to-many, many-to-
few, few-to-few, and few-to-many, and audiences are active and interactive.26 Castells 
wrote, “What makes this revolution unique is how knowledge generation and 
information devices allow us to create a feedback loop that creates, uses and supports 
                                                
21 Nimmer, “Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy,” 640; Pownell, “Defamation and the 
Nonmedia Speaker, 201-202; Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” Hastings Law Journal 26 (1975): 633-
634. 
22 Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 633. 
23 Nimmer, “Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy,” 650-651. 
24 C. Edwin Baker, “The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law,” 
Hofstra Law Review 35 (2007): 959-960. 
25 Jerome A. Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom? (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Press, 1973): 
67. 
26 Castells, Communication Power, 55; Singer, “Journalism and Digital Technologies, 220; 
Bruce H. Westley and Malcolm S. MacLean, “A Conceptual Model for Communication Research,” 
Journalism Quarterly 34 (1957): 35-38. 
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innovation in a continuous way.”27 The revolution Castells spoke of is seen as the result 
of massive technological changes, mainly the availability of personal-computing 
devices and access to a worldwide system of networks.28 The technologies and 
convergence culture relating to them have placed information, and the ability to produce 
it, interact with it, and share it, in the hands of people who in previous generations had 
no access to the means of significant mediated communication. Castells has argued that 
the emergence of the network era has signaled the creation of a new social structure that 
is characterized by the transformation of time and space, a weakening of traditional 
socializing institutions (including the media), and constant availability of information.29 
The shift has, in a sense, placed a press in the hands of anyone with a computer and an 
Internet connection.  
The Supreme Court and the Press Clause 
 It was not until the 1960s and seventies that the Supreme Court turned 
substantial attention to the press clause.30 Certainly, issues regarding free press emerged 
well before this time period. The Alien and Sedition Acts, passed in 1798, made it 
illegal to “write, print, utter or publish” information against the government.31 Cases 
related to the acts, however, never reached the Supreme Court.32 Also, until the 
Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868, press-clause questions that emanated from 
                                                
27 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 31. 
28 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New 
York: Picador, 2007); Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New 
York: New York University Press, 2006), 2-3. 
29 Castells, Communication Power, 51; Manuel Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-
Power in the Network Society,” International Journal of Communication 1 (2007): 239-240. 
30 Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 632. 
31 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of 
Security Crises (Jerusalem, Israel: Law School of Hebrew University, 1987), 2. 
32 Stewart, “Or of the Press, 632. 
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the states were ruled as being outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.33 Early 
twentieth-century cases, such as Schenck v. United States34 and Abrams v. United 
States,35 both in 1919, considered the constitutionality of the Espionage Act, which 
made it illegal to “utter, print, write, or publish” information that was abusive to the 
United States government, Constitution, flag, or armed forces.36 The Court, however, 
did not address these as press cases. Instead, the questions relating to the leaflets in the 
cases were seen as dealing with speech rights rather than press rights. As Justice Potter 
Stewart asserted, even as late as in the decades leading to the 1960s and seventies, “The 
Court was seldom asked to define the rights and privileges, or the responsibilities, of the 
organized press.”37 
 The attention the press clause received in the second half of the twentieth 
century resulted from the shifting role of journalism during the time period. Journalists 
started to take a more aggressive role in questioning political authority.38 The first 
Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting was awarded in 1964.39 News outlets were 
covering controversial topics, and in many cases, reflecting the nation’s skepticism 
about governmental decisions regarding issues such as the Civil Rights movement, 
Vietnam War, and Watergate scandal. Journalism historian Michael Schudson 
characterized the sixties as the time when the “adversary culture” between journalists 
                                                
33 Stewart, “Or of the Press, 632; In Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), the 
Supreme Court determined that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. 
34 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
35 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
36 Brennan, The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence, 4. 
37 Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 632 
38 Daniel C. Hallin, “The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political Support: A Critique of the 
Thesis of an Oppositional Media,” The Journal of Politics 46, no. 2 (1984): 2. 
39 The Pulitzer Prizes, “Past Winners & Finalists by Category,” http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat 
(accessed 9 Oct. 2012). 
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and government officials emerged.40 Increasingly, Schudson asserted, “News 
emphasized policy divisions and conflicts in Washington.”41 As journalists pushed, 
challenged, investigated, and reported on government activities, they tested the 
boundaries of their rights. Government officials started to focus on “news management” 
and new regulations were passed to limit media access.42 
 As a result of the adversarial relationships between journalists and government 
officials that grew sharper in the sixties and seventies, a steady flow of press-clause-
related cases worked their way to the Supreme Court. From this period, and a few cases 
before and after it, four general principles regarding the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the clause can be seen as most influential: (1) the speech and press clauses are either 
interchangeable or overlapping protections; (2) the press clause was created to halt prior 
restraints and government threats toward the press; (3) the press clause does not provide 
journalists with any more or fewer access rights or protections than other citizens; and 
(4) journalistic norms and practices should inform how the press clause is interpreted. 
While each of these principles carries strong case and legal-scholarship support, it is 
important to emphasize that they are not all necessarily mutually exclusive. Single cases 
often apply or emphasize more than one of the four principles. They are, however, 
valuable in understanding different ways the Court has viewed the press clause and in 
informing discussions of how the Court should interpret the press clause in the network 
era. 
                                                
40 Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers (New 
York: Basic Books, 1978), 163-164. 
41 Michael Schudson and Susan E. Tifft, “American Journalism in Historical Perspective,” in 
The Press, eds. Geneva Overholser and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 31. 
42 Schudson, Discovering the News, 163. 
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Press and Speech: Interchangeable, Overlapping, or Individual? 
 Legal scholars have lamented the Court’s failure to clearly discern how the press 
clause is different than the speech clause in terms of First Amendment jurisprudence.43 
Most of the Court’s decisions that deal with press issues include little or no indication 
regarding how the two clauses are different or if the Court views them as being 
different. Instead of defining the clauses, the Court has often chosen to use them 
together, referring to the freedoms of speech and press generally as First Amendment 
protections, or referring to the issue in question as simply a matter of freedom of 
expression. None of these tendencies, however, is helpful in clarifying how the Court 
differentiates between the two clauses. Legal scholar Melville Nimmer highlighted that 
the Court’s problems in this area are best seen in defamation cases, such as New York 
Times v. Sullivan,44 decided in 1964, and Gertz v. Welch,45 from 1974. In Sullivan, an 
Alabama city commissioner argued that he was defamed by an advertisement in The 
New York Times titled “Heed the Rising Voices.”46 The Court ruled unanimously that a 
public figure must prove actual malice in order to establish the degree of fault required 
in order for a libel action to proceed.47 The Court declared, “We are required in this case 
to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for 
speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a 
public official.”48 Throughout the Court’s landmark decision, in which it famously 
asserted that “debate about public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
                                                
43 Nimmer, “Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy,” 647; Pownell, “Defamation and the 
Nonmedia Speaker,” 198.  
44 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
45 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
46 376 U.S. at 256. 
47 Ibid., 279-280. The Court defined actual malice as knowing information is false or acting with 
reckless disregard for whether it is factual or not.  
48 Ibid., 256. 
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open,”49 it referred to the protections of speech and press together, offering no 
indication regarding whether it viewed the clauses as having separate meanings, and, if 
they do, what those meanings might be. For example, in Sullivan, the Court declared 
that the state supreme court’s ruling in the case was “constitutionally deficient for 
failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are 
required.”50  
If the case had been one regarding a physical protest outside the courthouse in 
Montgomery, Alabama, the Court’s decision likely could more easily be understood as 
dealing with the speech clause alone. In Texas v. Johnson,51 the 1989 flag-burning case 
involving a physical protest during the Republican National Convention in Dallas, the 
Court focused in its opinion on the flag-burner’s right to free speech.52 Because the 
message in Sullivan was published in a newspaper, the question arises regarding 
whether the case was grounded more in the speech or press clause. The Court’s ruling is 
not clear, and the case’s outcome is viewed as a victory for speech and the press. 
 Gertz, also a defamation case, provides another example of the lack of clarity 
the Court has afforded regarding the differences between the speech and press clauses. 
The case considered whether the American Opinion, a magazine, defamed a lawyer for 
his role in representing the family of a young man who was shot by a Chicago police 
officer.53 In a five-to-four ruling, the Court overturned the lower court’s finding for 
Robert Welch and the American Opinion, emphasizing that Elmer Gertz was a private 
person and was more vulnerable to damage to his reputation than a public official or 
                                                
49 Ibid., 270. 
50 Ibid., 264. 
51 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
52 Ibid., 406-407.  
53 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.  
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public figure. As in Sullivan, the case centered on a print publication. Justice Lewis 
Powell started the Court’s opinion in Gertz in the same way Justice Brennan began 
Sullivan, by concluding that the case’s core questions dealt with the freedoms of speech 
and press, and made references to the concepts of speech and press together throughout 
the opinion. 54 Nimmer argued, “The ambiguity in the sweep of the Gertz damage rules 
result from the Court’s failure to acknowledge that speech and press represent two 
separate interests.”55 The pairing of the two clauses does not mean that the Court in 
these cases did not address press-related concerns. The Court has referred to “the press” 
often when considering cases that have dealt with newspaper and broadcast-related 
questions.56 These references, however, were not specifically related with the meaning 
of the press clause and how it differs from the speech clause. The justices addressed the 
rights of the press often, but mostly connected them broadly to the First Amendment 
and not specifically to the press clause.57 Another area of confusion arose from 
instances when justices referenced the speech and press clauses together, but were 
clearly referring to the press. In Curtis Publishing v. Butts, a 1967 decision, Justice John 
Harlan, writing the Court’s opinion, explained: 
The resolution of uncertainty in this area of libel actions requires, at bottom, 
some further exploration and clarification of the relationship between libel law 
and the freedom of speech and press, lest the New York Times rule become a 
talisman which gives the press constitutionally adequate protection only in a 
limited field.58 
The lack of clear definitions and differentiations regarding actual distinctive 
meanings of the speech and press clauses in a substantial line of Court precedents 
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contributes to the challenge of understanding how the Court should interpret the press 
clause in the network era. Justices’ decisions to often place the clauses together, without 
separate definitions, provides support for the argument that the two are a pair, 
dependent on one another, or mean the same thing.59 Viewing the two as a pair, and not 
as separate rights, provides support to those who argue the two were not intended to be 
interpreted separately.60 This argument is outlined more fully in the next section, which 
looks at scholarly literature regarding the press clause.  
The Press Clause as Protector of Journalism’s Democratic Mission 
 While the Court has been less than clear regarding the differences between the 
press and speech clauses in some cases, especially those dealing with defamation, it has 
provided relatively strong support in other cases for the position that the press clause’s 
primary purpose is to protect journalism’s democratic mission. Near v. Minnesota,61 
which in 1931 addressed a law that allowed prior restraints on “nuisance” publications, 
provides one of the strongest examples of this approach to the press clause.62 State 
officials utilized the nuisance law to bring suit against Jay Near’s Saturday Press 
newspaper.63 The officials sought to halt the publication indefinitely because of its 
attacks on local officials, local media outlets, and members of the Jewish community. 
The Court ruled that the state law was unconstitutional because prior restraints on 
publication violated the First Amendment.64 As in other examples outlined in the 
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previous section of this chapter, Chief Justice Charles Hughes mentioned speech and 
press protections together often during the first parts of the Court’s opinion. He 
emphasized, for example, that the freedoms of speech and press are not absolute.65 Later 
in the opinion, however, he spoke specifically about the press clause. He contended that 
“liberty, in each of its phases, has its history and connotation and, in the present 
instance, the inquiry is as to the historic conception of the liberty of the press.”66 The 
question Justice Hughes focused on in Near was whether prior restraints on publications 
violate the press clause.67 He was specific about the press clause, and did not mention 
the speech clause. Justice Hughes wrote that the press clause’s “chief purpose” is to 
protect the media from prior restraints.68  
 The Near ruling is especially stark as an example of the Court’s view of the 
press clause when it is viewed in context with other free-expression cases during this 
time period. In 1919, the Supreme Court upheld the Espionage Act of 1917 in two 
different landmark cases.69 The Espionage Act made it a crime to make false statements 
with the intent to interfere with the success of the military.70 The act was amended in 
1918 to include uttering, printing, writing, or publishing disloyal or “scurrilous” 
language. In another First Amendment-related case, the Court upheld a New York 
criminal-anarchy law that limited anti-government speech in 1925.71 Two years later the 
Court unanimously upheld a California law against advocating criminal acts.72 In 1931, 
in Near, however, the Court drew the line at prior restraint. While the Court had upheld 
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state and federal laws that punished certain types of speech in a variety of relatively 
recent cases, it struck down Minnesota’s law, and when it drew the line, it emphasized 
that the Minnesota law violated the press clause. 
 Forty years after Near, the Court’s strongly worded opinion in New York Times 
v. United States, popularly referred to as the Pentagon Papers case, provided additional 
support for the argument that the Court understands the press clause as protecting media 
outlets from prior restraints so they can carry out their missions in a democratic 
society.73 The New York Times acquired a classified history of the Vietnam conflict 
from former military analyst and RAND Corporation employee Daniel Ellsberg and 
started publishing stories using the documents in 1971.74 After three days of stories in 
the Times, the government obtained an injunction against further publication. In the 
resulting case, the justices determined that the government’s concerns regarding 
publication of classified documents did not overcome the “heavy presumption” against 
constitutional validity that any form of prior restraint bears when it comes before the 
Court.75 In his concurrence in the per curium opinion, Justice Hugo Black emphasized 
that the injunction against publishing the Pentagon Papers halted “the publication of 
current news of vital importance to the people of this country.”76 He contended that the 
press receives First Amendment protection so it can fulfill an “essential role in our 
democracy.”77 That protection, Justice Black argued, means safety from censorship, 
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prior restraints, and injunctions from the government.78 Finally, Black related the value 
of press protection and the media’s democratic mission by emphasizing: 
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in 
government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the 
duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and 
sending them off to distant land to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and 
shell.79 
 
It is noteworthy that the speech clause played almost no role in Justice Black’s 
concurring opinion. The clause arose only in general listings of First Amendment rights, 
and Justice Black did not pair speech and press clauses in his emphatic statements 
regarding journalism’s role in democratic society. It is also important to highlight that 
Justice Black specifically characterized the press clause as a protection for the media 
industry.   
 Similar support for this connection between the press clause, the media industry, 
and the democratic mission of journalism can be seen in Cox v. Cohn, a 1975 ruling.80 
The case focused on the constitutionality of a Georgia law that made it illegal to publish 
the name of a rape victim. A television reporter learned the name of a rape victim using 
publicly available court documents during the trial for the assault and murder of the 
victim. In finding the Georgia law unconstitutional, the Court’s opinion focused on the 
democratic function of the press. By “press” the Court appeared to be referring to 
traditional media, which the justices indicated serve a vital role in society.81 The Court 
determined, “Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our 
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the 
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administration of government generally.”82 The Court also emphasized that the 
government should have no role in criminalizing the free exchange of publically 
available information in a democratic society.83 Instead, the justices continued by 
asserting that the First Amendment protects “the public interest in a vigorous press.”84  
 The Court, much as was seen in the previous section, has not always been clear 
regarding how it understands the press clause. While cases such as Near and New York 
Times v. United States provide robust arguments for the value of a free press in a 
democratic society, the definition of who or what constitutes the press varies from case 
to case. In the Near and the Pentagon Papers decisions, newspapers were at the center 
of the cases, and therefore were well connected to the press clause. In Mills v. Alabama, 
a 1966 decision that involved a state law that criminalized political endorsements in 
newspapers, the connection between the media and the press clause was less clear. In 
striking down the law, Justice Black wrote, “No test of reasonableness can save a state 
law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment when that law makes it a 
crime for a newspaper editor to do no more than urge people to vote one way or another 
in a publicly held election.”85 While this portion of the decision supports press-clause 
protections for media outlets, Justice Black complicated the boundaries of the press 
clause in other parts of the opinion. He defined the press clause as protecting books, 
magazines, leaflets, and circulars.86 He contended that many types of published work 
play a role in informing individuals in a democratic society.87 A similarly broad 
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argument regarding the meaning of the press clause as it relates to the democratic 
mission of the press emerged from the Court’s opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, in 1972. 
The Court characterized the question before it as whether reporters were protected from 
testifying before grand juries by the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment.88 
While the Court ruled that the First Amendment did not protect journalists from 
revealing information to grand juries, Justice Byron White, writing for the Court, 
provided further insight regarding the press clause. He argued that the liberty of the 
press applies as much to “the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a 
mimeograph”89 as it does to “the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest 
photocomposition methods.”90 In the same passage, Justice White wrote that freedom of 
the press is a “fundamental right which is not confined to newspapers and 
periodicals.”91 Instead, he argued the right applies to any kind of publication that carries 
information. He listed lecturers, novelists, scholars, and dramatists as people who 
contribute to public debate and knowledge.92  
 While the cases above provide relatively strong support for the principle that the 
Court viewed the press clause as a protection for the flow of information in a 
democratic society, conflicts arose regarding whom the press clause protects. Justice 
White’s considerations, as well as his assertions in Mills, characterized the press 
clause’s protections as applying to anyone who contributed information to public 
discussion in democratic society. Those perspectives lend support to the idea that the 
press clause is not reserved solely for the media industry, and relate to questions 
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regarding how the Supreme Court should interpret the press clause in the network era. 
The reasoning in Branzburg and Mills conflicts with what is seen in cases such as Near, 
Cox, and New York Times v. United States, in which the Court related the press clause 
to media practitioners. The decisions in Branzburg and Mills, however, included 
conceptualizations by the Court suggesting many other forms of media contribute to 
deliberation in society. Thus, while the Court has never been clear about who the press 
clause was designed to protect, the justices have consistently communicated that they 
value the press clause’s role in a democratic society.  
No More and No Less Rights for Journalists 
 Beginning with Branzburg, the Court heard several cases in a relatively short 
time period (mostly from 1972 until 1980) that explored whether the press clause 
extended to protecting the right of access to information and provided protections from 
government searches and inquiries. The outcome of this line of cases was a relatively 
consistent conclusion from the Court that the press clause does not provide journalists 
any more or any fewer rights than other citizens. This line of decisions is especially 
important when considering the extent to which the network-society era has blurred the 
lines between journalists and citizen publishers. In fact, in Branzburg, Justice White 
outlined the difficulties with defining who qualified as a journalist, and used those 
problems as a support for his position that the press clause did not protect journalists 
from testifying before grand juries.93  
Paul Branzburg was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal in Kentucky. 
In two instances he wrote stories using unnamed, confidential sources, regarding illegal 
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drug production and use.94 He was summoned by grand juries after the stories were 
published, and in both cases, he declined to reveal his sources, arguing he had a 
Constitutional right to protect their anonymity. In deciding the case, the Court 
considered whether the speech and press clauses protected journalists from testifying 
before grand juries.95 In what Justice Stewart, who dissented in the case, called a four-
and-a-half to four-and-a-half ruling, the Court narrowly ruled that the First Amendment 
does not protect reporters from being compelled to reveal sources before grand juries.96 
As part of its opinion, the Court considered the problems involved with identifying who 
qualifies as a reporter, contending, “Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define 
those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable 
procedure.”97 The Court continued in the passage by contending that the press clause 
was for everyone, not simply for journalists, and that many people would argue their 
work contributed to the flow of information, and therefore should be protected from 
appearing before a grand jury.98  
The Court also indicated in Branzburg that it understood the press clause as 
stopping short of providing reporters privileges that extend to the news-gathering 
process. In the opinion, the Court emphasized that requiring reporters to respond to 
questions from grand juries did not place prior restraints on the media or command 
journalists to publish certain information.99 By emphasizing that point, the Court 
reinforced the principle that the press clause acted as a protection against government 
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restraints, and at the same time showed that justices saw a line between those 
restrictions and going further to offer reporters protections for the newsgathering 
process. The Court emphasized that journalists are citizens and that citizens are not 
made immune by any part of the Constitution from appearing before grand juries.100 
The Court wrote, “It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every 
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or 
criminal statues of general applicability.”101 Scholars have identified those passages as 
key components to understanding the principle that the press clause does not provide 
rights to reporters that beyond those of other citizens.102 
 It is important, however, to emphasize that Branzburg also produced one of the 
Court’s most famous and most influential concurring opinions. Justice Powell joined the 
five-justice majority on the judgment in the case, but wrote separately in his 
concurrence to emphasize that in a similar case with somewhat different facts he would 
have considered granting a limited privilege for journalists to protect their sources.103 
Justice Powell wrote, “The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify 
before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of 
news or in safeguarding their sources.”104 He emphasized that the Court’s historically 
robust protections of First Amendment freedoms would assure the media were not 
mistreated in regard to government subpoenas.105 Since that time, some lower courts 
have relied upon Powell’s concurring opinion to allow journalists protection from 
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revealing sources, particularly in cases not involving grand juries as Branzburg did.106 
Further, the Court has never acted to overrule that practice by lower courts. Thus, even 
though the Branzburg judgment did not support an understanding of the press clause as 
offering rights to journalists beyond those of other citizens, its practical effect has been 
to suggest that in some contexts such rights do exist.  
Branzburg was not the only press-clause-related case that divided justices in this 
area. Nearly all of the landmark cases have been one-vote decisions.107 All three of the 
cases that deal with access for reporters to prison facilities — Saxbe v. Washington 
Post, Pell v. Procunier, and Houchins v. KQED — were decided by one-vote majorities 
that interpreted the press clause as not extending journalists’ rights beyond those of 
other citizens. And, as with Branzburg, two main principles arose in the decisions: 
forcing journalists to have the same rights as others does not create a prior restraint or 
otherwise impede the media’s work and journalists should have the same rights as other 
citizens. Despite his strong dissent two years earlier in Branzburg, Justice Stewart wrote 
the Court’s opinions in Saxbe and Pell.108 In both cases, which were handed down on 
the same day in 1974, journalists contested the constitutionality of prison policies that 
prohibited members of the media from conducting interviews with specific inmates.109 
In Saxbe, Justice Stewart argued that a ban on all interviews with prison inmates would 
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violate First Amendment press freedoms, but emphasized that under the prison policy, 
journalists were still able to gather information from inmates by conducting interviews 
through the mail or through an inmate’s attorney. 110 Importantly, Justice Stewart 
postulated that “the policy is applied with an even hand to all prospective visitors, 
including newsmen, who, like other members of the public, may enter the prisons to 
visit friends or family members.”111 Justice Stewart drew from the Court’s ruling in 
Branzburg to contend in the Pell decision that limiting access to specific prisoners did 
not constitute a violation of the press clause.112 Justice Stewart finished his opinion in 
Pell by emphasizing:  
The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from interfering in any 
way with a free press. The Constitution does not, however, require government 
to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the 
public generally.113 
 
The Court’s opinion in Houchins, a 1978 case that dealt with reporters’ access to 
jail inmates, included a similarly phrased understanding regarding the line between 
press protections and news-gathering rights. The Court declared, “The Constitution 
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”114 In the Pell 
opinion, the Court highlighted this exact conflict by emphasizing that the reporters did 
not claim that the government was impairing their right to publish. Instead, they 
claimed the policy limited their right to gather news without government interference.115 
In asserting the difference between the two rights, the Court detailed different stories 
journalists were still free to write regarding prisons, and contended that the only real 
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change caused by the prison’s policy was that journalists’ access to face-to-face 
interviews with specific inmates was limited. 
 The Court’s opinion in Houchins stood on Justice Stewart’s opinions for the 
Court in Pell and Saxbe. In Houchins, journalists sought access to a specific area in a 
county jail to do a story regarding how inmates were being treated and their 
psychological conditions.116 The jail declined to allow the journalists in alone, but 
organized jail tours for groups of twenty-five. The tours did not include a portion of the 
jail where a prisoner had committed suicide. The Court upheld the jail’s actions by 
reinforcing the distinction between protecting the press from government restraints and 
extending to reporters First Amendment-related rights of access. The Court found that 
the First Amendment protects “the freedom of the media to communicate information 
once it is obtained,” and that it does not compel “the government to provide the media 
with information or access to it on demand.”117  
 Finally, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, which was decided in the same year as 
Houchins, provided another angle regarding the Court’s argument that journalists 
should have no greater rights than other citizens. Law enforcement officials acquired a 
search warrant for the Stanford Daily newspaper’s office after the publication ran 
photographs from a violent hospital protest. Officers were attacked and injured in the 
protest and the vantage point from which the photographs in the newspaper were taken 
indicated to law enforcement officials that the newspaper might have unpublished 
images that would identify the attackers.118 The newspaper staff argued the search 
violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights because additional considerations 
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must be taken into account when the search includes a newspaper.119 The Court ruled 
five-to-three that newspapers should not receive protections from legally executed 
searches.120 The newspaper argued that newsroom searches would disrupt timely 
production, endanger access to sources of confidential information, deter journalists 
from preserving notebooks and negatives, inhibit internal editorial deliberations, and 
encourage the press to self-censor.121 The Court argued the attention in a search warrant 
should be based in its reasonability, not on the property owner, and that it saw no reason 
why a newsroom should receive different protections than other places. In this sense, 
the Court outlined a slightly different incarnation of the principle that journalists should 
not receive greater protections than others.122 Justice Stewart, in his dissent, argued 
newsrooms should have an extra layer of protection from searches because he feared 
that they would burden the freedom of the press by interrupting time-sensitive writing, 
editing, and publishing cycles.123 He also argued that the press clause isolated a single 
institution in the United States as deserving extra protection. He wrote, “Our 
Constitution does not explicitly protect the practice of medicine or the business of 
banking from all abridgment by government. It does explicitly protect freedom of the 
press.”124 While the Court in Zurcher further supported the dominant argument that was 
found in Branzburg, Saxbe, Pell, and Houchins, that members of the press should have 
no greater rights, protections, or means of access than other citizens, Justice Stewart 
offered a strong opposing argument in that he understood the press clause as outlining 
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rights for journalists that went beyond those of other citizens. His view of the press 
clause, however, has never been supported by a majority of the Court, and his own 
opinions for the Court in Pell and Saxbe appear to conflict with or at least limit this 
view. 
The Supreme Court and Journalistic Practices and Processes 
 The Supreme Court has often included careful examinations of journalistic 
norms and practices when considering press-cause issues. Ties can be seen between the 
Court’s deliberations regarding the press clause and journalistic processes as interpreted 
by the justices. The ties are evident in a variety of ways in key press-clause precedents, 
including cases regarding defamation claims,125 information access,126 newsroom 
searches,127 and right-to-reply laws.128  
Journalistic practices were at the center of the Curtis Publishing ruling,129 which 
established the standard that “public figures,” people who are well known nationally or 
in their communities, must meet to win libel cases.130 Curtis Publishing centered around 
a story published in the Saturday Evening Post, a weekly magazine, that accused 
University of Georgia Athletic Director Wally Butts of “conspiring to fix” his team’s 
annual football game against the University of Alabama. The story accused Butts of 
giving all of the Georgia football team’s plans and plays to Alabama coach Paul Bryant. 
The primary source in the article was an Atlanta insurance salesman who said he 
overheard a portion of a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts sued for 
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libel, arguing the “magazine had departed greatly from the standards of good 
investigation and reporting and that this was especially reprehensible, amounting to 
reckless and wanton conduct, in light of the devastating nature of the article’s 
assertions.”131 The Court, in a five-to-four ruling, found the Post had shown a reckless 
disregard for the truth, meeting the standard for actual malice that was developed in 
Sullivan, which made it possible for Butts to win his libel claim. The Court’s opinion 
focused on Butts’s claim that the Post departed from proper journalistic conduct. The 
Court, in the final thesis portion of its opinion, stated: 
A “public figure” who is not a public official may also recover damages for 
defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation 
apparent on showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme 
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to 
by responsible publishers.132 
 
The Court went on to explain that deficiencies in the reporting led to harm to 
Butts. The opinion listed numerous areas where the Post erred or departed from the 
justices’ understandings of journalistic norms. It outlined that the publication printed the 
story despite misgivings regarding the reliability of its primary source and without 
verifying its information with others.133 The Post also assigned the story to a reporter 
who had limited knowledge of football and failed to consult with others who knew 
about the sport before submitting the story. 
In Curtis Publishing, the Court incorporated journalistic maxims such as 
verification, research, truth, and the use of sources, with the Court’s actual-malice 
standard, which was created in Sullivan as a requirement for public officials to prevail 
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in libel actions and extended to public figures in the Curtis Publishing ruling.134 Actual 
malice, the Court established in Sullivan, means knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for whether published information is true or not.135 Curtis Publishing 
provided a stronger definition and connection than Sullivan regarding how journalistic 
practices relate, in the Court’s eyes, to the press clause’s protections. The Court wrote, 
“It is the conduct element, therefore, on which we must principally focus if we are 
successfully to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions and the freedom of 
speech and press.”136 To the Court, the conduct of journalists, within boundaries largely 
set by the field’s practitioners, can be used to interpret the actual-malice standard in 
defamation cases. 
In Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo and Herbert v. Lando, both cases that 
were decided after Curtis Publishing, the Court continued to incorporate journalistic 
practices with decisions that related to the press clause. In both of these cases, the Court 
primarily focused on editorial decision-making, providing a dividing line between 
where the press clause protected editorial processes and where it did not. Tornillo 
examined the constitutionality of a state “right of reply” law that required media outlets 
to allow people to respond to accusations about them. Pat Tornillo was running for 
public office when editorials in the Herald questioned his decision-making and actions 
he had taken in past public-service roles. Tornillo, referring to the right-of-reply law, 
demanded the Herald print his response, verbatim, to the accusations, but the 
newspaper declined to comply with his request.137 The Court, in a unanimous decision, 
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struck down the Florida law. In doing so, Court supported the idea that justices viewed 
editorial decision-making as a protected area of journalistic work. The opinion showed 
the Court recognized that journalists exercise certain processes in reporting and 
disseminating information, and that the government should have no influence on those 
processes.138 The Court argued that “any such compulsion to publish that which ‘reason 
tells them should not be published’ is unconstitutional.”139 Later in the opinion, the 
Court asserted that the Florida law “fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment 
because of its intrusion into the function of editors.”140 The decision also defined a 
newspaper as more than a “receptacle” for information, explaining that journalists make 
careful decisions based on understandings of public issues, public officials, and space 
and time limitations.141 The case provided relatively strong support for the idea that the 
Court incorporates its understandings of journalistic practices when it considers the 
meaning of the press clause. 
The Court considered editorial decision-making in a different way in Herbert, a 
case that involved Anthony Herbert, a retired Army officer who accused his superior 
officers of covering up war crimes while he was serving in Vietnam.142 CBS did a story 
about Herbert, which he argued falsely portrayed him fabricating stories about war 
crimes because he was relieved of command. Herbert contended the story also damaged 
the value of his forthcoming book.143 Following the Sullivan and Curtis Publishing 
precedents, Herbert sought to prove the journalists had displayed a reckless disregard 
                                                
138 Ibid., 256. 
139 Ibid.  
140 Ibid., 258. 
141 Ibid. 
142 441 U.S. at 155. 
143 Ibid., 156. 
 
 30 
for the truth. To do so, Herbert’s attorneys deposed Lando regarding his editorial 
decision-making processes, but Lando declined to answer questions regarding his 
decision-making process, arguing that the First Amendment protected him from 
disclosing such information.144 The Court ruled six-to-three in favor of Herbert, finding 
the First Amendment went as far as protecting journalists from government restraints on 
publication, but halted at protecting them from responding to questions regarding their 
state of mind when making journalistic deliberations.145 The Court acknowledged 
journalists’ concerns, and in doing so supported principles that emerged from Tornillo 
regarding how the Court viewed editorial thinking. The Court showed sensitivity toward 
CBS’s concerns that “frank discussion among reporters and editors will be dampened 
and sound editorial judgment endangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject 
to inquiry by defamation plaintiffs.”146 While these concerns were not understood by 
the Court as substantial enough to change the course of its decision, they support the 
idea that the Court considers how journalists do their work when making rulings. 
Herbert, especially when thought of with Tornillo, provided another layer of 
understanding regarding how the Court has related journalistic practices to the press 
clause. 
Further support for this concept can be found in the Court’s analyses of 
journalists’ information-gathering processes and needs for accurate information. The 
Court debated the value of in-person interviews in Saxbe, which stemmed from a 
Federal Bureau of Prisons policy that prohibited in-person interviews between 
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journalists and specifically requested inmates.147 While the Court ruled five-to-four to 
uphold the policy, its opinion, and Justice Powell’s thoughtful dissent, include a careful 
look at the journalistic practice of interviews. The Court found that the prison policy did 
not stop journalists from conducting “brief interviews with any inmates they 
encounter.”148 It also argued the policy did not stop journalists from conducting letter-
based interviews with inmates. In his dissent, Justice Powell found considerable 
problems with the Court’s understanding of what constituted an interview. Justice 
Powell outlined the differences between conversations and interviews, arguing that 
conversations were spontaneous and did not afford for privacy, a one-on-one focus, or 
preparation time for the journalist.149 In contrast, Justice Powell defined an interview as 
a “prearranged private meeting with a specifically designated inmate. It is unrestricted 
as to subject matter and lasts a sufficient time period to permit full discussion.”150 
Justice Powell went on to explain the importance of interviews to journalists. He argued 
that “personal interviews are crucial to effective reporting . . . [and] a newsman depends 
on interviews in much the same way that a trial attorney relies on cross-examination.”151 
He identified the interaction that occurs between reporters and sources during in-person 
interviews, and asserted that the value of follow-up questions as well as the ability to 
make requests for immediate clarification of information provided by a source. Justice 
Powell acknowledged that “newsmen are reluctant to publish a story without an 
opportunity through face-to-face discussion to evaluate the veracity and reliability of a 
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source.”152 In his argument, Justice Powell touched on journalistic values such as 
accuracy, truth, and source evaluation. He found the practice of in-person interviews to 
provide a unique dynamic that carried with it, as a journalistic process, tools that helped 
journalists gather and evaluate information. In his dissent, Justice Powell argued the 
press clause was endangered when these practices of the press were limited.153 
Interviews were not the only information-gathering tool the Court addressed. 
The Court focused on the need for the media to freely report on information found in 
the public record in Cox, a case in which the Court struck down a Georgia law that 
made it illegal to report the name of sexual assault victims.154 The case stemmed from a 
television report that used a publicly available court record to obtain and report the 
name of a rape victim. Beyond finding that the First Amendment protects reporters from 
being penalized for reporting publicly available information, the Court emphasized the 
importance of truth and accuracy in reporting. The Court wrote, “Great responsibility is 
accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings 
of government, and official records and documents open to the pubic are the basic data 
of government operations.”155 In that sense, by considering journalistic routines, the 
Court related an understanding that the press clause protects the democratic function of 
the media in society. 
 Broadly, the final principle from the Court’s rulings regarding the press clause 
indicated that the way journalism defines itself, through its values and practices, could 
influence how the Court defines journalism, and the press clause itself, in future rulings. 
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With this in mind, the ways that professional journalism adapts to changes created by 
the network society as well as the ways in which citizen journalists adopt the values and 
practices of journalists can be expected to be factors in the way journalistic norms are 
viewed by the Court in the future.  
Legal Scholars and the Press Clause: Redundancy, Preference, and Access 
 Legal scholars have consistently indicated, regardless of their varying 
conclusions regarding the press clause’s meaning, that one of the great challenges in 
understanding the clause is that the authors of the First Amendment were not clear 
regarding the clause’s intended meaning or the scope of its protections.156 Legal scholar 
David Lange acknowledged, “The Framers left us language in the First Amendment 
which justifies the present debate — language which, under almost any view one takes, 
is less than clear.”157 Legal scholars have examined the Court’s decisions and have, in 
many ways, come to different conclusions regarding the meaning of the press clause.158 
They have carefully considered whether the press clause is a redundancy to the speech 
clause, or a deliberate, distinct part of the rights created by the Framers. Examining both 
of these veins of thought from legal scholars, as well as considering the access theory 
that was advanced by Barron, provides insights into how legal scholars have viewed the 
press clause in the past and how it might be understood in the future. 
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The Press Clause: Redundancy or Distinct Right? 
Justice Stewart, in a law article that was published during the height of the 
Court’s focus on the press clause in the 1970s, provided one of the most-complete 
articulations regarding the clause’s meaning when he explained that the press clause 
was not a redundancy to the speech clause, and that it was created to protect the media 
as an industry.159 He wrote, “The Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. 
The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given 
explicit constitutional protection. This basic understanding is essential.”160 In Justice 
Stewart’s view, the clause was an institutional protection. He explained that most of the 
rights in the First Amendment relate to personal protections.161 He also argued that 
because the press clause references a specific industry, its protections belong to the 
press and not to the people. If the press clause was interpreted as belonging to the 
people, he contended, it would be a redundancy with the speech clause.162 To Justice 
Stewart, a reporter who wrote a story and published it utilized his or her free-speech 
rights, just like any other person who communicates a message.163 Yet, Justice Stewart 
wrote that the press clause is not “simply freedom of speech for reporters.”164 He 
contended that the clause’s purpose is to “create a fourth institution outside the 
government as an additional check on the three official branches.”165 To Justice Stewart, 
the press clause was not created to protect the journalist’s messages; it was written to 
guard the media industry from governmental prior restraints and other intrusions. 
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Justice Stewart’s institutional approach has been utilized as the foundation of a 
substantial number of subsequent examinations of the press clause within legal 
scholarship. Nimmer supported and expanded on Justice Stewart’s view when he 
examined the fundamental question the Court has struggled with in many of its 
decisions: “Is any freedom conferred upon ‘the press’ by the freedom of the press clause 
which would not be available to it (as well as nonmedia speakers) by the freedom of 
speech clause?”166 To answer his question, Nimmer differentiated between the press and 
speech clauses by explaining that the press clause protects the media’s role in providing 
information to citizens so they can take part in deliberation in democratic society.167 
The speech clause, he argued, does not play much of a role in that area. Instead, the 
speech clause provides protection for self-fulfillment and creates a safety-valve function 
in that people feel free to express their views.168 By conceptualizing the press clause as 
protecting the media’s ability to provide information to a democratic society, Nimmer’s 
conclusion overlapped with Justice Stewart’s understandings. Importantly, Nimmer 
found that the functions of the press and speech clauses often intersect or have 
commonalities that cause the Court consider them together.169 Similarly, First 
Amendment scholar Edwin Baker contended that speech rights protect personal 
autonomy and the liberty to act, while press rights safeguard the media industry in a 
democratic society.170 Legal scholar David Anderson, who conducted an extensive 
investigation of how the idea of a press-protecting clause in the First Amendment 
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evolved, concluded the authors viewed the clause as a distinct and important element 
for protecting their vision of a government for and by the people.171 
Other legal scholars have found weaknesses in Justice Stewart’s institutional 
approach to the press clause, and have questioned how the press clause can be seen as 
different from the speech clause if it does not provide any rights for journalists beyond 
those enjoyed by others. Scholars who examine the clause from this perspective have 
focused on cases such as Branzburg, Saxbe, and Zurcher as examples. Anthony Fargo, a 
media-law scholar, emphasized that the Court has consistently argued that both speech 
and press rights are for individuals, not a specific institution or group of practitioners.172 
In this sense, the speech and press rights are viewed as interconnected rights. Margaret 
Blanchard, a First Amendment historian, observed, “Freedom of the press is almost 
universally measured by the standard of what the general public could do in a like 
situation.”173 From her perspective, the Court has consistently seen the press clause as 
an extension of the speech clause, because when freedom of speech has been granted to 
individuals, it has been granted to the press.174 She found one exception to that rule: “If 
the protection sought by the press for its activities is not identical with the protection 
granted the public in a like situation, the Court will be sympathetic if, and only if, a 
distinct benefit will accrue to the public from such a decision.”175 Blanchard concluded 
that journalists should focus their efforts on widening the rights of everyone to have 
access to information and to communicate, because expanding the rights of everyone 
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was the best route through which the interests of journalism would be served. With 
these ideas in mind, Blanchard contended that the press should not argue for privileges 
that would have the press clause viewed as an institutional protection, such as Justice 
Stewart and other legal scholars posited.  
Blanchard was not alone in finding problems with the institutional approach. 
Lange explained that in Justice Stewart’s conceptualization of the press clause, it is 
difficult to define which forms of communication would qualify as the institutional 
press, and therefore receive the press-clause protections.176 Furthermore, Lange wrote 
that if the press clause provides members of the institutional press unique rights “it 
seems equally clear that it can do so only at the expense of individual interests which 
have long been protected.”177 In other words, if the press clause is considered unique to 
the speech clause in that certain rights are provided to the press that are not available to 
others, then some who are not identified as members of the media will, inherently, have 
fewer rights. This concern was also raised in attorney Katherine Pownell’s examination 
of how defamation law operates for media and nonmedia speakers. She contended that 
the Sullivan178 precedent extended to both media and nonmedia speakers because the 
case focused on a critique of the government and the media entity was more of a vehicle 
for the critical speech. While The New York Times was the defendant in the case, the 
litigation revolved around an advertisement that was purchased by a group that was 
seeking to raise funding and awareness for the civil rights movement in the South.179 
The Court’s ruling that the public official, Sullivan, was required to prove actual malice 
                                                
176 Lange, “The Speech and Press Clauses,” 101. 
177 Ibid., 119. 
178 376 U.S. at 254. 
179 Ibid., 256-259. 
 
 38 
focused more on speech than press protections.180 Pownell acknowledged journalism 
occupies a vital role in society, but argued individuals who share and discuss 
information on smaller scales, nonmedia speakers, also execute that mission.181 In this 
sense, she acknowledged the value of journalism but did not find that the press clause 
should be used to elevate journalists’ rights and protections beyond those of other 
communicators.182 
Pownell also addressed the practical challenges attached to interpreting the press 
clause as providing additional protections to journalists: How should “journalist” be 
defined?183 In this regard, Pownell, Lange, Blanchard, and others referred to Justice 
White’s sweeping argument in Branzburg that the liberty of the press protected a broad 
range of communication forms in society. He wrote that freedom of the press was for 
“the lonely pamphleteer” as much as it was for the “large metropolitan publisher.”184 
The passage also postulated that many other groups contributed information to members 
of society. The often-cited passage represents one of the most-explicit definitions of 
how the Court perceives the press clause, and, at the same time, highlights the difficulty 
in defining who would receive press-clause protections. Justice White’s considerations 
highlight the central problems with Justice Stewart’s institutional understanding of the 
press clause. Justice Stewart’s model did not define which groups were a part of the 
“publishing business” that he conceptualized the press clause as being created to 
protect.185 This challenge of definition is only exacerbated by the technological and 
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social changes brought about by the network society. Scholars struggled to define who 
or what deserves press-clause protections before the Internet evolved, and that remains 
important when looking to the future of the clause. Lange wrote, “Problems in 
definition, then, are the first obstacle to providing separate constitutional status for 
speech and the press.”186 He contended that if the press is defined using Justice White’s 
broader approach, the press clause will be conceived as similar to the speech clause.187  
If the press is defined more narrowly, however, lonely pamphleteers and underground 
press groups might be excluded, leaving out two of the primary groups the Framers 
would have acknowledged.188  
Access Theory and Its Day in Court 
The debate among legal scholars regarding the strengths and weaknesses of 
Justice Stewart’s institutional understanding of the press clause operate from similar 
assumptions regarding the role of the press in society and the protections the press and 
speech clauses provide. Barron’s access theory offers a substantially different reading of 
the press clause, because he asserted that it was created to ensure that individual citizens 
have access to the means of mass communication. Contrary to Justice Stewart’s 
institutional understanding, Barron argued the press clause was created for the people, 
not the press. Developed during the height of the Supreme Court’s focus on the press 
clause in the 1960s and 1970s, Barron’s access theory contends that freedom of the 
press means members of the public should have freedom to access society’s vehicles of 
mass communication.189 His theory questions the predominant interpretations of the 
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press clause and provides an alternative reading that is based on the understanding that 
individual voices can only make an impact if they are spoken through the mass media190 
and that the mass media, with its commercial interests and limited number of owners, is 
restricting the freedom of the press by limiting the voices who can be heard.191 Access 
theorists argue that the limited avenues through which members of the public can 
express their views through the press is not consistent with the intent of the authors of 
the First Amendment.192 Barron contended that partisan pamphleteering, newspapers, 
and essays represented the press during the period that the First Amendment was 
written, and, to that end, the Framers could not have envisioned the oligarchical and 
limiting media system that has evolved in the centuries since then.193 Barron wrote: 
The mass media’s development of an antipathy to ideas requires legal 
intervention if novel and unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum — 
unorthodox points of view which have no claim on broadcast time and 
newspaper space as a matter of right are in poor position to compete with those 
aired as a matter of grace.194 
 
Barron highlighted his assertion that the First Amendment had been interpreted 
as protecting expression, but the protection could only be realized for those who had 
access to the means of communication.195 He viewed the “marketplace of ideas” theory 
that was articulated in Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Abrams as a 
romanticized approach to the First Amendment.196 The view, originally discussed by 
British author John Milton, argued that the truth would emerge when placed in a free 
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and open encounter with false ideas.197 Barron argued the theory failed to account for 
nongovernmental obstacles to the spread of ideas, such as concentrated media 
ownership and focuses on economic rather than informational priorities.198 
 Barron’s solution to the problem of limited access as a result of concentrated 
commercial ownership of the media was to allow the government to intervene in the 
media to compel journalists to provide the public access to the means of mass 
communication.199 A year after his seminal work regarding access theory was 
published, Barron argued the merits of his ideas before the Supreme Court in the 
Tornillo case that was discussed earlier in this chapter. In his arguments before the 
Court, Barron focused on the foundational ideas of access theory, and postulated that 
the Florida right-of-reply law was created to enable debate about public issues.200 He 
supported his arguments with ideas from the Court’s relatively recent decisions in 
Sullivan201 and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,202 both defamation cases that focused on 
the First Amendment’s role in protecting discussion about public issues.203 Barron 
contended that political discussion could not take place effectively if only one debater 
had the megaphone power of the mass media. To this end, Barron emphasized that the 
Herald’s circulation size was much larger than any other media outlets in the area. He 
argued that for Tornillo to engage effectively in debate regarding the issues of his 
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candidacy and the criticisms raised by the editorial, he would need access to the 
Herald.204  
The Supreme Court was skeptical of Barron’s theory and ultimately voted 
unanimously to strike down the Florida right-of-reply law that the legal scholar had 
championed. At the heart of the Court’s opinion was a rebuttal of the fundamental 
assumptions of Barron’s theory. The Court wrote: 
Proponents of enforced access to the press take comfort from language in 
several of this Court’s decisions which suggest that the First Amendment acts as 
a sword as well as a shield, that it imposes obligations on the owners of the press 
in addition to protecting the press from government regulation.205 
 
The Court examined some of Barron’s arguments before determining, “However 
much validity may be found in these arguments, at each point the implementation of a 
remedy such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some mechanism, 
either government or consensual.”206 The Court found that compelling publishers to 
print that which they did not see fit to print would damage the “gloss” on the First 
Amendment that had developed throughout history. The Court also dispatched Barron’s 
argument that the concentration of media ownership required that newspapers be 
compelled to provide access to the public, explaining that newspapers were bound by 
only two factors: finding enough readers and advertisers to support their businesses and 
maintaining credibility as news sources.207  
 While the Supreme Court, in many ways, unanimously rejected the assumptions 
of access theory in its decision in Tornillo nearly forty years ago, Barron’s approach is 
still advanced in legal scholarship, and Barron has continued to develop his theory. He 
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has contended, for example, that the Internet has created greater access to forms of 
expression and debate, but media ownership trends still make the need for more formal 
access requirements necessary.208 He has also examined the Court’s more balanced 
approaches regarding access in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC209 and Denver Area 
Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, both cases that dealt with 
freedom of speech questions as they relate to cable television.210 Communication 
scholar Robert McChesney, in an article that focused on access theory in the network-
society era, argued that the massive media conglomerates that own the major news 
outlets are too focused on profits to serve people with the information they need.211 In 
doing so, he brought Barron’s concerns about ownership into a twenty-first-century 
context, and considered the future of press freedom “when the right to launch effective 
new media is non-existent in a market or effectively limited to billionaires, and the 
investors have no more interest in journalism than they do in insurance or producing 
undergarments.”212 McChesney’s solution to this concern was similar to what Barron 
concluded four decades before: the government is obligated to step in and create a press 
system that includes requirements that media companies provide access to the public.213 
McChesney argued that several factors, including technological and economic changes 
brought about by the network society, would cause the Court to readdress Barron’s 
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original question: “Freedom of the press for whom?”214 He concluded, “What the First 
Amendment means for freedom of the press is likely to be determined in the coming 
generation, and scholars, legal and communication, need to prepare for it.”215 
 Thus, the legal scholarship regarding the press clause can be divided into three 
groups: the institutional conceptualization that was put forth by Justice Stewart and 
supported by legal scholars such as Nimmer and Baker; those who argue the 
institutional understanding of the clause is unworkable;216 and Barron’s access theory, 
which contends that the press clause was intended to make the press more freely 
available to the public. Each of these areas of consideration regarding the press clause 
provide a set of theoretical assumptions that contribute to this study’s efforts to 
construct a framework for how the courts can interpret the press clause in the network-
society era. 
Journalism, Change, and the Press Clause 
One of the key areas of conflict in the Court’s deliberations and the scholarly 
literature regarding the press clause involves how journalism, or the role of a journalist, 
would be defined if the clause was interpreted as providing the media distinct rights as 
compared to those afforded by the speech clause. Fargo highlighted this conflict by 
pointing out the divergent conceptualizations of the press put forth by justices White 
and Douglas in Branzburg.217 Writing the Court’s opinion, Justice White outlined a 
broad conceptualization of journalism, in which the “press in its historic connotation 
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and 
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opinion.”218 Justice Douglas, in a dissent that starkly opposed Justice White’s 
conceptualization of the press clause, utilized a more mission-oriented approach to 
outline journalism. He wrote, “The press has a preferred position” so it can provide 
information to citizens so they can be self-governing.219 These passages from the Court 
relate closely to questions that have evolved regarding journalism’s mission and roles 
that have only intensified since the emergence of network technology. The case 
literature also indicates the Court has shown a willingness to use the practices of 
journalism, especially in defamation cases, to guide its decisions.220 For these reasons, 
examining how the Court should interpret the press clause in the twenty-first century 
requires consideration of the unique characteristics of network communication and the 
influence of the network era on journalism and its practices. In light of the Court’s past 
considerations regarding journalism’s practices, examining the ideas that underpin the 
network society and its influences on communication provides another building block in 
considering how the courts should interpret the press clause in the twenty-first century.  
Characteristics of the Network Society 
 People are using network technologies in ways that have profoundly changed 
the way they communicate.221 Castells conceptualized the shift in the way people 
communicate in the network-society era as a revolution that is, in many ways, 
comparable to what occurred during the Industrial Revolution.222 Both revolutions, he 
explained, included fundamental changes in technology, which resulted in shifts in 
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economy, society, and culture.223 The revolutions are different in that one was fueled by 
energy-related innovations, such as the steam engine and electricity, while the network 
era is characterized by information technology.224 Information, via new technologies, is 
not only being made massively available to people, but is being used to generate new 
ideas in a continuous cycle of innovation. Castells contended: 
What characterizes the current technological revolution is not the centrality of 
knowledge and information, but the application of such knowledge and 
information to knowledge generation and information/communication devices, 
in a cumulative feedback loop between innovation and the uses of innovation.225 
 
The use and generation of information by all types of people has profoundly 
influenced how the media interact with audiences and vice versa, Castells contended. In 
this sense, the network era represents a paradigmatic shift from the mass-media model 
and its assumptions about audiences, meaning, and how messages are transmitted.226 In 
considering how the Court will interpret the press clause in a new era, the 
characteristics of the mass-media and network-society paradigms must be considered. 
The modes of communication now available to all people, a fundamental part of 
questions about the press clause’s future, must also be examined.  
 Many of the characteristics that define journalism in the United States evolved 
with the creation of a “mass” media during the Progressive Era, which started in the late 
nineteenth century. The conceptualization of the media audience as a “mass” came as 
part of a broader historical shift in American life during the Industrial Revolution.227 
Much as massive technological shifts are reshaping daily life today, the move to more 
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urban, industrial, and corporate lifestyles brought unlike people together.228 People 
arrived in cities from traditional lifestyles on farms and in rural areas to find jobs in 
growing mass-production markets, and as a result they shared less in common with their 
neighbors than they did in pre-industrial society, which was more pastoral, 
interconnected, and homogeneous.229 The creation of the “mass” audience came as a 
result of these social changes. As communication scholars Shearon Lowery and Melvin 
DeFleur stated, “Modern societies are media-dependent societies. Their populations 
make use of the media for achieving a great many goals that are handled differently in 
the traditional society.”230 Thus, the social changes at the start of the Progressive Era 
created the need for mass publications. During the same time period, technological 
changes made it possible to print massive amounts of information at relatively low 
costs. As Paul Starr, a media historian, explained, the idea of the media audience as a 
“mass” came from the standardized culture of the time.231 In an era when daily life 
revolved around mass production, it was easy to view the audience as a “mass.”  
 The constitutive assumptions of the mass-media paradigm came to be that 
communication was largely a one-way street and that audiences were uniform groups.232 
News production required expensive technology and only publishers or broadcasters 
had the power and resources to use the tools of mass communication.233 Finally, the 
media had relatively exclusive access to powerful individuals, and were therefore in a 
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position to provide the scarce resource of information to large audiences.234 The 
conceptualization of a mass media that communicated to mass audiences began to wane 
in the final decades of the twentieth century, as a series of compounding technological 
advancements were introduced.235 Among them were the personal computer, fiber-optic 
cable, and software that made networked communication accessible to many.236 
Because the advances dealt with information technologies, and information is central to 
human activity, their spread had a powerful impact on society.237 The pervasiveness of 
the new technologies helped bring about a new system regarding how people 
communicate. Castells wrote, “The potential integration of text, images, and sounds in 
the same system, interacting from multiple points, in chosen time (real or delayed) 
along a global network, in conditions of open and affordable access, does fundamentally 
change the character of communication.”238 The changes in communication brought on 
by these technological innovations undermined the fundamental assumptions of the 
mass-media model.239 Communication was no longer a one-way street — it became 
interactive. In the network era, users share control over content production and its 
reception; audience members are active participants in news selection, information 
creation, and distribution; and individuals can take on some of the roles journalists once 
held nearly complete power over, such as publishing or broadcasting information.240 
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 Castells identified the roots of the shift to the network-society era as emerging 
before the key inventions of the last part of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, while 
mass-media outlets communicated to large audiences, computer-mediated 
communication, primarily on a one-to-one level, began to evolve.241 As the technology 
improved, the once-distinct lines between mass communication and computer-mediated 
communication began to blur. By the early years of the twenty-first century, the two had 
become nearly indistinguishable from one another as audience members blogged, 
shared, and interacted in other ways with personal and traditional-media messages.242 
Castells wrote, “As people (the so-called users) have appropriated new forms of 
communication, they have built their own systems of mass communication.”243  
 Castells argued the convergence between traditional media and computer-
mediated communication led to the creation of a new and pervasive form of 
communication: mass self-communication.244 The new communication form is massive 
in that it can reach large and geographically dispersed audiences. It is self-
communication in that the messages are created and directed by users.245 To Castells, 
mass self-communication joins interpersonal and mass communication to create an 
interactive, coexistent environment where the three forms complement each other.246 
The concept of mass self-communication bears important repercussions regarding how 
the Court could interpret the press clause. Castells explained that sites such as YouTube 
are similar to traditional mass communication in that people can use them to reach large 
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audiences, but the key difference between traditional conceptualizations of mass 
communication and mass self-communication is that “anyone can post a video on 
YouTube, with few restrictions. And the user selects the video she wants to watch and 
comment on from a huge list of possibilities.”247 In other words, mass self-
communication is free of the institutional editorial decision-making, time and space 
constraints, and economic considerations that journalists use to create and disseminate 
some messages and ignore others. Media scholar Henry Jenkins, in discussing 
participatory culture on the Internet, wrote, “Convergence represents a cultural shift as 
consumers are encouraged to seek out new information and make connections among 
dispersed media content.”248 To that end, Jenkins suggested groups of people can work 
together, pool resources, combine skills, and use “collective intelligence” as “an 
alternative source of media power.”249 To the extent that conceptualizations of mass 
self-communication and participatory culture, such as Castells and Jenkins discussed, 
gain wider acceptance and prove relevant as dominant ideas regarding how the media 
operate in the network era, such considerations could prove to be factors that influence 
the Court regarding how it interprets the press clause. 
Journalistic Identity in the Network Society 
 The paradigm shift from the mass-media to the network-society model has led to 
change and uncertainty regarding journalistic norms and practices.250 Technological 
advancements have allowed anyone with access to a computer and an Internet 
connection to be a publisher, and this widespread ability to communicate messages to 
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audiences has raised questions regarding who is and is not a journalist and what norms 
and practices should guide journalism in the twenty-first century.251 For a field of work 
to be considered a profession, two primary criteria must be met: (1) on a cognitive level, 
a profession requires that its practitioners hold a unique body of knowledge that is not 
generally held by others, and (2) on a normative level, a professional must contribute 
something that is essential to the health and functioning of society.252 The levels of 
autonomy and prestige afforded to practitioners of a craft also must be considered.253 A 
doctor, for example, must complete a rigorous educational process, including 
supervised practice, and be cleared by a medical board to practice his or her profession. 
Journalism holds no such education requirements. Not all journalists have degrees, and 
not all who do have degrees in journalism.254 As for prestige and appreciation for its 
role in society, studies routinely find journalists are not highly regarded by others and 
their autonomy is seen as being too great.255 This vein of thought also relates to 
questions regarding the cognitive aspects of journalism. Journalism does not have a 
unique body of knowledge.256 Furthermore, journalism does not have requirements for 
entry into the field.257 In regard to contributions to society, journalists have historically 
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tied their work’s meaning to the public-service role of providing information to citizens 
so that they can take part in deliberations with others in a democracy society.258 
 Journalism scholars are not in agreement regarding whether journalism is a 
profession. Merrill argued journalism was not a profession, and journalism scholars 
Peter Gade and Wilson Lowrey contended that journalism can be seen as a semi-
profession because it lacks predetermined standards for membership but has functions 
and attributes that are shared by a group of practitioners.259 Beam and Meeks classified 
journalism as a profession, but one that was being deprofessionalized as a result of 
technological changes brought about by the network era and decisions made by the 
profession in response to the changes.260 Beam and Meeks found that journalism is a 
profession because it has organizations that advocate for members, universities that 
provide specialized education in the field, common professional values, and relative 
similarity in practices that are shared across traditional medial outlets.261 The authors 
explained that the growth of blogs and other citizen-publishing efforts are undermining 
journalists’ traditional hold on the provision of information. Beam and Meeks wrote, 
“Journalists are being forced to share control over news making with these ‘non-
professionals.’ The power sharing with the audience has created uncertainty about 
journalists’ professional roles and has diminished the occupation.”262 The uncertainty 
identified by Beam and Meeks relates to how journalists do their work, which ties with 
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both considerations regarding professionalism and larger questions about differentiating 
journalism from citizen publishing in the twenty-first century. 
 Journalism scholar Jane Singer, in examining how characteristics of journalism 
have weathered the shift from the mass-media model to the network era, found that 
journalists can no longer identify themselves by their ability to disseminate information 
to audiences.263 Both journalists and citizen publishers are capable of building and 
reaching audiences of varying sizes in the network era. Journalists can no longer find a 
distinctive identity in having access to sources of information either.264 The Internet has 
placed libraries of information in the hands of anyone with Internet access.265 The 
ability to communicate clear, skillfully crafted messages to audiences is also no longer a 
trait journalists can claim as their own, since many information providers, including 
bloggers and regular contributors to sites such as the Huffington Post, can make that 
claim.266 To this end, Singer proposed that journalism remain strongly guided by its 
normative claims regarding its public-service role to society and adapt past roles to the 
distinctive characteristics of network society.267 She wrote, “The normative stances, 
however, are more useful in setting boundaries around the entity of journalism and the 
enterprises of those who practice it.”268  
Journalism’s gatekeeping role, traditionally one of its core functions, has been 
substantially diminished by the emergence of the network society.269 Instead of deciding 
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the information audiences receive, journalists are shifting to provide the service of 
helping audiences make sense of what they encounter. Kovach and Rosenstiel wrote: 
The new journalist is no longer deciding what the public should know — this 
was the classic role of gatekeeper. He or she is helping audiences make order 
out of it. This does not mean simply adding interpretation or analysis to news 
reporting. The first task of the new journalist/sense maker, rather, is to verify 
what information is reliable and then order it so people can grasp it 
efficiently.270 
  
The authors described this function as a gate-watching role that places journalists in the 
positions of intermediaries, sense-makers, and verifiers regarding the flood of 
information audience members receive.271 
 The concepts of truth and a completed journalistic report are changing as well. 
Singer related these changes to the postmodern conceptualizations of truth, facts, and 
reality, in regard to Internet culture.272 Journalism’s roots in Enlightenment thinking 
regarding the rationality of man and modernist approaches regarding scientific methods 
and processes to discover truth put it at odds with an online culture that bears more 
postmodern characteristics,273 such as skepticism regarding universal truths and a lack 
of respect for experts.274 Journalists have traditionally defined truth as the outcome of a 
series of steps regarding comparing and verifying information from a set of sources.275 
The process begins and ends before a story is published. Singer wrote, “The online 
zeitgeist flips that on its head. Publication is the first, not the last, step in the process of 
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verification because only after an idea is published can it be, collectively, vetted.”276 
Network-society audiences expect to engage in the verification process, and the truth, 
then, emerges through interaction with the audience.277 Media ethicist David Craig 
included this aspect of twenty-first-century journalism in his list of standards for 
excellence in online journalism. He wrote, “Journalists need to continue doing their own 
independent reporting while communicating actively with readers and welcoming their 
insights.”278 This approach changes the traditional conceptualization of a completed 
story. Published content becomes something that is a work in progress, a shift that 
Kovach and Rosenstiel conceptualized as making journalists more similar to forum or 
seminar leaders than as authorities.279 
 Considering the audience’s role in verifying information and creating a more 
open-ended approach to content creation relates to another emerging norm for twenty-
first-century journalists: transparency. This area of focus relates with the other changing 
roles in that it incorporates an understanding that online audiences are active, and 
skeptical of experts and absolute truths. Transparency, in this context, means 
communicating “as much as possible about what has gone into a story — a story that is 
not complete once the journalist has written it but rather is part of an ongoing and more 
broadly shared process.”280 Incorporating transparency as a journalistic practice in the 
network era helps provide journalists with more credibility in their work during a time 
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and atmosphere when more postmodern conceptualizations of truth are emphasized.281 
Kovach and Rosenstiel explained that journalists can help make up for limitations they 
face regarding knowing the truth or the accuracy of information they gather by being 
transparent about the nature of the information they are conveying to the audience.282 
The authors, as an example, contended that journalists should be transparent about the 
questions their stories fail to answer.  
 The requirement that journalists produce original content is not new to the 
network era.283 And while originality does not constitute a new role or practice for 
journalists, it represents a dividing line for how journalists can separate themselves 
from citizen publishers. In this sense, originality of content could play a role in how the 
Court defines the press clause in the network era. Citizen publishers do little or no 
original reporting and instead act as compilers or analyzers of other people’s 
messages.284 Singer concluded that “a traditional journalist’s reportorial skills — 
negotiating with and interviewing sources, witnessing and recording events, and turning 
what has been learned into a cogent, original story — remain largely unthreatened.”285 
The temptation, however, for journalists to take information from online sources, 
including other media outlets, is greater when the pressure to produce and constantly 
update information is so great.286 Kovach and Rosenstiel emphasized the need for 
journalists to produce original content and to avoid taking second-hand information 
from online sources. Kovach and Rosenstiel’s argument relates to the central element of 
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journalistic verification, while Singer’s reasoning for highlighting originality is to help 
examine journalistic professionalism. In either case, the role of originality has been 
elevated as a mechanism to distinguish professional from nonprofessional journalism in 
the network society. 
 The characteristics of the network society and questions regarding journalistic 
professionalism and the role and practices of journalism in the twenty-first century, 
while divided into separate sections in this chapter, share relationships in regard to 
considerations of how the Court should interpret the press clause in the network-society 
era. Gade, for example, brought many of these ideas together when he contended, 
“Journalists should become more ‘responsive and responsible’ to the network by 
seeking other voices and using the ‘crowd’ to help verify content.”287 The Court has 
considered editorial decision-making and journalism’s skills and practices in past 
rulings.288 Such considerations provide evidence that the Court will likely again 
consider how journalists understand and go about their work in future cases.  
As emphasized in the introduction of this chapter, the Court has not made a 
ruling regarding the press clause in the network era.289 Therefore, this study draws upon 
relevant bodies of legal and theoretical discourse to construct a framework in which 
courts in the network-society era can ground complicated questions concerning 
interpretations of the press clause in a conceptual rationale that integrates historical 
understandings with those of a dramatically transformed environment. The final section 
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of this chapter details the methodological approach that will be utilized in this analysis. 
This study will be guided by the following research questions: 
 • What understandings are dominant in this study’s analysis of the relevant bodies 
of legal and philosophical discourse?    
 • Are there significant commonalities among dominant understandings identified 
in the respective bodies of legal and philosophical discourse?    
 • Are there significant conflicts among dominant understandings identified in the 
respective bodies of legal and philosophical discourse?    
 • To the extent that significant commonalities and conflicts can be identified in the 
respective bodies of legal and philosophical discourse, how do they critically relate to 
historical understandings of the press clause?    
 • What does this analysis suggest regarding how understandings dominant in this 
study’s examination of the relevant bodies of legal and philosophical discourse can 
provide grounding for interpreting the press clause in the network society? 
Method 
 This study will employ a qualitative methodological approach to guide the 
evaluation of the three sets of primary sources discussed in the introduction of this 
chapter to propose a framework from which the courts can ground questions regarding 
interpretations of the press clause within the unique communication environment that is 
being engendered by the network society. A study that centers on understandings 
relevant to judicial interpretations of the press clause and theoretical conceptualizations 
of the role of the press in democratic society can be effectively advanced by utilizing 
the text-based and meaning-making-oriented approaches offered by qualitative 
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methods.290 The approach focuses intensely on identifying patterns and themes within 
messages.291 As John Pauly, a scholar whose work examines the history and sociology 
of mass media, articulated, the fundamental focus of qualitative research is that it seeks 
to provide deeper understandings of meaning-making — “the symbolic processes by 
which humans constantly re-orient themselves to the world.”292 That effort will be 
advanced methodologically in this study through the use of qualitative content analysis 
to examine narratives represented in lower-court rulings when citizen publishers have 
claimed protections that have been traditionally reserved for journalists, Supreme Court 
decisions in which justices have articulated conceptual understandings regarding 
Internet questions related to the First Amendment, and philosophical conceptualizations 
that are central to understanding the phenomenon of a digitally networked society.  
 As introduced early in this chapter, that analysis will be specifically grounded in 
sociologist David Altheide’s twelve-step, qualitative document-analysis process in 
order to systematically assess the documents from each of the bodies of discourse that 
are the focus of this study in terms of the broader concerns regarding the future of the 
press clause in the network-society era. Altheide emphasized that his approach to 
document analysis is “oriented to documenting and understanding the communication 
of meaning, as well as verifying theoretical relationships.”293 His approach asserts that 
the underlying understandings and meanings that are most significant in a set of 
documents are seldom initially evident. The meanings must be allowed to “emerge or 
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become more clear through constant comparison and investigation of documents.”294 
The term “emerge,” in Altheide’s conceptualization, is central to the process of a 
gradual formation of meaning through immersion in the documents. For Altheide, the 
documents themselves, when properly assessed, can reveal context for symbolic 
meaning that contribute to a tracking of the creation and influence of social 
understandings.295  
 Altheide’s method focuses on identifying what he calls “dominant themes.” His 
twelve-step approach involves formulating research questions, creating a context 
through which documents can be analyzed, examining a small group of the documents 
to allow preliminary categories to form for data collection, testing preliminary 
categories by examining more documents, revising categories, implementing 
“progressive theoretical sampling” (a process that includes selecting materials based on 
an evolving understanding of the topic of the study), collecting data, analyzing data 
(which includes repeated reading, sorting, and searching through documents), 
comparing and contrasting extremes and noteworthy differences, summarizing findings, 
and placing the findings within a broader interpretation.296  
 Fundamental to Altheide’s method is his articulation of how themes and frames 
should be understood. Themes, to Altheide, can be seen as “mini-frames” or primary 
ideas that regularly recur in a set of documents.297 Frames are “a kind of super theme” 
that act as a larger boundary for how something is discussed in a set of documents. 
Altheide declared, “The significance of frames, themes, and discourse for document 
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analysis cannot be overemphasized. Theoretically, frames and themes are crucial in 
defining situations and provide much of the rationale for document analysis.”298 
Altheide’s understanding of frames complements sociologist Erving Goffman’s 
conceptualization of framing. Goffman defined framing as the process people use to 
define and classify the situations they encounter using certain principles from social 
events and their places in those events.299 Communication scholar Robert Entman 
highlighted the way that frames encourage specific understandings of a narrative. Such 
understandings influence “those perceiving and thinking about events to develop 
particular understandings of them.”300 In this conceptualization, people frame reality so 
they can make sense of it and manage it. Entman characterized framing as a powerful 
research tool, asserting, “The concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe 
the power of a communicating text. Analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in 
which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or 
communication) or information.”301 Framing analysis has been used in many studies 
concerned with matters broadly similar to the focus of this dissertation. Political-science 
scholars Adam Simon and Jennifer Jerit, for example, examined framing in political 
communication regarding debates about abortion, and journalism scholar Stephen Reese 
conducted a case study on how journalism was framed in the Newseum in Washington, 
D.C.302  
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 Utilizing Altheide’s document analysis in developing this dissertation began 
with drawing upon a relatively wide range of relevant sources — such as mass-media 
reports, scholarly journals, and court opinions — to place the overall study in context 
with regard to the historical influences on the way the press clause is understood today,  
the unique technological influences on the emergence of the network society, and other 
elements of this study. With guidance from the research questions and context provided 
by the supporting readings, a set of search criteria for each of the three sets of 
documents was developed. In the case of each respective body of discourse that is 
focused upon in this study, an initially wider set of information was read and the search 
criteria were then revised until a clear set of criteria had been created for each of the 
three sets of documents. This approach was employed in a manner consistent with the 
openness that is emphasized in qualitative research methods, beginning without rigid 
predetermined themes but instead emphasizing an inductive process that includes 
interaction between the researcher and the documents.303 Utilizing the criteria 
established through the initial document-gathering and reading, a final set of documents 
were gathered from each of the three subject areas. See chapters Two, Three, and Four 
for more detailed explanations regarding the process that was utilized for each of the 
respective bodies of discourse. Altheide stipulated that this step in the process requires 
the researcher to focus on the questions involved in the project and read texts until 
either all of the relevant texts have been found and examined or a wide enough sample 
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has been selected from a larger population of what was found.304 In regard to the lower-
court cases in Chapter Two and the Supreme Court decisions in Chapter Three, a high 
degree of confidence was established that all of the relevant cases were found. In the 
case of the theoretical discourse central to understanding the phenomenon of a digitally 
networked society in Chapter Four, a set of relevant texts was necessarily drawn from a 
wider pool.  
 Consistent with Altheide’s approach emphasizing “extensive reading, sorting, 
and searching,” through materials, the data-analysis stage included reading each 
chapter’s documents closely and repeatedly.305 Throughout the readings, detailed notes 
were taken and initial possible themes and frames were identified. Possible themes and 
frames were revised and further focused after the initial set of readings and then 
throughout overall re-readings of the texts. The process included labeling extreme 
examples that both supported and conflicted with emerging themes and frames, as well 
as writing short summaries regarding what each text discussed. From these immersive 
interactions with the texts for each chapter, a clearer and more focused set of themes 
gradually emerged. Once interactions with the documents failed to result in further 
adjustments, the themes for each chapter were summarized and supplemented with 
examples.306 The themes and frames were analyzed within the context of each 
respective chapter’s subject matter and then ultimately drawn upon to advance the 
objective of this study to form a unified framework in which the courts can ground 
complicated questions concerning interactions of the press clause in the network 
society. 
                                                
304 Ibid., 35-36. 
305 Ibid., 43. 




As the overview in this chapter detailed, the emergence of the network society 
has raised substantial questions in regard to how the press clause of the First 
Amendment will be conceptualized by the courts in the twenty-first century. The 
Supreme Court’s past rulings regarding the press clause have not clearly differentiated it 
from the speech clause, but justices have indicated that they do not understand the 
clause as providing journalists with rights that go beyond those available to others in 
society, and that they will often consider journalistic norms and practices when 
deliberating on questions that relate to the freedom of the press. Future legal 
deliberations regarding the press clause could be influenced by the way jurists 
understand journalism. Similarly, a substantial amount of the legal scholarship relating 
to the press clause focused on whether it is distinct from the speech clause, and whether 
Justice Stewart’s conceptualization of the press clause as an institutional protection for 
the media as an industry is accurate. From both the legal and the scholarly perspectives, 
the historically uncertain nature of the boundaries of the press clause’s protections are 
only exacerbated by the emergence of network technologies that allow individuals to 
communicate with audiences of varying sizes, further complicating questions regarding 
the clause’s protections. The next chapter begins the document analysis of the three 
bodies of discourse that will be assessed on that methodological basis in this 
dissertation. It focuses on lower-court opinions in which judges developed rationales for 
deciding cases in which citizen publishers argued for protections that have traditionally 




Chapter Two: Lower Courts, Citizen Publishers, and Press Protections 
 This chapter focuses on the narrative represented by lower-court opinions in 
which the courts developed conceptual rationales for deciding cases in which bloggers 
or other citizen publishers argued for protections historically more associated with the 
institutional press under the press clause. The cases were analyzed with a focus on 
identifying a consistent and qualitative emphasis on what will be discussed here in 
terms of four themes identified in the articulation of those conceptual rationales. Each 
of the themes involve representations of the press clause or arguably related protections 
as understood in terms of particular concerns that were emphasized in the courts’ 
conceptual rationales. In particular, the themes in that context focused on (1) concern 
with the way a message is delivered more than with the content of a message, (2) 
concern with whether messages are delivered according to accepted rules of journalism, 
(3) concern with the exercise of the First Amendment’s speech clause more than with 
exercise of its press clause, and (4) preference for organizations and groups over 
individual citizen publishers. 
 As detailed in greater length in Chapter One, the categories were identified 
using Altheide’s process of document analysis, a methodological form of qualitative 
content analysis. It involves examining a small number of the documents to begin 
developing categories to guide data collection, testing the categories on more 
documents, revising the categories, and implementing “progressive theoretical 
sampling” — which refers to “the selection of materials based on emerging 
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understanding of the topic under investigation.”1 Altheide’s qualitative data analysis 
“consists of extensive reading, sorting, and searching through” the documents, 
comparing and contrasting extremes and key differences, and then summarizing and 
integrating findings with interpretation.2 Ultimately, Altheide characterized the themes 
that emerged through this process as “mini-frames,” or central ideas within a text.3 He 
conceptualized a frame as “a kind of super theme” that acts as a primary idea within a 
set of documents.4 
 The cases analyzed in this chapter represent all of the relevant lower-court 
decisions available in which judges articulated conceptual rationales for deciding cases 
in which bloggers or other citizen publishers argued for protections historically more 
associated with the institutional press under the press clause. To be reasonably certain 
that all of the relevant cases were included in the analysis, the same keyword search was 
conducted using all four of the primary legal research databases. The terms “internet or 
blog” and “First Amendment” and “journalist or journalism or media” were searched in 
separate inquiries across the Westlaw, Bloomberg’s Media Law Reporter, LexisNexis 
Law Schools, and Bloomberg Law databases.5 Searches were limited to cases decided 
after January 1, 1995, a date that corresponds with the time period when the public and 
media companies began to use the Internet in significant numbers.6 From the hundreds 
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5 John Palfrey, “Cornerstones of Law Libraries for an Era of Digital Plus,” Law Library Journal 
102, no. 2 (2010-2011): 171, 178. In this article, Palfrey indicated that Westlaw, LexisNexis Law, and 
Bloomberg Law are the central legal resources that are used by legal scholars. 
6 David Carlson, “The History of Online Journalism,” in Digital Journalism: Emerging media 
and the changing horizons of journalism, ed. Kevin Kawamoto (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2003), 51-52. 
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of cases found in the searches, only those that appeared to address instances when 
citizen publishers claimed protections that have traditionally been reserved for 
journalists were saved. By the time the fourth database, Bloomberg Law, was searched, 
no new cases that fit the analysis’ criteria were found. Initially, twenty-seven cases were 
pulled from the database searches because they appeared to include judges’ conceptual 
rationales for deciding cases in which citizen publishers argued for protections 
historically more associated with the institutional press under the press clause. Those 
cases were printed and read completely, and several were found to deal with issues that 
were outside of the scope of this analysis. Ultimately, twelve cases were found to fit the 
study’s criteria. The twelve cases were analyzed using Altheide’s method, which in that 
stage involved repeated readings, note-taking, sorting, and searching the documents, as 
well as comparing and contrasting differences between the texts.7  
 This chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which examines the earliest 
cases that emerged from the lower courts, those ranging from 2001 to 2009, and the 
second includes the six most recent decisions, those from 2010 to 2012. Those 
groupings were made in order to include consideration of whether substantial 
differences may have been evident between those respective periods, given the more 
widespread social awareness and understanding of Internet-related matters in the second 
time period. Each section is structurally organized to provide discussion of the facts, 
central questions, and key ideas from each case. Then the themes or categories that 
emerged using Altheide’s process of document analysis are discussed.  
 
 
                                                
7 Altheide, Qualitative Media Analysis, 43. 
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Early cases, 2001-2009 
  This section of the chapter focuses on the earlier set of lower-court rulings, those 
from 2001 to 2009, that involved instances when citizen publishers claimed protections 
that have been traditionally reserved for journalists. The cases focused on in this section 
are: Smith v. Plati (2001), O’Grady v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (2006), 
Forensic Advisors v. Matrixx Initiatives (2006), BidZirk v. Smith (2007), Alvi Armani 
Medical Inc. v. Hennessey (2008), and Kaufman v. Islamic Society of Arlington (2009).8 
After a detailed factual discussion of each case, the themes that emerged through 
application of Altheide’s process of document analysis are presented.  
Smith v. Plati 
 Smith is the oldest of the twelve cases in this analysis. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided the case in 2001, but the initial issue occurred 
in 1998,9 just as legislators and the courts were beginning to grapple with what the 
Internet was and if, how, and to what extent it should be regulated. To provide historical 
context, the Communications Decency Act was passed in 1996 and the Supreme Court 
considered its first Internet-related First Amendment case, overturning the provisions in 
the CDA that dealt with Internet content in 1997, just months before Theodore Smith 
started the online news site involved in this case.10 Considered in this historical context, 
Smith provided the first instance where an online publisher, using technologies still not 
                                                
8 Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2001); O’Grady v. Superior Court of Santa Clara 
County, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2006); Forensic Advisors v. Matrixx Initiatives, 
170 Md. App. 520 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); BidZirk v. Smith, 35 Media L. Rep. 2478 (G.D. S.C. 2007); 
Alvi Armani Medical Inc. v. Hennessey, 37 Med. L. Rptr. 1420 (S.D. Fla. 2008); and Kaufman v. Islamic 
Society of Arlington, 291 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App. 2009). 
9 56 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. 1999). 
10 The Communications Decency Act was passed by Congress in 1996. It included two 
provisions that were intended to protect minors from indecent material on the Internet. In a unanimous 
ruling, the Supreme Court found the two provisions of the CDA were overly broad and that they abridged 
the First Amendment’s freedom of speech protections. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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yet fully comprehended by regulators, judges, or the general public, sought the same 
treatment as a traditional media outlet. At the time, legal scholars speculated that the 
courts would create a “crazy quilt” of First Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to the 
Internet.”11 Unlike later cases, which show an evolving understanding of the Internet by 
both the judges and the parties involved, Smith did not involve what became the 
traditional battle lines in cases, such as citizen publishers’ claims that they qualify for 
the media exemption in trademark or election laws or bloggers’ arguments that they are 
protected by reporters’ shield-law protections. This case simply involved an enthusiastic 
citizen publisher who wanted to document University of Colorado athletics just as the 
World Wide Web was first becoming technologically and economically available 
throughout the United States.12 In 1997, Smith created Netbuffs,13 a website that 
includes stories, chat rooms, pictures, and message boards regarding University of 
Colorado athletics.14 Initially, Smith was given the same access and privileges as those 
afforded to members of the traditional media.15 He had opportunities to interview 
players and coaches and was able to take photographs during sporting events. At the 
start of the 1998 school year, the athletic department limited his access, and he was no 
longer given the same access as members of the traditional media. He was asked to pay 
for schedules, news releases, and photographs.16 Smith argued David Plati, the 
university’s assistant athletic director for media relations, wanted to eliminate Netbuffs 
                                                
11 Jonathan Wallace and Michael Green, “Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the Printing 
Press and Freedom of Speech,” Seattle University Law Review 20 (1996): 711. 
12 Lee Sproull and Manuel Arriaga, “Online communities,” in The Handbook of Computer 
Networks: Distributed Networks, Network Planning, Control Management, and New Trends and 
Applications, Vol. 3, ed. Hossein Bidgoli (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 903.   
13 Smith, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 
14 Smith, 258 F.3d at 1172. 




because it competed with the university’s athletics website.17 In taking legal action 
against the university, Smith claimed he had a right to the same level of access as is 
provided to other media. He also claimed his free-speech rights were infringed upon 
because the university retaliated against him by limiting his access to the sources of 
information for his site.18 
 The court dismissed Smith’s claim that Plati and the athletic department were 
retaliating against him and his website. The court determined, without discussion, that 
“publishing Netbuffs.com is undoubtedly an activity protected by the First 
Amendment.”19 The court stopped short, however, of finding Plati’s actions harmed 
Smith’s rights. The court recognized the university’s actions made Smith’s work more 
difficult, but found that he had other means of gathering the information he sought. The 
fact that the court determined Smith’s website was protected by the First Amendment 
but was not harmed by his lack of access to information made available to others raises 
questions regarding whether a traditional media outlet, such as a Boulder, Colorado, 
newspaper or television station, would have received the same treatment from the court. 
The judge contended, “Plati’s actions did not cause Smith to suffer an injury that would 
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to publish an internet site.”20 The 
court’s opinion did not debate whether Netbuffs qualified as a news outlet, nor did any 
of Smith’s contentions appear to require the designation be made. For this reason, it is 
                                                
17 Smith, 258 F.3d at 1172. 





difficult to know if a newly established, one-man website that used technologies that 
were still being interpreted by lawmakers and judges, weakened Smith’s case.21 
The court then turned to Smith’s claim of equal access to information provided 
to members of the traditional news media. The court found no Supreme Court or Tenth 
Circuit precedents that supported a First Amendment right of access, and emphasized 
that the Supreme Court had repeatedly stated that no First Amendment right of access 
existed for the public or the press.22 Next the court considered Smith’s claim that a 
Colorado law could be utilized to compel a governmental official to perform the tasks 
of his or her duty.23 The court dispatched this claim as well, writing, “Plati’s job 
requires him to make on-going decisions regarding what University athletic information 
is made public, given to the press, or kept confidential — and every variety of decision 
in between — under constantly changing circumstances.”24 To that end, the court 
viewed any decision in Smith’s favor as an intrusion by the legal system into the day-to-
day responsibilities of Plati’s job. Plati had the right, the court wrote, to decide how 
many photographers, for example, are on the sidelines of a football game and to decide 
who those photographers were.25 To this end, the appeals court found in favor of Plati.  
O’Grady v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County 
 Five years after Smith, there is clear evidence in O’Grady, a 2006 case, that 
judges and citizen publishers had by then developed more sophisticated understandings 
                                                
21 Few law articles refer to this case. One of the few that specifically discussed the case stated 
that the Smith opinion elaborated on the Tenth Circuit’s precedents regarding retaliation against people 
who exercise their free speech. See Anjoli Terhune, “Redressing the Balance: An Examination of the 
Scope of First Amendment Protections, Prosecutorial Discretion and Probable Cause in the Wake of 
Hartman v. Moore,” Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27 (2007): 684. 
22 Smith, 258 F.3d at 1178. 
23 Ibid., 1202-1203. The court cited Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 106(a)(2). 




of online communication. Much as in Smith, the O’Grady case revolved around 
Internet-only publications. O’Grady involved two online magazines that claimed 
protection under the California reporter’s shield law from being compelled to provide 
identifying information regarding anonymous sources.26 The case, which was at the 
state appeals-court level, centered on Apple’s argument that Internet-only publications 
O’Grady’s Power Page and Apple Insider must turn over the names of the sources that 
provided them confidential information about an upcoming, unreleased Apple 
Computer product.27 In November 2004, the websites published articles about a 
GarageBand-related product that was to be announced early the next year. The articles 
included product specifications, drawings, and how much the product would cost. The 
case pivoted on whether or not the web magazines qualified for protection under the 
state shield law. In considering this central aspect of the case, the three-judge panel’s 
opinion carefully considered the characteristics of the sites. The court examined the 
longevity and publishing frequency of the two sites, pointing out that PowerPage had 
published daily since 1995, and that Apple Insider had distributed several articles per 
week since 1998.28 The opinion highlighted that each site received hundreds of 
thousands of unique visitors a month, giving them discernable audiences.29 The court 
also recognized that PowerPage had nine editors and reporters on staff. These factors of 
time in existence, frequency of publication, and audience size operated as measures of 
credibility to the court. The court’s decision to use these characteristics to evaluate an 
online source could provide guidance in future cases. One legal scholar has proposed a 
                                                
26 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1437. 
27 Ibid., 1432-1433. 




two-prong test regarding whether online news sites qualify for shield-law protection 
using the court’s website evaluation methods in O’Grady.30 Another legal scholar 
identified this a “functional approach” and also indicated it could be used by other 
courts.31 
 The court’s opinion in O’Grady, importantly, also considered the intended 
meaning of the state shield law and whether it applied to the websites. The shield law, 
which originates in the California Constitution, states:  
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a 
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication . . . shall not be adjudged 
in contempt . . . for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured 
while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or 
other periodical publication.32  
 
 Apple argued the web magazines did not qualify for protection under the shield 
law because they were not engaged in “legitimate journalistic activities” and did not fit 
the types of people or publications listed as being protected by the law.33 In this sense, 
Apple argued the websites did not apply from both the standpoint of the type of 
messages they communicated or the vehicle through which they were delivered. The 
court disagreed with Apple’s assessment, finding that the shield law was intended to 
“protect the gathering and dissemination of news,” and that the websites were fulfilling 
that role when they published the information.34 The court also found the websites were 
more than qualified in regard to the classes of people protected by the law. Using 
relatively strong language, and devoting several pages to its justification, the court 
                                                
30 Carol Toland, “Internet Journalists and the Reporter’s Privilege: Providing Protection for 
Online Periodicals,” University of Kansas Law Review 57 (2008): 461, 484-488. 
31 Adam Cohen, “The Media that Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate,” 
Southern California Law Review 85 (2011): 1, 55. 
32 O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1456.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 1457. 
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asserted, “Petitioners’ Web sites are not only ‘publications’ under various sources we 
have noted but also bear far closer resemblance to traditional print media than to 
television and radio.”35 The court explained that the websites had pages and articles that 
readers open and that, while articles were not published on a set schedule, information 
was regularly updated. While the court, in this instance, used understandings of 
traditional media functions and information to guide its decision, it is noteworthy that 
the judges were not completely free in their determinations. They were asked to 
interpret a law in which the precedential interpretation had been established in the 
1980s, long before Internet-based news outlets emerged.36 As is seen in other cases in 
this section, courts in other states have also found it challenging to interpret shield laws 
that were written before the network era brought about massive changes in 
communication technologies. In this instance, the California court found the sites were 
protected under the shield law and therefore did not have to provide the names of their 
sources.  
Forensic Advisors v. Matrixx Initiatives 
 A few months after O’Grady, on the other side of the country, the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals faced another instance when an online-only information 
source claimed shield-law protections. A subscription-based financial newsletter, the 
Eyeshade Report, published an article in 2003 that raised questions about the stability 
and viability of Matrixx Initiatives, a publicly traded health-care company.37 The 
twenty-three-page report, with more than one-hundred footnotes, included misleading 
                                                
35 Ibid., 1462. 
36 The court cited Mitchell v. Superior Court of Marin County, 37 Cal. 3d 268 (Cal. 1984). 
37 Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 524. 
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statements that led Matrixx to sue for defamation.38 Matrixx, based in Arizona, 
subpoenaed Forensic Advisors, the Maryland company that publishes the Eyeshade 
Report, for its documents relating to the story. It also called the company president to 
appear before the trial court in Arizona.39 Forensic Advisors complied, sending 
hundreds of documents, and the president, Timothy Mulligan, provided a deposition for 
the court. When Mulligan was again subpoenaed several months later, he declined to 
respond.40 Mulligan claimed protection under the Maryland news-media privilege and 
argued that if he testified, his subscribers — whom he relied on for both income and 
information for stories — would no longer feel comfortable providing information and 
would likely cancel their subscriptions.41 
The Maryland shield law, outlined in the court’s opinion, does not mention 
newsletters or online media.42 Interestingly, the opinion did not address whether an 
online newsletter was eligible for protection under the law. It merely discussed if a 
financial newsletter counted as a “periodical” according to the Maryland news-media 
privilege law. The California court in O’Grady focused on a similar question because 
the state’s law listed “other periodical publications” as part of the list of types of media 
that were protected.43 The Maryland court found the Eyeshade Report qualified for 
protection under the state law.44 Unlike in O’Grady, however, the Maryland court did 
not examine characteristics of the Eyeshade Report in detail. Other than noting the 
length of the report, the number of footnotes, and the contents of the report as they 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 525. 
40 Ibid., 526-527 
41 Ibid., 527-528. 
42 Ibid., 534. 
43 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1459. 
44 Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 535. 
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related to the case, the court focused more on pre-Internet precedents than on analysis 
of the website and the newsletter it carried. Media law scholar Dean Smith highlighted 
that the wording in the Maryland shield law that defined “news media” happened to be 
broad enough that the court was not forced to evaluate the financial newsletter to the 
same extent that the California court examined the websites in O’Grady.45 This 
reasoning, however, means that citizen publishers who seek shield-law protections that 
have traditionally been reserved for traditional media will have varying levels of 
success depending on the wording of state shield laws. In this case, with little further 
discussion regarding its reasoning, the Maryland Court determined the Eyeshade Report 
fit within the state shield law’s definition of “news media” and remanded the case to the 
district-court level. 
BidZirk v. Smith 
 Unlike the previous two cases, BidZirk, a 2007 federal-district-court case from 
South Carolina, did not involve a shield-law claim by a citizen publisher. It did, 
however, require a judge to evaluate the content of a series of blog posts in an effort to 
determine if they qualified for the news exemption contained within the Lanham Act.46 
While the legal question in this case is different, the judge was asked to evaluate some 
of the same legal questions as those found in O’Grady and Forensic Advisors.  
BidZirk, an online-auction-listing company, brought defamation, invasion of 
privacy, and trademark violation claims against a blogger who wrote a four-part series 
                                                
45 Dean C. Smith, “Price v. Time Revisited: The Need for Medium-Neutral Shield Laws in the 
Age of Strict Construction,” Communication Law & Policy 14 (2009): 235, 263. 
46 The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946. It was created to halt unfair business competition. The 
act included the creation of a national trademark registry and legal protection for trademark holders. See 
Don R. Pember and Clay Calvert, Mass Media Law (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 561; “Lanham 
Act,” Legal Information Institute, accessed April 4, 2013, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act.  
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about the business’s services.47 The four-part series was titled: “Special Report: You 
Gotta Be Berserk to Use an eBay Listing Company!”48 In the report, Phillip Smith 
outlined his experience using BidZirk to list his goods on eBay. The judge highlighted 
that Smith’s blog included “positive and mostly negative aspects of utilizing an eBay 
listing company, like BidZirk, and provided a checklist for his readers to utilize in 
deciding whether to use a listing company.”49 In deciding the case, the judge dispatched 
the invasion-of-privacy claim on procedural grounds and determined that Smith’s words 
were not defamatory.50 In the trademark claim, however, the judge was forced to 
designate whether Smith’s blog was a commercial or news-and-information endeavor. 
The Lanham Act provides an exemption from trademark-infringement actions when the 
trademark is used for news, reporting, or commentary.51 Smith utilized the BidZirk 
company logo in his blog reports, and BidZirk argued his blog was not a news site, but 
rather a commercial vehicle. The judge indicated that he could find no precedent that 
determined whether a blogger was a journalist.52 Unlike the approach used in O’Grady, 
where the characteristics of the sites were evaluated, the judge in BidZirk considered the 
details of the message and the circumstances that drove its creation. In doing so, the 
judge determined Smith’s blog fit the news, reporting, or commentary requirements 
under the Lanham Act. He emphasized that he considered the “content of the material, 
not the format, to determine whether it is journalism.”53 The judge also indicated that he 
considered Smith’s intent, which was to convey information to the public, in making his 
                                                
47 BidZirk, 35 Media L. Rep. at 2480. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 2480-2483. 
51 Ibid., 2483-2484. 




determination. Importantly, the judge emphasized that the story included positive and 
negative aspects of BidZirk’s services, it provided a checklist people could use in 
deciding if an eBay listing company would be beneficial for them, and it shared what 
the author learned in his experiences in a way that could benefit others.54 Finally, the 
judge emphasized that Smith conducted research before writing the blog posts. Smith, 
the judge explained, read other people’s discussions of BidZirk’s services and read 
about BidZirk’s competitors. The judge wrote, “Smith’s article evidences his intent to 
report what he believed was a newsworthy story for consumers.”55  
Alvi Armani Medical v. Hennessey 
Armani, a 2008 case, included different legal questions but reprised similar 
issues as those found in BidZirk. The key similarity this case has with O’Grady, 
Forensic, and BidZirk is that a court was asked to decide whether a citizen publisher 
could be considered a type of news media in relation to a state or federal law. In 
Armani, a federal-district court in Florida examined whether the Hair Restoration 
Network, an information site about hair treatments, could be viewed as a media source 
in regard to two different claims made against it by Dr. Antonio Avli Armani, a hair 
restoration specialist. Armani argued Patrick Hennessey and his company, Media 
Visions, defamed him and used deceptive business practices by posting negative 
statements on their website, and created fake accounts in order to post disparaging 
comments on the site’s forums.56  
The judge in this case considered Media Visions’s motion for all the claims 
against it to be dismissed. Armani’s unfair-trade-practices claim was based on a Florida 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Armani, 37 Med. L. Rptr. at 1421. 
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law that was created to protect against “unfair methods of competition, unconscionable 
acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce.”57 The central point of contention in that claim was the “trade and 
commerce passage.” Media Visions argued its website’s forums were not involved in 
trade and commerce, so the claims should be dismissed. The site itself received monthly 
revenues from hair-transplant doctors who paid to be on the site’s list of recommended 
practitioners. Media Visions, argued, however, its site was fundamentally focused on 
news and information for a specific audience. The judge highlighted that Media 
Visions, “through their website provide[s] information to the consumer public about the 
hair restoration and transplant industry. . . . Potential patients heavily rely upon 
information provided in the website.”58 Because the judge’s only task in this case was to 
rule on Media Visions’s motion for dismissal, he did not determine whether or not the 
information posted on the website was news and information and therefore exempt from 
prosecution under the unfair-trade-practices law. The judge concluded that Armani’s 
claim of unfair trade practices could continue, finding that Armani “adequately alleged 
the defendants have engaged in ‘unfair methods of competition’ . . . and that such 
allegations are sufficient to satisfy the ‘trade or commerce’ language contained” in the 
law.59 
The defamation claim resulted in a similarly complex argument. A Florida law 
requires that media outlets are notified and given at least five days to respond before a 
                                                
57 Ibid., 1423. The ruling cited Fla. Stat. §501.204(1) (2008). The law defines trade and 
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person can file a defamation action.60 Media Visions argued it did not, as a news outlet, 
receive the legally required notice before Armani filed the suit. Armani contended that 
the law did not apply because the Hair Restoration Network was not a media outlet.61 
The judge explained, much as in BidZirk, that none of the precedents in his jurisdiction 
provided guidance regarding whether a website like the Hair Restoration Network could 
be viewed as a news outlet for the purposes of the Florida law. The judge declined to 
consider the cases Armani brought forth to support his claim that the website was not a 
news outlet because almost all of them predated the Internet era.62 Instead, the judge 
found agreement with the cases put forth by Media Visions, which included two 
previous Florida decisions that found online media could receive protection under the 
state’s law.63 One of the cases, a 2006 Florida circuit-court decision, specifically found 
stories published on the Internet could qualify for protection under the law’s “other 
medium” designation.64 Using these cases, the judge determined the site qualified as a 
news outlet, acknowledging that “in reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that it 
could find no legitimate justification for interpreting the broad term ‘other media’ to 
exclude the internet.”65  
The judge’s decision relates to factors Smith recognized regarding Forensic 
Advisors.66 The state law, much as was the case regarding the Maryland shield law in 
Forensic Advisors, was written broadly enough that a citizen publisher’s website could 
                                                
60 Ibid., 1424. The ruling referred to Fla. Stat. §770.01 (2008). The law requires prior 
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claimed it qualified as “other media.”  
61 Armani, 37 Med. L. Rptr. at 1424. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Holt v. Tampa Bay Television, 34 Med. L. Rptr. 1540 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 2006). 
65 Armani, 37 Med. L. Rptr. at 1424. 
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qualify as a form of news media. Aside from the judge’s designation of the website as 
being protected by the state law, it is noteworthy that the decision was nearly entirely 
focused on the mode of communication, an online forum. So much attention was 
devoted to the vehicle the message was carried in that the judge’s decision did not 
include any information about what specifically was stated on the website that caused 
the initial conflict between the parties. This approach was substantially different from 
how the federal-district judge in BidZirk went about evaluating the questions in that 
case. The judge in BidZirk considered the content of the message and the intent, but the 
judge focused on the vehicle the message was conveyed in, rather than its content.  
Kaufman v. Islamic Society of Arlington 
 Kaufman, like Armani, hinged on a decisive detail found in a state law. In this 
case, however, the three-judge, Texas-appeals-court panel delved into greater detail 
regarding the author of the message and the vehicle through which it was delivered 
when determining whether Joe Kaufman, a citizen journalist, qualified for media 
protections. The 2009 case arose from an article about Muslim Family Day at Six Flags 
Over Texas in Arlington. Kaufman wrote that the park would be “invaded by a radical 
Muslim organization that has physical ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and financial 
ties with Hamas.”67 The article was published in 2007 in Front Page Magazine, an 
online-only publication. The Islamic organizations sued Kaufman for defamation, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for an injunction against Kaufman’s 
current and future publications.68 Among the conflicting legal maneuverings from both 
parties, the Texas appeals court was tasked with deciding if the Islamic group’s motion 
                                                




for dismissal of Kaufman’s appeal of the lower-court decision could be halted by 
Kaufman’s claim that he was a member of the media. Texas law does not allow a media 
member’s appeal in defamation cases to be dismissed. The law states that an appeal 
must be allowed if there is “a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in 
part upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media.”69 
 The Islamic group argued Kaufman was not a member of the media, so he could 
not thwart its motion for dismissal by calling upon the state law. The group contended 
that Kaufman’s Internet posts did not equate to journalism, Front Page Magazine was a 
blog and therefore not a media outlet, and that Kaufman had none of the training 
traditionally connected with journalism.70 The court disagreed, finding that Kaufman 
was eligible for protection under the state law. Therefore, in this case, the court focused 
on external credentials, rather than the content of the message, presenting a contrast to 
the content and intent-based approach the judge used in BidZirk, the careful analysis of 
the site characteristics in O’Grady, and the focus on the method of communication 
found in Armani. While the facts and laws under consideration in each of these 
preceding cases were somewhat different, each of them, along with Kaufman, asked a 
court to make a designation regarding whether a citizen publisher could be viewed as 
receiving protections that have been traditionally enjoyed by journalists. In Kaufman, 
the court emphasized that the author had worked as a full-time journalist for various 
national publications since 1995, and that he was a regular contributor to Front Page 
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Magazine, which had nearly half-a-million readers a month. Also, others edited 
Kaufman’s work before it was published. Finally, the court considered the credentials of 
Front Page Magazine’s publisher, David Horowitz.71 The fact that Horowitz had 
appeared on cable-news channels and as a speaker at universities helped the court 
decide Kaufman was a member of the news media.  
Uniquely for this case, in comparison with the preceding cases that involved 
state laws enacted before the emergence of the Internet, the Texas legislature had 
revised its definition of “news media” in 2009 to include “electronic; and other means, 
known or unknown, that are accessible to the public.”72 While the law’s new wording 
did not explicitly include “website” or “Internet,” the court concluded Front Page 
Magazine qualified both as “electronic” and as “accessible to the public.”73 In regard to 
the vehicle through which the message was communicated, the court determined that 
the state law should be interpreted in the same way for traditional and online media 
parties. The court wrote, “We hold that a person who communicates facts or opinions 
through the internet is entitled to appeal” under the law.74 Even without the revised 
wording, the Texas court indicated it would have found that Front Page Magazine 
qualified as news media. The court referred to a Texas Supreme Court precedent in 
finding that “when the text of a statute logically authorizes the application of the statute 
to a new technology or communication medium, we should apply the statute in that 
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way.”75  Using broad strokes, and without applying any qualifiers, the court argued 
anyone who communicated online qualified as a member of the electronic media.76  
The court in Kaufman considered a combination of website characteristics, such 
as examining the site’s monthly readership, and the author’s and broader publication’s 
journalistic credentials to evaluate the question posed in the case.  
Document Analysis 
 The following subsections focus on utilizing Altheide’s method of document 
analysis to categorize representations that emerged through such examination of the 
preceding six lower-court decisions. Those representations related to the press clause or 
arguably related protections as understood in terms of particular concerns that were 
emphasized in the courts’ conceptual rationales. In Altheide’s articulation of the heart 
of the methodological approach, the “actual words and direct messages of documents 
carry the discourse that reflects certain themes, which in turn are held together and 
given meaning by a broad frame.”77 As emphasized in the introductory section of this 
chapter, the themes identified in that analysis were: concern for (1) the way a message 
is delivered more than with the content of a message, (2) whether messages are 
delivered according to accepted rules of journalism, (3) emphasis on the exercise of the 
First Amendment’s speech clause more than with the exercise of its press clause, and 
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The Way the Message is Delivered Versus the Content of the Message 
In the cases summarized above — with one exception — the courts’ discourse 
consistently reflected the construction of a theme in which citizen publishers’ claims for 
protections that have been traditionally reserved for journalists were to be decided 
within the framework of the vehicle through which the message was sent. The content 
of the message the citizen publisher conveyed was characterized within the narrative put 
forth in these cases as being of lesser or no importance. In Forensic Advisors, for 
example, the court’s discourse communicated that it understood the question before it as 
being related to “whether a financial newsletter is entitled to protection under the state’s 
news-media privilege.”78 The narrative conveyed in the cases emphasized the vehicle of 
communication, and placed the possible contribution made by the message in a 
secondary role. Furthermore, the text in Forensic Advisors included only a one-sentence 
footnote that summarized some of the problems in the twenty-three-page report from 
which the case arose, and no other mention of the content of the message was made.79 
The discourse in Armani was similar in that the case revolved around claims of 
defamatory message-board postings and unfair business practices regarding the 
website’s content, but none of the content that led to the issues in the case was included 
within the opinion.80 Instead, the court’s narrative concentrated on whether websites, 
and message boards especially, qualified as an “other medium” according to a Florida 
law.81 By focusing their determinations on the vehicle through which messages are 
delivered, the courts in the discourse carried in these cases communicated an 
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understanding that the content of the messages, regardless of their value to deliberation 
in society, is of little importance when judges evaluate citizen publishers’ claims for 
protections that have traditionally been reserved for journalists. 
The theme appeared to emerge within this body of discourse for two primary 
reasons: First, the narrative conveyed by the judges communicated a concern that they 
could not find precedential support to guide their decisions. The mostly pre-network-era 
precedents they focused on were medium-based precedents, those that focused on 
whether or not a type of communication delivery should be included under existing 
laws. Second, this body of discourse indicated that the wording of existing press-related 
statutory protections, such as shield laws, directed the courts’ focus toward the vehicle 
of communication and not the message. 
The Forensic Advisors, BidZirk and Armani rulings in particular included 
passages where judges indicated they could not find clear precedential support for the 
questions before them. The Florida court in Armani wrote, for example, that the issue 
before it “has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida or by any 
court in this circuit.”82 The judge in BidZirk wrote that “there is no published case 
deciding whether a blogger is a journalist.”83 The Financial Advisors ruling included a 
similar statement and then turned to pre-Internet precedents from Ohio and 
Massachusetts, those regarding print materials, to guide the court’s deliberation 
regarding the web-based financial newsletter in question.84 The Texas court in Kaufman 
directed much of its deliberation on whether “articles communicated through the 
internet equate in legal effect in some circumstances to words published by more 
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traditional electronic or print media.”85 As with Forensic Advisors and Armani, the 
courts’ narrative articulated an understanding that the central question in the case 
related to the matter of how the message was delivered, rather than concern for the 
content of the message.  
In constructing this theme, the narrative put forth by the California court in 
O’Grady went a step further by associating the lack of relevant precedent with reasons 
why it concentrated on the way the message was delivered rather than on the content of 
the message. The opinion included extensive details with respect to the contents of the 
messages, but the judges ultimately communicated an understanding that vehicle-based 
considerations were the determining factors in their decision. The court wrote, “We 
decline the implicit invitation to embroil ourselves in the questions of what constitutes 
‘legitimate journalism.’ . . . We can think of no workable test or principle that would 
distinguish ‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ news.”86 In this sense the discourse 
conveyed an understanding that a content-based approach was unworkable, and from 
that point in the decision, the narrative framed the question before the court as 
pertaining to whether the websites were periodicals or if the author of the messages 
qualified as an “other person” according to the California shield law.  
The narrative also indicated that these cases carried a greater concentration on 
the way a message was delivered than on the content of the message itself because state 
shield laws, and other laws considered within these cases, focused on the medium. The 
California shield law that was considered in O’Grady, for example, concentrated on 
who is covered and what types of publications are covered. The law’s wording does not 
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take into account what was is communicated in the messages. The law does not 
consider, for example, whether the message is of a legitimate public concern or if it 
contributes to what is known in a democratic society. The Maryland shield law’s 
wording, examined in Forensic Advisors, lists newspapers, magazines, journals, press 
associations, news agencies, wire services, radio, television, and any “printed, 
photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating information to the 
public.”87 These criteria do not consider the content, only the communicated format of 
the information, and therefore substantially direct the courts’ evaluations of citizen 
publishers’ claims. This theme was not limited to shield laws. The Armani and Kaufman 
cases focused on other types of state laws that afford protections to the media. The 
defamation law in Armani that requires that five days pass after a story is printed or 
broadcast before a lawsuit can be brought against a media outlet specifically mentions 
newspapers, broadcasts, periodicals, or “other medium[s].”88 This wording, the 
narrative indicated, channeled the court’s attention toward addressing the vehicle of 
communication, rather than the content of the message.  
The opinion in BidZirk communicated a different understanding than what was 
conveyed by the courts in the other cases in this section. The case was decided on the 
basis of the message, not the vehicle in which it was carried. The judge characterized 
his approach as examining “the content of the material, not the format, to determine 
whether it is journalism.”89 The text carried an understanding that the message and the 
intent of the author were of central importance in the judge’s deliberation. The judge 
wrote, “Smith felt that what he learned from his experience with BidZirk would be 
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helpful to others dealing with an eBay listing company. . . . There is no evidence that 
the sole purpose of the article was to denigrate BidZirk.”90  
While BidZirk provided a contrast, the fact that the primary determining 
consideration in the narrative contained within these cases was on the way the message 
was delivered indicates that even those who have insightful or important ideas to 
contribute to democratic society will have to communicate them through a form of 
online media that can be easily linked to state shield-law or related statutory language, 
which tends to favor traditional media, or stay within the medium-based logic of lower-
court judges. While the courts’ decisions often turned to older, non-network-era 
precedents and state laws that were not written to include online communication, five of 
these six decisions, all but Smith, resulted in the court finding the citizen publisher 
qualified for rights that have been traditionally reserved for journalists. 
 
Message Delivery According to Accepted Rules of Journalism 
 The discourse within this set of cases most consistently reflected an expectation 
by the courts that the way messages were delivered, and to a far-lesser extent the 
content of the messages, should resemble judges’ understandings of the rules of 
journalism. The criteria varied in each case, because there was no full, formal 
exploration of journalistic practices in any of the decisions. The narrative carried within 
these cases, however, indicated, through the way judges assessed journalism in a variety 
of contexts that they expected a person who claimed to be a journalist to display some 
comprehension of traditionally accepted journalistic concepts. In Kaufman and 
O’Grady, for example, the narrative specifically asserted that the authors went beyond 
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simply posting ideas on forums and recognized the editorial thought-processes involved 
in the publications.91 The discourse represented in these decisions indicated that judges 
expected to see evidence of information-gathering, editorial decision-making, editors 
vetting messages, and the use of original information and interviews. In finding the 
online-only magazines in O’Grady qualified as media under the California shield law’s 
wording, for example, the judge wrote, “It is established without contradiction that they 
gather, select, and prepare for purposes of publication to a mass audience, information 
about current events of interest and concern to that audience.”92 In this sense, the 
decisions indicated that judges were seeking a way to distinguish the work of citizen 
publishers from members of the traditional media.  
The fact that the authors in BidZirk and in Kaufman conducted background 
research appeared to be central to the judges’ thinking in both cases. The judge’s 
discourse in Forensic Advisors carried a concern regarding the danger to the 
information-gathering capabilities of the online publication if it was compelled to 
divulge its anonymous sources.93 The judge in BidZirk asserted, “Smith engaged in 
background research. . . . Smith’s article evidences his intent to report what he believed 
was a newsworthy story.”94 The court in Kaufman recognized on two occasions in the 
opinion that the writer gathered information from government publications, public 
documents, and Muslim websites.95 The discourse in both cases communicated an 
understanding that the presence of research and original information were central to the 
court’s determination. The central contention of the plaintiff in Smith was that the 
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athletics officials at the University of Colorado had halted his access to information. In 
the decision, the judge weighed the parties’ arguments, asserting that Smith sought to 
observe teams’ practices and interview sources. While the court did not rule in Smith’s 
favor, its opinion communicated an understanding that information-gathering, as a part 
of the way it comprehended journalism, was an important characteristic within its 
evaluation of the citizen publisher’s claim. In O’Grady, Apple argued the online-
magazine publishers could not claim media protections because the content they posted 
was mostly just stolen data. The opinion rejected that understanding by recognizing a 
difference between simply posting information and coming “into possession of, and 
convey[ing] to their readers, information those readers would find of considerable 
interest.”96 In further contributing to that theme, the opinion asserted, “The decision 
whether to take this approach, or to present original information at the top level of an 
article, is itself an occasion for editorial judgment.”97 In refuting Apple’s contentions, 
the opinion discussed the way the online-magazine publishers exhibited editorial 
processes that went beyond those found on simple discussion boards. The judges 
concluded the publishers demonstrated editorial judgment that dictated which stories 
ran, where they ran, their length, and how they would be presented.98 The court’s 
discourse placed emphasis on the manner in which those characteristics contributed to 
the conclusion that the online magazines qualified for protection under the state shield 
law.  
The narrative conveyed in the Kaufman opinion communicated a similar 
understanding in its assessment of the way the editorial process was involved in the 
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writer’s publication in Front Page Magazine. The text articulated an understanding that 
the presence of an editorial process helped Kaufman qualify for protection under the 
Texas law.99 In both BidZirk and Kaufman, the opinions reflected an understanding that 
not all people who published online were journalists.100 As the court in Kaufman 
expressed it, “We do not hold, therefore, that everyone who communicates on the 
internet would qualify as a member of the electronic media.”101 The opinion further 
asserted that the journalistic characteristics demonstrated by Front Page Magazine also 
included the fact that the author addressed a national issue of public concern, which the 
narrative communicates contributed to the court’s decision. The fact that the discourse 
in these cases so often recognized the way that the parties followed certain journalistic 
rules contributed to the theme that the way messages were delivered should resemble 
judicial understandings of the rules of journalism in order to support claims for 
protections that have been traditionally reserved for journalists. 
 
Exercise of Speech Clause Versus Exercise of Press Clause 
 With few exceptions, judges framed the issues before them as matters of free 
speech in the context of expression exercised on the Internet. In other words, the 
narrative carried an understanding that what the citizen publishers communicated was 
speech expressed online rather than something published in a press-clause sense. The 
press clause was mentioned three times in the six cases, once in a quote from a Supreme 
Court case and twice in tandem with the speech clause.102 It was not otherwise 
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explicitly included in the discourse represented by the cases. In Smith, for example, the 
court utilized an earlier, pre-Internet case that was analogous to the citizen publisher’s 
in which a police officer “retaliated against a plaintiff’s freedom of speech.”103 
Similarly, in the O’Grady, the opinion framed the question before the court as being 
based on if the articles were “protected speech.”104 These two particular examples are 
noteworthy because Smith was a one-man website publisher, while O’Grady 
encompassed two online-only magazines with large audiences and a series of editors 
and reporters. While it is understandable that a court would understand a one-man 
operation as a type of soapbox whose messages appeared to be more related with an 
individual’s speech, it is worth emphasizing that the more complex operations in 
O’Grady were also conceptualized in the text as relating to speech-clause concerns.  
 The discourse within the Armani case further carried the theme that the courts 
understand citizen publishers’ messages as relating to the speech clause. In discussing 
Armani’s demand for an injunction against The Hair Restoration Network website, the 
narrative focused on the fact that his claim sought “an impermissible prior restraint on 
speech and should be dismissed as inconsistent with the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.”105 The word “speech” was utilized on every reference regarding 
prior restraints and the opinion never conveyed an understanding in which the website 
was discussed as a form of press or as something specifically triggering press-clause 
protection. In O’Grady, however, the discourse on more than one occasion represented 
the web-based magazines at the center of the case as being like printed newspapers and 
magazines. The court wrote, “News-oriented Web sites like petitioners’ are surely ‘like’ 
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a newspaper or magazine for these purposes.”106 Despite this representation of the 
online magazines as being like traditional media outlets that have historically been at 
the center of press-clause cases, the narrative in O’Grady primarily articulated an 
understanding of the case from a speech-clause perspective.107  
In Smith, the discourse framed the author’s two primary claims in terms of 
speech issues. The narrative only shifted to press issues when the court dispatched 
Smith’s right-of-access claim. The court then drew upon Supreme Court rulings 
regarding access for reporters in contending that the institutional press has not been 
found to receive greater access to information than others.108 And even in discussing 
press-oriented access cases, the text did not refocus its thematic attention on the press 
clause, which in fact was not specifically mentioned. In Kaufman, the press clause was 
mentioned once, and then in conjunction with the speech clause, in a footnote as part of 
an excerpt from a Texas law.109 In asserting that the article’s author and the website 
were eligible for the news-media exemption, the court correlated its discourse with 
another Texas-court opinion by concluding that a “plain reading of this language 
evidences clear legislative intent that a party seeking summary judgment on claims and 
defenses that implicate free speech be entitled to appeal a trial court’s denial of this 
relief.”110 The case the opinion drew upon dealt with a false advertising claim regarding 
a trade journal. The case, with its speech-clause orientation, was utilized in the court’s 
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discourse to contextualize its determination that the law’s media exemption extended to 
online publications.  
 
Preference for Organizations and Groups over Individuals  
 The narrative consistently represented the characteristics relevant to citizen 
publishers’ websites and communications in terms of comparisons to traditional media. 
Although the discourse communicated a level of skepticism that individual citizen 
publishers could be understood in equivalent terms to how journalists traditionally have 
been, the discourse in these cases nevertheless generally categorized what the citizen 
publishers were doing as similar to the practices of traditional media sources of 
information. This thematic approach made it far more likely that a group of people with 
an established audience, a clear information niche, a business model, an association 
with other professionals, and regular updates on their website or blog would succeed in 
their claims for protections that have traditionally been reserved for the press. The other 
side of that coin, however, meant that communicators acting alone who did not exhibit 
such characteristics faced a more difficult threshold when seeking protection.  
 The construction of this theme was reflected in the way the courts’ discourse 
articulated how they understood the citizen publishers. In Smith, the opinion primarily 
referred to Smith by his last name and referred to his website, Netbuffs, only sparsely in 
the opinion. The text carried a similar understanding in BidZirk, referring to the blogger 
by his last name and only mentioning the blog title on first reference. In all of the 
group-oriented cases, the discourse primarily referred to the group or publication in 
question, such as the Eyeshade Report in Forensic Advisors or Front Page Magazine in 
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Kaufman. In O’Grady, the opinion referred to Apple Insider and O’Grady’s PowerPage 
throughout.111 The use of the citizen publisher’s name in the individual-based cases 
versus the online publication’s name in the group-oriented cases operated as a 
noteworthy form of positioning, intentionally or not, on the part of the judges. When a 
website was nearly always referred to by the name of its author, it seemed to make less 
sense, in terms of the understandings articulated in the narrative, that it receive 
protections that have traditionally been reserved for the media. When the website’s 
name was utilized throughout, that suggested that it made more sense in terms of the 
judges’ understandings that the website would be a type of media outlet, something 
deserving of press-related protections. 
 Because Smith also lacked other characteristics that were emphasized in the 
narrative, those generally found in group-oriented websites, the opinion expressed an 
understanding of him as a “person” and not as a media entity. In dispatching one of 
Smith’s claims, the opinion concluded that the athletic department’s actions did not 
cause “Smith to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from 
continuing to publish an Internet site.”112 The case’s text further contributed to the 
articulation of this theme by asserting that the athletic department’s decision to exclude 
Smith might have hindered his ability to gather information, but “alternative avenues to 
information remained open.”113 Finally, in this passage, the court’s discourse framed its 
understanding in terms of the district court’s logic concerning the fact that the state did 
nothing to halt Smith from publishing. The district court wrote, “Smith continues to 
possess the ability to publish anything any citizen could by opening a privately operated 
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website.”114 These passages contribute to the theme because the discourse 
communicates an understanding that the court was reluctant to represent Smith as 
anything more than a person with a website. In the context of the other cases in this 
analysis, that decision to view Smith as a person and not as media placed him in the 
context of a lone publisher who lacked many of the traditional media-like characteristics 
the courts drew upon in constructing their dispositive understandings. In contrast, when 
the California court in O’Grady determined that the online-only magazines qualified for 
protection under the state shield law, its opinion represented the publications as if they 
were news outlets. It found that “news-oriented Web sites like petitioners’ are surely 
‘like’ a newspaper or magazine.”115 The court highlighted the fact that the magazine had 
editors and that they were “conceptually indistinguishable from publishing a 
newspaper.”116 
 Understandings that favored group-oriented online publications were also 
apparent in Kaufman and Forensic Advisors. The discourse in Forensic Advisors carried 
an emphasis that the Eyeshade Report focused on publishing information about publicly 
traded companies and that it included a network of subscriber-contributors. The text 
asserted that “because some of FAI’s customers are ‘sources’ of the information 
provided in the Eyeshade Report, disclosure of FAI’s customer list would create 
substantial likelihood that the customer/sources would no longer be willing to provide 
information.”117 This passage communicated that the court constructed its 
understanding from concerns with both the information-gathering ability of the report 
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and the financial model. Similarly, in Kaufman, the narrative conveyed a recognition 
that Front Page Magazine had a sizeable audience, a clear subject area of focus, and a 
history of regularly updating its site with information.118 The discourse also stressed the 
significance of the online publication having a system of editors who vetted information 
that was submitted by contributors such as Kaufman.119 
 As examined in the first theme discussed in this chapter, BidZirk stands to some 
extent apart from the other cases. It represents the only time in the twelve cases focused 
upon in this chapter that an individual citizen publisher had his claims for press-related 
protections affirmed. As in Smith, the judge in references throughout the opinion 
utilized the blog author’s name. The judge did not appear, however, to place 
significance on the characteristics that often were represented as most crucial in other 
cases. No reference was made regarding the financial status of the website, and it was 
not clear from the construction of the opinion whether Smith’s blog was consistently 
published, had a large audience, or had a specific area of focus. The discourse’s focus 
on the message, rather than the way the message was delivered, and its related 
recognition of the journalistic qualities of the message, contributed heavily to the fact 
that Smith’s four-part blog series about online auction-listing companies was 
understood as qualifying for the media exemption that was at the center of the case. 
 The judges in their discourse in these cases articulated an understanding that 
citizen publishers are more akin to individuals with the ability to communicate online 
than they are to media outlets. This theme was conveyed by judicial understandings that 
citizen-publishing groups, such as the online magazines in the O’Grady case, are more 
                                                




similar to traditional media and, therefore, more deserving of rights traditionally 
reserved for institutional media. Similarly, the rights of citizen publishers were 
conceptualized as relating to speech-clause, rather than press-clause, concerns. The 
discourse within the cases in the next section of this chapter communicated the same 
themes, but the decisions in those cases generally represented a greater level of 
skepticism from the courts regarding citizen publishers’ claims for traditional-media 
protections. 
Later cases, 2010-2012 
  This section of Chapter Two focuses on the later set of lower-court rulings, 
those from 2010 to 2012, involving instances when citizen publishers claimed 
protections that have been traditionally reserved for journalists. The cases focused upon 
in this section are: Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc. 
(2010), Nexus v. Swift (2010), Too Much Media v. Hale (2011), Obsidian Financial 
Group v. Cox (2012), Johns-Byrne Company v. TechnoBuffalo (2012), and Bailey v. 
State (2012).120 After a detailed factual discussion of each case, the themes that 
emerged through application of Altheide’s process of document analysis are presented.  
Mortgage Specialists v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries 
 In Mortgage Specialists, the New Hampshire Supreme Court came to similar 
conclusions as those made by the Texas court in Kaufman less than six months earlier. 
The court employed similar reasoning, when compared with Kaufman, when faced with 
a case that hinged on whether a website qualified for media privileges. As with the 
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Texas court, the New Hampshire court focused on the way the message was delivered, 
rather than on the content itself. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries maintained a 
website that ranked businesses that were involved in the mortgage industry and 
provided forums for readers to discuss their experiences with mortgage lenders.121 In 
August 2008, the website posted confidential information about Mortgage Specialists 
and listed the company as “at risk” on its ranking device, the “Implode-O-Meter.”122 It 
also posted information about state actions that were taken against the lender. Finally, a 
reader posted what Mortgage Specialists claimed were defamatory comments on the 
website’s forums. In the case, Mortgage Specialists pursued an injunction against the 
site, demanded the confidential documents be taken down, and sought the identity of the 
anonymous poster. 
 Implode declined to take the information down from its website or to identify 
the name of the person who posted on its website. The group claimed it was a news 
organization, which meant it was protected by the newsgatherer’s privilege in the New 
Hampshire Constitution.123 Mortgage Specialists disagreed, arguing Implode was not a 
news organization and was not eligible for the newsgatherer’s privilege. Importantly, as 
was seen in BidZirk, the court explained that there was little precedent available 
regarding the question it was considering. In making its determination, the court wrote, 
“Although our cases discussing the newsgathering privilege have involved traditional 
news media, . . . we reject Mortgage Specialists’ contention that the newsgathering 
privilege is inapplicable because Implode is neither an established media entity nor 
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engaged in investigative reporting.”124 In outlining its decision, the court referred to the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Branzburg v. Hayes, referring to the justices’ 
determination that freedom of the press was a “fundamental personal right which is not 
confined to newspapers and periodicals.”125 Implode provided information to the public, 
which the court found qualified it as a reporter under the New Hampshire Constitution’s 
privilege.126 To this end, the court rejected Mortgage Specialists’ call for an injunction, 
determining that such a move would violate the First Amendment. In regard to 
protecting the anonymity of the person who posted on the forum, the court remanded 
that portion of the case.127 Though the outcomes were similar, the finding in this case, 
with the facts in mind, is more broad and inclusive than the shield-law rulings in 
O’Grady and Forensic Advisors. Attorney Benjamin Wischnowski argued the Mortgage 
Specialists ruling could damage the formation of a standard for how citizen publishers’ 
claims for media protections will be evaluated in the future, because he found, 
“Extending the reporter’s-privilege protection to a website simply because that site 
‘serves an informative function in the flow of information’ creates an amorphous 
standard that is unlikely to prove sustainable.”128  
Nexus v. Swift 
 Nexus, decided in 2010 in a state appeals court in Minnesota, provided a murkier 
set of facts in comparison to previous cases regarding citizen-publishers’ claims on 
privileges traditionally held by journalists. The case revolved around Janette Swift’s 
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fight against plans to relocate a residential facility for juvenile sex offenders near her 
home.129 As part of her protest, Swift utilized YouTube, a personal website, a blog, and 
email to spread information about a patient who died at the hands of a Nexus staff 
member while he was being restrained. The text she posted with the YouTube video 
stated that the center was “getting away with murder.”130 She called the company 
“sadistic” and posted that the leaders were “bad people” on her website. She sent emails 
to Nexus employees and its board of directors. The company sued Swift for defamation, 
contending that Nexus was never charged with murder and that the employee followed 
state-approved procedures for restraining a patient.131 The company outlined other 
problems regarding information Swift had posted as well. In her defense, Swift argued 
she was a media defendant, a claim which was treated with skepticism by the court. 
While the court ultimately declined to rule on this aspect of the case, instead choosing 
to remand the case, it appeared dismissive of Swift’s claims in a way that was similar to 
the federal appeals court’s reaction in Smith. The court stated Swift “seems to contend 
she is a media defendant.”132 In acknowledging Swift’s argument that her work was 
placed on a blog and on a video, the court wrote, “She sites no authority for the 
proposition that this renders her a media defendant, and we are aware of none.”133 Much 
as in Smith, the court appeared dismissive of the citizen publisher’s work in a way that 
would be unlikely to occur in the face of a more-established, traditional-media 
organization.  
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In claiming to be a media defendant, Swift argued the First Amendment and 
Article I, Section Three of the Minnesota Constitution protected her statements.134 
According to the Minnesota Constitution, if she were viewed as a media defendant, 
Nexus would have to prove “actual malice,” the highest degree of fault required in order 
for a libel action to proceed, to win its claim against Swift.135 Actual malice requires the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant showed reckless disregard for the truth or knew the 
information being published was untrue and published it anyway.136 Because the court 
chose to remand the case, it provided limited insight regarding Swift’s media claim.  
The final angle the court considered was in regard to the message’s intent. Swift 
argued her messages were a form of public participation, which under Minnesota law 
can provide protection to a communicator who is accused of defamation. Public 
participation, according to the state law, is defined as “speech or lawful conduct that is 
genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action.”137 
Nexus disagreed with Swift’s contention, claiming that her statements “were too 
attenuated from the public controversy to meet the statutory definition.”138 Nexus also 
argued the public-participation aspect of Minnesota law did not apply to online 
communication. The court flatly rejected this view, determining that the state law’s 
“public-participation requirement does not exclude speech communicated through the 
medium of the Internet.”139 In closing, the court instructed the district court to decide if 
Swift was a media defendant and if her statements classified as public participation. 
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Too Much Media v. Hale 
 Too Much Media is the first of two similar cases in which citizen publishers had 
their claims for media protections rejected. In this case, a 2011 ruling by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, the way the message was delivered was the determining factor. Shellee 
Hale, a former Microsoft employee who became a life coach, was victimized by cyber-
flashers who pretended to be interested in her classes only to flash her when she put 
them on her web-camera.140 Her experiences led her to investigate other ways women 
were being abused online. She started work on an online resource, Pornafia, for victims 
and potential victims of the adult entertainment industry.141 While she worked on her 
website, she utilized a pornography-industry website’s message board to communicate 
her information. Her message-board posts included claims that Too Much Media, a 
company that creates payment and information-tracking software for the pornography 
industry, had threatened people and profited from a breach that exposed its otherwise-
anonymous customers’ names. The company sued Hale for defamation and false-light 
invasion of privacy.142 Too Much Media argued Hale’s posts implied the company was 
engaged in illegal activities, used technology in unethical ways, and committed fraud. 
Hale contended that her message-board posts were intended to inform the public and 
encourage debate about a matter of public concern.143 She also claimed protection under 
the New Jersey reporter’s shield law and the First Amendment right to free speech.  
 Hale argued she spoke with the attorney general of Washington State and her 
congressman, went to several adult-industry trade shows, interviewed people involved 
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in the adult-entertainment industry, and read extensively online in preparing the 
messages she posted on the Oprano message boards.144 From the beginning, the court 
asserted that Hale’s journalism-related activities would make little difference in its 
decision. The court wrote, “Our focus in this case, though is not on what the law 
protects. Instead, we are required to determine whom the Legislature intended to cloak 
with an absolute privilege.”145 The court focused on the vehicle of communication that 
Hale utilized, a message board, rather than the content of her messages. The court 
conducted a detailed reading and analysis of the state shield law, highlighting that the 
statute had not been amended since 1979.146 The fact that online technologies were not 
listed in the law did not eliminate them from protection, the court explained. Instead, 
the court concluded, “The existence of new technology merely broadens the possible 
spectrum of what the Shield Law might encompass.”147 In this sense, the court in Too 
Much Media was faced with a similar challenge to what the California court in O’Grady 
and the Maryland court in Forensic Advisors faced: Interpreting a shield law that was 
written before the communication technology at the center of the case was invented. 
The court examined the nature and uses of message boards, and determined that they 
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were forums for conversation. The court contended that message boards are used to 
allow people to post and read “topics of common interest.”148 Ultimately, the court 
classified message boards, as a communication tool, are more comparable to letters to 
the editor than newspapers or other forms of traditional media.149 The determination 
centered on a single passage in the shield law, which states that qualifying information 
sources must be “similar” to traditional news sources.150 The court wrote “these sites 
allow people a chance to express their thoughts about matters of interest. But they are 
not the functional equivalent of the types of news media outlets outlined in the Shield 
Law.”151  
In closing its opinion, the court addressed a more content-based avenue, much 
like the one used by the federal-district court in BidZirk, of assessing if a message-board 
post qualified as journalism. It asserted that this approach accounted for whether the 
message provided information to the public and considered the process involved in 
gathering the information. The court, however, stated it was charged with interpreting a 
specific law, not a theory: “If the legislature had wanted to create an intent test alone, it 
could have done so.”152 Much as in O’Grady and Forensic Advisors, the unique nature 
of the state’s shield law influenced the outcome. The courts’ evaluations of the press-
related statutory protections, such as shield laws, however, have varied. The court in 
O’Grady placed substantial weight on its evaluation of the characteristics of the site. 
The Texas court in Kaufman evaluated the website’s characteristics and the author’s 
journalistic qualifications. In Too Much Media, the New Jersey court considered the 
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characteristics of the site as well, but it ultimately focused on a narrow understanding of 
the shield law, indicating that no matter the importance of the message Hale was 
conveying, it would not be protected because it was posted on a message board. In this 
sense, Wischnowski viewed the Too Much Media and Mortgage Specialists decisions as 
being on opposing sides of a spectrum. In the Mortgage Specialists decision, the New 
Hampshire court’s interpretation of the shield law was relatively broad, which left room 
for the Implode website to be considered a media outlet. The Too Much Media ruling, 
however, was too exclusive because it focused only the form of delivery, Wischnowski 
argued.153  
Obsidian Financial Group v. Cox 
 Obsidian, a 2012 decision, represents another instance within this set of cases 
when a citizen publisher’s claimed for shield-law protection under a state law was 
denied. Obsidian Finance sued Cox for defamation after she posted numerous blog 
posts that accused the company of fraud, stealing, and lying.154 The posts were on 
multiple sites, including “obsidianfinancesucks.com” and 
“bankruptcycorruption.com.”155 Many of the posts consisted of a single sentence. Cox 
claimed protection under the First Amendment, the Oregon shield law, and another 
Oregon law that, much like the Florida law in Armani, requires those who plan to bring 
a defamation action against a media defendant to first demand a retraction or correction. 
Since Obsidian never demanded a correction or retraction from Cox, her designation 
regarding whether or not she qualified as a journalist was a key determination in the 
case. The judge, however, read the retraction law and saw no mention of blogs among 
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the types of media that were listed as being protected.156 The law requires that the 
offending message is published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, radio, 
television, movie, or “other printed periodical.”157 For this reason, the judge found 
Cox’s was not a media defendant, and therefore, that Obsidian’s defamation claim was 
not hindered by that fact that it did not wait five days before commencing its 
defamation suit.158 The judge came to the same conclusion in regard to Cox’s argument 
for protection under the shield law. The law required, the judge found, that the person 
who claimed protection work for one of a group of specifically listed types of media 
outlets.159 The judge explained that the law in question is specific in its wording and 
contended, “The Legislature did not simply say ‘publications’ or ‘broadcasts,’ but 
instead, delineated specific types of media.”160  
 Cox also argued that, since she was a media defendant, Obsidian had to prove 
actual malice, the highest standard of scrutiny for a plaintiff to reach in a defamation 
case.161 In response to this claim, the judge listed seven criteria that, in his 
conceptualization of journalistic practices and processes, characterized journalism. He 
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The criteria he listed were: (1) an education in journalism, (2) an affiliation with a news 
outlet, (3) observance of journalistic practices of editing and disclosure of conflicts of 
interest, (4) keeping interview notes, (5) creating understandings of confidentiality with 
anonymous sources, (6) the creation of an original product, rather than a compilation of 
the work of others, and (7) getting both sides of the story.162 The judge offered no 
citation regarding the origins of his list. He concluded that Cox failed to meet any of the 
criteria he outlined, writing, “I did not state that to be considered ‘media,’ one had to 
posses all or most of the characteristics I recited.”163 In this sense, he found that neither 
the letter of the law, nor his impression of what constituted journalism, supported Cox’s 
claim as a media defendant.  
Much as in Too Much Media, the judge interpreted the state law as not 
protecting an individual citizen publisher. The judge in Obsidian added a list of 
professional criteria and found that Cox did not meet any of the requirements. The 
professional credentials part of the decision is similar to the Texas appeals court’s 
approach in Kaufman. Only in that case, the court used a more broad understanding of 
the law’s wording. Regarding Obsidian, Attorney John Dougherty cautioned that 
protection should not be dictated by “extraneous factors such as education [and] 
employment status.”164 He concluded that Cox’s speech likely was not eligible for the 
media protections she claimed, but the judge’s strict understanding of the law and his 
list of journalistic criteria likely would mean that deserving citizen publishers would 
also not be protected.  
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Johns-Byrne Company v. TechnoBuffalo 
 Johns-Byrne shares substantial similarities with O’Grady in that both cases 
involve an online-only technology magazine that published unreleased plans for a large 
technology company’s upcoming product.165 The Johns-Byrne decision came from a 
2012 Illinois Circuit Court decision that leaned heavily on the reasoning found in the 
O’Grady and Too Much Media rulings.166 In August 2011, unreleased images of the 
Motorola Droid Bionic smartphone, were stolen from Johns-Byrne, the company that 
was hired to print the product’s manual. TechnoBuffalo posted images and information 
about the phone. The printing company, believing the website knew the name of the 
anonymous source, petitioned the court to compel TechnoBuffalo to provide all of its 
communications from a seven-day span.167 TechnoBuffalo claimed the Illinois reporter’s 
privilege protected it from having to disclose the names of its sources. 
In examining the website’s claim, the judge considered TechnoBuffalo’s 
characteristics, listing that the website encouraged technology-firm employees to break 
the law. He also highlighted that “the sole purpose of the TechnoBuffalo solicitation is 
to promote TechnoBuffalo, without a second thought as to what harm it may cause 
lawful companies whose stolen information it leaks.”168 The website, however, included 
layers of editors and fact-checkers for its information, the judge recognized. The site 
contained information about technology-related issues, commentary, guides, reviews, 
and video. It boasted more than a million visitors per month. The printing company 
argued the website did not acquire the information through active investigation and that 
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its information was mere hype and not actual journalism.169 In his decision, the judge 
chose to primarily focus on the characteristics of the website, instead of the credentials 
of the reporters or the content of the messages.  
 After examining the characteristics of the website, the judge turned to the state 
law’s wording. He emphasized that the laws states, “No court may compel any person 
to disclose the source of any information obtained by a reporter.”170 The judge 
determined TechnoBuffalo fit the definition, under the law, of a reporter.171 He 
disagreed with Johns-Byrne’s argument that newsgathering must be active to be 
considered reporting. He wrote that “how news is collected — actively, passively or 
otherwise — is not set out or discussed in the Act.”172 The judge next examined whether 
TechnoBuffalo qualified as a news medium according to Illinois law. He lamented that 
“the line between what constitutes an online newspaper or periodical and a standard 
news website remains hazy.”173 In his evaluation of the TechnoBuffalo website’s 
characteristics, he compared chicagotribune.com, a traditional media outlet’s news site, 
with the merits of Salon, which does not have a print product. Finally, he acknowledged 
that the law included the wording “print or electronic format,” which he construed as 
including online media.174 With these determinations, the judge found that he had no 
other option but to rule TechnoBuffalo was a news medium according to Illinois law. 
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This determination meant the state could not compel the site to provide the information 
the printing company sought. As in other cases in this chapter, the unique wording of a 
state shield law substantially influenced the course of the decision. Still, the judge chose 
to direct his considerations toward the characteristics of the specific website involved in 
the case, not the form of online media in general, as the judge did in Too Much Media. 
He also did not consider the content, as was the case in BidZirk, or the credentials of the 
authors, as the courts did in Kaufman and Obsidian.  
Bailey v. State 
 Bailey presents a unique scenario in comparison to the previous cases because 
the case deals with a Maine election law that requires political advocacy groups to 
report their funding sources and to provide a name and contact address on all 
communications.175 The federal-district-court case required the judge to decide if a 
website that published negative information about a single candidate during the final 
months of the 2010 gubernatorial election qualified for the election law’s media 
exemption. In outlining the facts of the case, the judge highlighted that the author of the 
website, Dennis Bailey, was a trained journalist who had spent many years working as a 
reporter for Maine newspapers.176 He had also worked as a press secretary, 
speechwriter, and adviser for top members of Maine’s state and national political 
figures. At the time of the 2010 election, he ran a public-relations firm and operated a 
related news-and-commentary blog. During the primary he worked as a political 
consultant for gubernatorial candidate Rosa Scarcelli. When she lost in the primary, 
Shawn Moody, an independent candidate in the governor’s race, hired Bailey. In 
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August of 2010, a few months before the general election, Bailey created “The Cutler 
Files,” which did not identify the source of the website’s contents or how it was 
financed.177 The website, which consisted of nine negative stories about gubernatorial 
candidate Eliot Cutler, received nearly 50,000 visits during the two months it was 
online. The Maine Commission on Government Ethics and Election Practices fined 
Bailey $200 for violating state election law.178 Bailey claimed the website qualified for 
protection under the law’s press exemption, but the commission rejected his claim.179 
Specifically, the commission, looking at the wording of the media exemption within the 
law, determined the site was not a “periodical publication,” so it did not qualify.180 
Before the federal district judge, Bailey argued he was a citizen journalist who qualified 
for the exemption, that the election law’s requirement that he identify himself violated 
his First Amendment right to speak anonymously, and that the law compromised his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal-protection under the law.181 
 Bailey’s media claim was the central feature of the judge’s decision. In the 
instance of the Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim, Bailey argued giving the 
press an exemption to a state law made one group favored above the other. The judge 
disagreed with Bailey’s claim, contending that “in determining if the Cutler Files was 
entitled to the press exemption the Commission focused on the website’s form, which is 
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exactly what the commission is required to do.”182 She emphasized that the Cutler Files 
was not disqualified from the exemption because it was a website. She supported the 
commission’s argument, explaining “news stories, commentaries or editorials posted on 
the internet would fall within the press exemption as long as they were disseminated by 
broadcast stations, newspapers, magazines, or other periodical publications.”183 The key 
difference was The Cutler Files was not “the equivalent” of a broadcast or print media 
outlet and it did not have a track record of being a “periodical publication.” The 
commission’s determination, the judge argued, had nothing to do with Bailey’s position 
as a citizen journalist.184  
While Bailey was not a shield-law case, the judge was asked to interpret the 
wording of a law and to discern if a citizen publisher qualified as a media outlet. It is 
noteworthy that the law in question was enacted in 2010, but does not list bloggers or 
any specific form of online communication. The legislature was aware of the existence 
of all of the new forms of communication and chose not to include them. The judge in 
this case was not asked whether a law that was written before its authors could have 
conceived of the Internet era should be interpreted as including citizen publishers. The 
authors of the Maine law knew of the changes and chose not to include them. Without 
any form of online communication being enumerated in the law, the judge considered 
whether Bailey’s website could be viewed as a “periodical publication” under the law.  
Bailey’s website, the judge highlighted, was only online during the two months 
before the general election. The fact that it was started and discontinued to fit the final 
portion of the election cycle indicated the website’s mission was not to be a periodical 
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publication but a political tool. The judge also focused on how often the website was 
updated, new content was added six times in the two months it was online, when 
determining whether or not it was a periodical publication. Finally, she speculated, 
“This case could well have come out differently if the Cutler Files had any sort of track 
record before it appeared on August 30, 2010, or if it had extended beyond its two 
month run.”185 Because the judge found Bailey was not treated differently due to the 
fact that he was a citizen journalist, she dismissed his equal protection claim.  
Similarly, she dispatched his claim that his First Amendment right to 
anonymous speech was violated. The Maine law requires only those engaging in 
advocacy-oriented political communication to register, and therefore, does not limit 
political speech, the judge argued. The law served a state interest because “an informed 
electorate is near its zenith where a widely-viewed website falsely claiming to be 
written by journalists unaffiliated with any campaign expressly advocated the defeat of 
an opposing candidate.”186 Voters have to know, she postulated, the sources of the 
information they receive during elections. It is noteworthy that, though the judge did not 
explicitly mention it, the commission and judge considered the characteristics and 
background of the website’s author. The case listed the author’s education, professional 
experience, and the fact that he worked for two different candidates during the 
campaign. It is possible, though the judge did not discuss it, that the outcome could 
have been different if the citizen publisher had been a lesser-known and less-affiliated 
person, rather than a well-known, paid operative in Maine politics. 
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 The following subsections utilize Altheide’s method of document analysis to 
categorize representations that emerged through such examination of the preceding six 
lower-court decisions. Those representations related to the press-clause or arguably 
related protections as understood in terms of particular concerns that were emphasized 
in the courts’ conceptual rationales. In Altheide’s articulation of the heart of the 
methodological approach, the “actual words and direct messages of documents carry the 
discourse that reflects certain themes, which in turn are held together and given 
meaning by a broad frame.”187 As outlined earlier, the themes were: concern for (1) the 
way a message is delivered more than with the content of a message, (2) whether 
messages are delivered according to accepted rules of journalism, (3) emphasis on the 
exercise of the First Amendment’s speech clause more than with the exercise of its 
press clause, and (4) preference for organizations and groups over individual citizen 
publishers. 
 
The Way a Message is Delivered Versus the Content of the Message 
 The discourse communicated an understanding in all six of the cases in this set 
that the most important factor in the decisions was the way messages were delivered, 
rather than the content of the messages. None of these cases were comparable to the one 
in BidZirk, a case in which content was conceptualized by the judge as being the 
determining factor. Instead, the narrative in these cases carried a relatively unified 
understanding that the content of the message, no matter its potential value to a 
democratic society, would not be a factor for a citizen publisher who sought protections 
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that have traditionally been reserved for journalists. The understandings articulated in 
the discourse indicated that citizen publishers will have to be certain the characteristics 
of the type of online communication they choose to use substantially resemble a 
traditional media outlet. That determination, the narrative also indicated, will largely be 
left up to the wording of the state’s press-related statutory protections and a judge’s 
interpretation of them.  
The discourse communicated understandings relating to this theme in the earlier 
set of cases in this chapter, but in this group of cases the narrative put forth more strict 
interpretations of the laws. In the earlier cases, five of the six decisions were favorable 
to the citizen publishers. The texts in those cases carried an emphasis on the way the 
message was delivered, but did not convey the same level of rigidness regarding the 
exact wording of the laws in question as the judges communicated in this set of cases. 
The more-accepting posture that was communicated in the earlier cases was especially 
evident in O’Grady, where the narrative indicated that just because the California 
legislature did not explicitly included websites in the shield law’s wording did not mean 
it meant to exclude them from protection.188 Importantly, the discourse in the cases in 
this section communicated an expectation that the messages be delivered in a format 
that closely resembled a traditional form of media.  
In Too Much Media, for example, the court postulated, “Our focus in this case, 
though, is not on what the law protects. Instead, we are required to determine whom the 
Legislature intended to cloak with an absolute privilege.”189 The ruling’s primary focus, 
though the “whom” could be viewed as indicating a focus on authorship, was 
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constructed upon determining whether or not an online message board was similar 
enough to traditional media to qualify under the wording of the state shield law. The 
centrality of the text’s focus was based on the fact that the shield law, written before the 
emergence of the network era, did not specifically enumerate online forms of 
communication, especially not message boards. The opinion recognized that judges in 
other jurisdictions had employed content or intent-based approaches in similar cases, 
but rejected the idea because it did not line up with the shield law’s wording.190 To that 
end, the discourse focused on the part of the law that stated that other forms of media, 
those not specified in the law, could be protected, if they were similar to traditional 
forms of media.191 The court found message boards did not meet the requirements, and 
in doing so conveyed an understanding in its opinion that is consistent with the way this 
theme was constructed in this set of cases. The discourse carried understandings of 
press-related statutory protections as not extending to online communication conducted 
by citizen publishers because the way they communicated their messages often did not 
relate closely enough with traditional media. The court in Too Much Media wrote, “In 
the context of news media, posts and comments on message boards can be compared to 
letters to the editor. . . . But they are not the functional equivalent of the types of news 
media outlets outlined in the Shield Law.”192 The understanding that was communicated 
in the New Jersey court’s opinion was in strong contrast to the O’Grady decision’s far 
more interpretive wording. The court in that case stated, “Presumably the Legislature 
was not prescient enough to have consciously intended to include digital magazines, . . . 
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by the same token, however, it cannot have meant to exclude them.”193 Both opinions 
considered the wording of a shield law that was written before the network era, but 
reflected vastly different understandings of those laws, further contributing to the 
differences regarding how this theme was constructed between the earlier and later 
cases analyzed in this chapter.  
The discourse in the Obsidian ruling carried an understanding that is analogous 
to the decision in Too Much Media regarding how messages were delivered. The 
opinion does not include an evaluation of the content of the citizen publisher’s blog 
posts, which were only briefly mentioned in the fifty-two-page ruling, contributing to 
the theme that the messages were not central to the courts’ determinations. Instead, the 
narrative in Obsidian conveyed an understanding that the case came down to an 
interpretation of the state-shield law, which placed the focus on the way the message 
was delivered. The blogger’s shield-law claim was rejected as a result of a reading of 
the Oregon shield law that related to the understandings articulated by the court in Too 
Much Media. The narrative in the Obsidian ruling conveyed an understanding that in 
the absence of an explicit inclusion of online forms of communication in the shield law, 
no protections would be extended to citizen publishers. The judge wrote, “The 
legislature did not simply say ‘publications’ or ‘broadcasts,’ but instead delineated 
specific types of media in which the statements had to occur before they received 
protection.”194 In Bailey, the opinion also expressed the understanding that the form of 
the communication, not the content, had to be the focus.195 Despite the newness of the 
2010 election law in question, the judge determined that Bailey’s political-attack 
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website did not qualify for the media exemption because it was not a broadcast station, 
newspaper, magazine, “or other periodical publication.”196 By declining to include 
details about the messages that were conveyed on the website, the narrative further 
contributed to the theme that the central determining factor to the courts related to the 
way the message was communicated. The opinion in Bailey focused on the “periodical 
publication” portion of the law, asserting that the ruling had nothing to do with the fact 
that Bailey was not a paid journalist or that he posted his messages online. The opinion 
emphasized that Bailey’s website was updated six times during the two months it was 
online and that it was taken down just before the November election. For this reason, 
the website was compared to a political leaflet in the opinion, further articulating an 
understanding that the way the message was communicated was the judge’s primary 
focus. 
As a part of this theme, the discourse in these cases carried an understanding 
that citizen publishers must develop a track record of consistent publication and they 
must do so using a form of online communication that resembles a traditional news 
outlet’s work. The TechnoBuffalo opinion focused on the way the website was 
organized, listing that it included “news,” “reviews,” “videos,” “user-submitted,” “in 
the news,” and “giveaways” sections, and that more-than-a-million readers visited it 
each month.197 In comparing TechnoBuffalo to other websites, the opinion examined it 
alongside those of news outlets such as the Chicago Tribune’s and Time’s, indicating 
through the choice of comparisons that the judge sought an established outlet with a 
news-like format. By focusing upon these characteristics, the discourse further 
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communicated that the way the message was delivered was central to the court’s 
deliberations. Conversely, Swift, the defendant in Nexus, posted videos with comments 
on YouTube and additional statements on personal blog sites. While the court remanded 
the case, the opinion communicated skepticism that Swift qualified for media 
protections under Minnesota law. The court stated, dispatching Swift’s arguments that 
she was a media defendant, that “she cites no authority for the proposition that this 
renders her a media defendant, and we are aware of none.”198  
The discourse represented in these cases strongly supported an understanding 
that the courts are more concerned with the way messages are communicated, than with 
their content. The later set of cases added an additional dimension, in comparison to the 
earlier cases, in that the narrative indicated that the way messages are communicated 
must generally line up closely with how the state’s press-related statutory protections 
are worded and how they view traditional media as operating. 
 
Message Delivery According to Accepted Rules of Journalism 
 The narrative in these cases communicated an understanding that citizen 
publishers seeking protections that have traditionally been reserved for journalists were 
expected to gather, produce, and distribute information in ways that resemble 
traditionally understood journalistic practices and processes. In these cases, as in the 
earlier ones, the discourse strongly communicated that judges sought evidence of 
journalistic processes, such as editorial decision-making, information gathering, fact 
checking, editing, and producing original content. The narrative in the Obsidian 
opinion, for example, carried a recognition of the lack of journalism-related 
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characteristics in the blogger’s posts. The judge asserted, “Defendant had presented no 
evidence as to any single one of the characteristics which would tend to establish 
oneself as a member of the ‘media.’”199 The Too Much Media opinion conveyed a 
similar understanding, asserting that the message-board poster in the case lacked the 
journalistic credentials to qualify for protection under the shield law. The court in Too 
Much Media concluded, “Defendant has exhibited none of the recognized qualities or 
characteristics traditionally associated with the news process, nor has she demonstrated 
connection or affiliation with any news entity.”200 The opinion, importantly, became 
more specific when it highlighted the absence of evidence that the citizen publisher 
edited, fact-checked, took notes during interviews, identified herself as a reporter, or 
gave Too Much Media an opportunity to tell its side of the story.201 By including 
characteristics such as these in its deliberations, the opinion further contributed to the 
theme that judges consider traditionally understood journalistic practices when 
evaluating citizen publisher’s claims for press-related protections. 
 Furthermore, the narrative in Johns-Byrne communicated a similar 
conceptualization of this theme, asserting that the story at the center of the case was 
chosen as part of an editorial process that involved considering a specific audience, that 
the stolen information in the case was not repeated verbatim but was incorporated into 
an article, and that a system of editors fact-checked the information.202 The judge 
                                                
199 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43125 at 20. The judge was referring to a list of journalistic criteria he 
compiled and utilized in his ruling in Cox’s appeal six months earlier. In that opinion, the characteristics 
he considered were: (1) an education in journalism, (2) an affiliation with a news outlet, (3) observance of 
journalistic practices of editing and disclosure of conflicts of interest, (4) keeping interview notes, (5) 
creating understandings of confidentiality with anonymous sources, (6) the creation of an original 
product, rather than a compilation of the work of others, and (7) getting both sides of the story. 
200 Too Much Media v. Hale, 413 N.J. Super. 135, 160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).  
201 Too Much Media, 206 N.J. at 222-223. 
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concluded, referring to the Illinois shield law, that “some journalistic process, at least as 
encompassed by the Act, took place.”203 Similarly, the opinion in Mortgage Specialists 
carried a recognition that the authors of the website in the case gathered information and 
that information was “legitimate” and truthful and was published to an audience.204 The 
court wrote, “We conclude that Implode’s website serves an informative function and 
contributes to the flow of information to the public. Thus, Implode is a reporter for the 
purposes of the newsgathering privilege.”205 The same undercurrent can be found in 
Nexus, but in that case however, the opinion characterized the citizen publisher’s work 
as lacking the required journalistic standards. The narrative carried an understanding 
that the citizen publisher’s work should be accurate and include context, asserting that 
the author’s use “of a selective quotation from her blog post leaves out the notable 
preceding sentence.”206 The discourse in these decisions communicated an 
understanding by the courts that these citizen publishers, who were seeking protections 
that have traditionally been reserved for journalists, deliver their information in ways 
that, to some extent, line up with judicial conceptualizations of journalism. 
 Finally, the discourse in Too Much Media constructed this theme in terms of a 
set of journalism-related criteria that it understood to be a tool for gauging the validity 
of claims made by citizen publishers. The opinion listed: “Connection to news media; 
purpose to gather or disseminate news; and a showing that the materials sought were 
obtained in the course of professional newsgathering activities.”207 By providing a list 
with these characteristics, the narrative articulated that the court was looking to relate 
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the citizen publisher’s work with the way it understood journalism. The opinion 
communicated an understanding that while the Internet has allowed anyone who utilizes 
social media or a blog to assert journalistic protections, the court understood the three 
journalism-based criteria it listed as providing a sort of mooring for future courts.208 The 
criteria put forth in Too Much Media, as well as the meanings regarding this theme that 
were communicated in the other cases within this set, indicated that judges utilize 
conceptualizations of traditionally understood journalistic practices and processes in 
adjudicating claims for press-related protections that are made by citizen publishers.  
 
Exercise of Speech Clause Versus Exercise of Press Clause 
 Citizen publishers’ communications were consistently represented as relating to 
speaking or speech-clause concerns, rather than to publishing or the press clause. The 
way judges communicated their understandings indicated they viewed the press clause 
as protecting an institution that the citizen publishers were not a part of and often did 
not resemble. The courts’ conceptualizations of citizen publishers’ messages as relating 
to speech was seen in Nexus, a decision in which the court wrote, “Here we find nothing 
in the text or implication of the statute to suggest that it demarcates Internet speech 
from other forms of speech. Internet speech is speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”209 Throughout the discourse, the court conveyed the understanding that 
Swift’s blog posts and comments on YouTube, items that were posted on the Internet, 
were analogous to “speech.” Conversely, the press clause was not invoked because, to 
the court, the institution of the press was not at issue. Instead, the opinion put forth an 
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understanding of Swift as a lone speaker and attributed speech-clause related 
protections and precedents to her.  
In Too Much Media the discourse communicated that the court understood the 
state’s shield law as relating to the press clause, contending that the New Jersey shield 
law “flows from the right to free expression and freedom of the press.”210 The opinion 
went on to list the traditional media forms the law protected. When considering the 
citizen publisher’s claim, the court stated, “This case is about the Shield Law, not 
freedom of speech. Defendant was free to exercise a right at the heart of our democracy 
by posting her thoughts online on Oprano’s message board.”211 In this passage, the 
narrative communicated that the court understood the citizen publisher as a speaker who 
had crossed the line in asking for shield-law protection because she was not part of the 
institutional press the law was created to guard. 
 The opinion in Mortgage Specialists conveyed a variation of this understanding 
when it concluded the Implode website, which examined the credibility of mortgage 
lenders, was a media outlet and therefore worthy of press protections under the New 
Hampshire Constitution. The case is distinct in this set of decisions because the opinion 
related the press clause to the website, and communicated an understanding that it 
interpreted the citizen publisher’s website as being comparable to traditional media. The 
court wrote, for example, “The fact that Implode operates a website makes it no less a 
member of the press. . . . Implode’s website serves an informative function and 
contributes to the free flow of information to the public.”212 The opinion also referred to 
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the website’s content as being “published” and it being a “publication.”213 It is no 
coincidence that this case also represents one of the two instances where courts in this 
set of decisions supported a journalistic protection claim made by citizen publishers. In 
the decision, the discourse conveyed an understanding that the court saw the website’s 
characteristics as lining up with its conceptualization of the press and the press clause. 
In Nexus and Too Much Media, the opinions characterized the citizen 
publishers’ messages as “posts” or “statements,” rather than utilizing words such as 
“published” and “publication,” as was seen in Mortgage Specialists. The word choices 
in Nexus and Too Much Media communicated that the judges did not understand the 
work that was done by the citizen publishers as relating to or resembling the work of the 
institutional press or press-clause concerns.214 In comparison, the opinion in Mortgage 
Specialists characterized the Implode website as being like a media organization and 
therefore worthy of the press-clause protections, those traditionally reserved for 
journalism institutions. In the meanings communicated in the narrative, the Implode 
website’s organization went beyond the type of communication seen in Nexus and Too 
Much Media, where single speakers’ messages were viewed as matters of free speech. 
Because the opinion in Mortgage Specialists conceptualized the Implode website as a 
media organization, something that could be related to the press clause, the court drew 
from the Branzburg decision, contending that “Freedom of the press is a fundamental 
personal right which is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.”215 By using the 
quote from the Branzburg precedent, the opinion asserted an understanding that the 
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courts are willing to extend press-clause-related protections to citizen publishers, but 
their work must resemble traditional media. The speech clause was more dominant in 
these cases because the discourse conveyed an understanding that the courts did not 
view what the citizen publishers did in most of the cases as being related to the 
institutional press that they conceptualized the press clause was created to protect. 
Instead, citizen publishers were understood as speakers, worthy of speech-clause 
protections. The Bailey decision further contributed to this theme because the opinion 
articulated an understanding of the author as a political speaker, not a publisher. The 
discourse indicated that Bailey lacked the characteristics that would make him worthy 
of an institutionally construed press clause. The judge wrote that the “press exemption 
does not prohibit speech, but only reduces the requirements which the press must meet 
in order to speak.”216 In this sense, the court’s discourse articulated an understanding 
that Bailey was free to speak to the same extent as anyone else but that he did not 
qualify for the press exemption because he did not show the characteristics of the 
institutional press, which the press clause was created to guard. 
 
Preference for Organizations and Groups over Individuals  
The discourse in this set of cases communicated a greater level of comfort in 
expanding protections that have traditionally been reserved for journalists to groups and 
organizations formed by citizen publishers, rather than to individual citizen publishers. 
None of the individuals who claimed press-related protections in this set of cases 
succeeded in receiving them. The two organizations, Implode-Explode Heavy Industries 
and TechnoBuffalo, however, succeeded in their claims for press-related protections. 
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The distinction communicated by the courts’ discourse regarding the groups emanated 
from two frames that were utilized to understand the communicators and their 
messages. Individual citizen publishers were framed in the narrative as speakers and 
their work was consistently described as a “post” or “statement.” The opinions utilized 
the individual speaker’s name throughout, repeating phrases such as “Swift expressed 
her opposition”217 or “She repeatedly referred to herself as media.”218 The group frame, 
in comparison, described the citizen publishers as being similar to traditional news 
organizations. Their messages were described as “articles” or “reports.” The opinions 
referred to the organization’s name, not individuals who wrote for or managed the 
website. Thus, the opinions included phrases such as “TechnoBuffalo maintains it is a 
‘news organization’”219 and “Implode published an article that detailed administrative 
actions.”220 In the group-related cases, the opinions also carried references to the 
specific audience the website served. The judge in Johns-Byrne wrote, 
“TechnoBuffalo’s website provides articles covering a breadth of technology-related 
issues and topics.”221 In the place of these references, the opinions in the speaker-related 
cases included questions regarding whether the information that was communicated was 
self-serving or for the public’s good. In Nexus, the court wrote, “Swift seems to contend 
she is a media defendant . . . because her statements were disseminated on a blog and a 
widely-viewed video.’”222  
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The existence of these two separate, communicator-centered frames, rather than 
a single understanding of citizen publishers, substantially influenced the outcomes in 
this set of cases. When a court’s discourse utilized a publication’s name, referred to its 
messages as “articles,” and identified an area it contributed information to in society, 
the citizen publishers involved stood a far greater chance of being understood as a type 
of media under state law. This was evident in Mortgage Specialists when the court 
concluded that the Implode website covered information about the mortgage industry. 
The opinion referred to the site as “Implode” throughout the decision. When the court 
analyzed Mortgage Specialists’s argument for an injunction against further publication 
of the information at the center of the case, it considered the content within the context 
of landmark Supreme Court cases that have dealt with traditional media outlets, such as 
New York Times v. United States, often referred to as the Pentagon Papers case, and 
Near v. Minnesota. In supporting its conclusion that Implode could not constitutionally 
be enjoined from communicating information, the court asserted, “While it may be true 
that Mortgage Specialists’s loan information is ‘confidential,’ such information is 
certainly not more sensitive than the documents at issue in the Pentagon Papers case.”223 
In placing Implode and the New York Times’s plight in the Pentagon Papers case 
together, the discourse indicated that the court understood the citizen publishers 
involved in the case, citizen publishers collected in a group, as being like a traditional 
news outlet. To contrast, it is likely the courts in Too Much Media, Obsidian, and Nexus 
would have viewed the individual citizen publishers involved in their cases as being 
more like Daniel Ellsberg, the individual speaker who sought to speak and did so by 
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going to the mass media with the Pentagon Papers, than a news outlet like the New York 
Times, which utilized the information to write articles and serve a clear audience. 
The opinion in Too Much Media further constructed this theme, starting its 
opinion by contending, “Millions of people with Internet access can disseminate 
information today in ways that were previously unimaginable.”224 In articulating its 
conceptualization of the Internet in this way, the court communicated it understood 
Hale to be a speaker and it placed its immediate focus on “people,” indicating the 
speaker frame would be utilized. The opinion also carried a recognized that Hale’s 
comments were not screened or edited, and were more comparable to unread letters to 
the editor than work that deserved protection under the New Jersey shield law.225 In this 
sense, Hale was framed as a speaker and the opinion communicated that the court 
understood her as someone who had an idea and sought to share it through the media. 
The court went on to characterize Hale as a “self-described journalist who posted 
comments on an Internet message board.”226 The Obsidian ruling conveyed comparable 
understandings with the judge asserting in the opinion that a dividing line exists 
between those who are speakers and those who are journalists. The judge wrote, 
“Statements on the Internet range from those made by traditional print publications such 
as daily newspapers (e.g., nytimes.com), to those more typically associated with a 
community bulletin board (e.g., craigslist.com).”227 In conceptualizing citizen 
publishers’ work in this way, the judge’s discourse in Obsidian conveyed an 
understanding that Cox was a speaker, someone on the “community bulletin board” end 
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of the spectrum. Furthermore, the discourse in Johns-Byrne communicated that the 
judge understood TechnoBuffalo as an example of the work of a group of citizen 
publishers whose website was closer to that of daily newspapers. In determining if 
TechnoBuffalo was a media outlet under the Illinois shield law, the judge compared it to 
eWeek.com, Time.com, and chicagotribune.com. Because TechnoBuffalo fit within the 
group frame, it was conceptualized as something that compared with more journalistic 
websites, instead of individual blogs or message boards. The result of the division 
between the two frames was that individual citizen publishers faced a far higher 
threshold than those who were in groups when they sought protections that have 
traditionally been reserved for journalists. 
The overall meanings that were conveyed by the discourse in these cases 
indicated that the courts understand citizen publishers’ claims for press-related 
protections in terms of how the messages are communicated and whether or not the 
information and its delivery are comparable to judicial understandings of traditional 
journalistic practices and processes. The narrative also conceptualized individual citizen 
publishers as lone speakers who do not resemble traditional news organizations and 
therefore have no right to claim protections that have historically been related to 
journalism.  
Conclusion 
In the span of cases in this chapter — from Smith’s initial disagreement with the 
University of Colorado athletics program in 1998 to the Maine court’s finding that 
Bailey’s website was not eligible for the press exemption in the state’s election law in 
2012 — the lower courts in jurisdictions throughout the United States appeared to 
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develop a greater understanding of how the Internet was being used by people as a 
communication tool. And while the same four themes were clearly evident in the cases 
from the two time periods in this chapter, the courts clearly started to hone their 
understandings of the Internet, and how citizen publishers and traditional journalists 
differed, in the later cases. This could be seen in the broader, more-accepting decisions 
in the six earlier cases, where five of the citizen publishers or citizen-publisher-based 
groups received the journalism protections they sought. This could also be seen in the 
early cases in decisions such as O’Grady or Forensic Advisors, where the courts read 
state shield laws that were written before the emergence of the network society and 
found that citizen publishers qualified for protections. In the later cases, the courts 
displayed greater depth in their understandings of online communication. They 
articulated more detailed and stringent expectations of citizen publishers who sought 
protections that have traditionally been reserved for journalists. This was seen in Too 
Much Media, Obsidian, and Bailey, for example, as the judges in these cases found the 
individual communicators, in the way citizen publishers’ messages were delivered, their 
general failure to follow accepted rules of journalism, and their failure to work with 
others to create a news-outlet-like operation, could not be seen as qualifying for press-
related protections under that various state laws in question in the cases. 
It is important to remember that this chapter focused on lower-court decisions 
regarding citizen publishers and their claims for protections that have traditionally been 
reserved for journalists because the Supreme Court has not addressed similar questions. 
The lower courts do not have a network-society-era precedent from the Supreme Court 
to guide them. The Supreme Court, however, has considered the Internet and Internet 
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freedoms. The next chapter focuses on the understandings the Supreme Court has 
articulated in asserting the conceptual rationales it has developed for deciding Internet 




Chapter Three: The Supreme Court and the Place of the Internet 
 in First Amendment Protections   
 This chapter focuses on the narrative represented by Supreme Court opinions in 
which justices articulated conceptual rationales they have developed for deciding 
Internet questions that relate to the First Amendment. The cases were analyzed with a 
focus on identifying consistent and qualitative emphasis on what are discussed here in 
terms of three themes that were identified in the articulation of those conceptual 
rationales. The themes focused on justices conceptualizing the Internet as (1) an 
idealized public sphere, (2) a vehicle connected to the speech clause and not the press 
clause, and (3) as a socially and technologically unique form of communication.  
 As detailed in Chapter One and similarly utilized in chapter Two and Four, the 
themes — and the methodological basis for categorizing them terminologically in this 
manner — were identified using Altheide’s method of document analysis, a form of 
qualitative content analysis that focuses on identifying thematic meaning in discourse. 
Altheide characterized themes as “mini-frames,” or central ideas within a text.1 He 
conceptualized a frame as “a kind of super theme” that acts as a primary idea within a 
set of documents.2 As throughout the analytic process of this dissertation, the 
implementation of “progressive theoretical sampling” in which Altheide’s qualitative 
data analysis is grounded,3 was utilized in an effort to identify the “specific properties 
of the . . . narrative that encourage . . . particular understandings . . . and [that] convey 
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thematically consonant meanings across media and time.”4  
 The cases analyzed in this chapter represent all of the Supreme Court decisions 
in which justices have articulated understandings in asserting the conceptual rationales 
the Court has developed for deciding Internet questions that relate to the First 
Amendment. In order to identify all of the Court’s cases that fit this criteria, a keyword 
search was conducted using three primary legal research databases: Westlaw, 
Bloomberg Media Law Reporter, and LexisNexis Law.5 The search terms were: 
“Internet or web or online or ‘World Wide Web’ or blog or website and ‘First 
Amendment.’” When the database offered the option, the search was narrowed to 
Supreme Court cases only. Searches were also limited to cases decided after January 1, 
1995, a date that corresponds with the time period when the public and media 
companies started to use the Internet in large numbers.6 The three searches found 131 
cases, though many were duplicates. Each of the cases was examined to see if it 
addressed the conceptual rationales the Court has developed for deciding Internet 
questions that relate to the First Amendment. The three searches found many cases that 
did not address the criteria and simply had the word “Internet” or “website” mentioned 
as part of a citation in a First Amendment-related case. A final search was conducted to 
find all of the Supreme Court cases that referenced Reno v. ACLU, the first case in 
which the Supreme Court addressed Internet questions as they related to the First 
Amendment. Since Reno was the first precedent in this area of law, this search was used 
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to make sure the preceding queries had found all of the relevant cases. The search 
brought up twenty-one cases, all of which had been found in the preceding database 
searches. An initial set of nine cases was printed and read thoroughly with the criteria in 
mind. Three of the cases involved discussion of the Internet, but did not require justices 
to articulate understandings regarding the conceptual rationales the Court has developed 
for deciding Internet questions that relate to the First Amendment. For this reason, the 
initial selection group was narrowed to the six cases analyzed and discussed in this 
chapter. 
 This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines the four 
cases that considered Internet questions related to the First Amendment that were 
decided during the Rehnquist Court — the era during which the Court was presided 
over by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, which began in 1986 and ended with his 
death in 2005. The second section examines the two decisions related to this topic from 
the period during which the Court has been presided over by Chief Justice John 
Roberts, which runs from late 2005 through the present. Placed in chronological order 
in each section below, the facts, central questions, and key ideas from the cases in the 
two sections are discussed. After that, each section focuses upon discussion of the 
themes that emerged in the Altheide document analysis.  
Rehnquist Court Cases 
 This section considers the four earliest Supreme Court cases that dealt with 
Internet questions as they related to the First Amendment. After a detailed discussion of 
each case, the themes that emerged through application of Altheide’s process of 
document analysis are presented. The cases in this section are: Reno v. ACLU (1997), 
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Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002), United States v. American Library Association (2003), and 
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004).7 The 2002 Ashcroft v. ACLU decision is referred to as 
“Ashcroft I” and the 2004 Ashcroft v. ACLU decision is referred to as “Ashcroft II” on 
all subsequent references.  
Reno v. ACLU 
 Reno marked the first time the Supreme Court examined the nature and extent of 
First Amendment freedoms concerning expression on the Internet. The 1997 decision 
set the foundational precedent for how the Supreme Court would move forward in 
conceptualizing First Amendment freedoms in the emerging network society. Reno has 
been cited by the court in nearly every other Internet-related case it has considered, 
including each of the other cases in this chapter.8 Over the course of more than fifteen 
years since the ruling, it has been cited in more than six hundred lower-court cases.9 
Reno also marked the start of a conflict between Congress and the Supreme Court 
regarding regulation of expression on the Internet. The Supreme Court’s decision to 
strike down central provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 in 
Reno led to the Child Online Protection Act of 1998, which resulted in two different 
Supreme Court decisions,10 and the Child Internet Protection Act of 2000, which led to 
another ruling by the Court.11 Each of these cases is discussed in this section of the 
chapter. Legal scholars have questioned if the unique characteristics of online 
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II), 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
8 The “Shepardize” function in Lexis-Nexis Academic found Reno has been cited twenty times 
by the Supreme Court as of March 2013. 
9 The “Shepardize” function in Lexis-Nexis Academic found Reno has been cited 664 times by 
lower-courts as of March 2013. 
10 Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 564; Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 656. 
11 American Library Association, 539 U.S. at 194. 
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communication, along with its international nature, will make it impossible for 
Congress to craft a law advancing its asserted interest in protecting children from 
indecent content online that can survive the Supreme Court’s strict-scrutiny test,12 
which is applied in challenges to government restrictions on content of expression 
protected by the First Amendment.13 The decision in Reno is of seminal significance in 
that it marks the beginning of the back-and-forth between Congress and the Supreme 
Court regarding attempts to restrict expression considered inappropriate for children and 
the First Amendment. It also represents the cornerstone of the Court’s jurisprudence 
establishing online communication as among the most protected forms of media. 
  In Reno, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged two provisions of the 
CDA. The first challenged provision prohibited people from using any 
“telecommunications device” to send obscene or indecent images to people who were 
younger than eighteen.14 The second provision in question made it a crime to use a 
computer to make any “patently offensive messages” available to people younger than 
eighteen years old.15 While the Court was unanimous in its decision to overturn both 
                                                
12 The strict-scrutiny test is a standard of judicial review that requires the government to prove 
that it has a compelling interest in regulating a form of speech and that the law in question is narrowly 
tailored so that no more speech than is necessary is limited by the statute. See Don R. Pember and Clay 
Calvert, Mass Media Law (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 649.  
13 Kate Reder, “Ashcroft v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again, or Does the 
International Problem of Regulating Internet Pornography Require an International Solution,” North 
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 6, no. 1 (2004): 139, 140-141; Charles Nesson and David 
Marglin, “The Day the Internet Met the First Amendment: Time and the Communication Decency Act,” 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 10, no. 1 (1996): 113, 113-114. 
14 Reno, 521 U.S. at 858-861 (citing U.S.C.A §223(a) (Supp. 1997)) reads, in part: “Any 
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, 
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the 
maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication.” 
15 Ibid. (citing 47 U.S.C.A §223(d) (Supp. 1997)) reads, in part: “(1) in interstate or foreign 
communications knowingly — (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or 
persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner 
available to a person under 18 years of age any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the 
 
 139 
provisions of the CDA because it found they violated the speech clause of the First 
Amendment, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor filed an opinion in which she concurred in 
part and dissented in part with the Court’s judgment.16 Specifically, the Court found the 
way the provisions were worded was overly broad and not sufficiently clear. The Court 
argued, “The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented. . . . Its open-
ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent 
messages.”17 
Before outlining its reasoning, the Court briefly described the history of the 
Internet, how it works, and who was using it.18 Significantly, in the Court’s first Internet 
case regarding the First Amendment, it demonstrated a strong grasp on the essential 
defining characteristics of the still-emerging Internet. The Court emphasized, for 
example, the Internet’s international scope and its capacity to connect “tens of millions 
of people with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the 
world.”19 Importantly, the Internet was characterized as a “wholly new medium” for 
people around the world to use to communicate. Observing that some forty million 
people already were using the Internet in 1996, the Court highlighted emerging 
challenges that legislators and courts would face regarding networked technology. 
Characterizing the Internet as quickly evolving and difficult to categorize, the Court 
wrote that the vast new communication tool was “located in no particular geographical 
location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world,” with access to networked 
                                                                                                                                          
user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2) knowingly permits any 
telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph 
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity.” 
16 Reno, 521 U.S. at 886 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
17 Ibid., 877. 
18 Ibid., 849-853. 
19 Ibid., 850. 
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technology.20 The Court compared emails to letters, characterized newsgroups as tools 
that foster discussion and information exchange, and pointed out that web pages have 
addresses that are analogous to telephone numbers.21 The Court also identified chat 
rooms as providing the potential to give “town criers . . . a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox.”22 The Court explained that many different types of 
people publish information online, making the web “comparable, from the readers’ 
viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed 
publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.”23 In these points can be 
seen some of the very foundations for how the Court would over the years ahead come 
to conceptualize and adjudicate First Amendment questions involving the Internet. The 
Court conceptualized the Internet as worldwide, both of informational and commercial 
value, decentralized geographically, and as a “unique new medium” in comparison to 
other media types.24 These characterizations of the Internet played a central role in the 
Court’s first ruling regarding First Amendment freedoms online.  
 Importantly, the Reno Court established that regulations of online content must 
be content-neutral and narrowly tailored. In doing so, it dispatched three previous 
Supreme Court precedents that were used by the government to argue its case, thus 
declining to accept the Internet, for First Amendment purposes, as within the realm of 
another type of media or types of content in which regulation could be permissible. The 
Reno Court found the provisions in question were not comparable to the precedent from 
Ginsberg v. New York. In that case, the Court established that the First Amendment did 
                                                
20 Ibid., 851. 
21 Ibid., 851-852. 
22 Ibid., 870. 
23 Ibid., 853. 
24 Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. 
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not protect child pornography.25 The Court emphasized that the law in that case was 
narrowly tailored to commercial transactions and provided a clear definition of what 
content was indecent. The CDA provisions in question provided no clear definition of 
what should be classified as indecent and it applied to informational and commercial 
transactions.26  
The Court also declined to accept the government’s argument that online 
indecency could be regulated in a way that was analogous to broadcast. Prior to Reno’s 
appearance before the Supreme Court, legal scholars Charles Nesson and David 
Marglin postulated that the Court’s determination in the case would likely hinge on how 
it understood the Internet. The authors contended that the case would center on the 
“application of constitutional standards that depend on facts about the nature of the 
medium.”27 In many ways, the scholars were correct. The government built part of its 
argument around Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, which 
set the precedent that the pervasiveness of broadcast media gave the government a 
compelling interest in regulating speech conveyed over the public airwaves during 
certain times of day and regarding certain content.28 In writing the Court’s opinion, 
Justice John Paul Stevens, who was part of the majority in the 1978 Pacifica ruling, 
emphasized that Pacifica was wholly inapplicable to the Internet. Pacifica dealt with an 
established agency that was assigned to regulating broadcast. The Pacifica case focused 
on “when — rather than whether — it would be permissible to air such a program in 
                                                
25 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
26 Reno, 521 U.S. at 865-866. 
27 Nesson and Marglin, “The Day the Internet Met the First Amendment,” 114. 
28 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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that particular medium.”29 The Court emphasized that it was acceptable to limit 
broadcast freedoms in Pacifica because the medium had historically received less First 
Amendment protection than any other.30 In Reno, the justices did not find the Internet to 
be pervasive or a form of communication that necessitated being treated like a medium 
that should receive limited First Amendment protection.  
Finally, the government argued that the CDA provisions were constitutional 
because they sought to create a form of “cyberzoning” online, much like the zoning 
laws the Supreme Court upheld in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. In Renton, 
the Court found city zoning laws that limited where adult entertainment businesses 
could be located were constitutional.31 Justice Stevens, who was part of the Court when 
it decided Renton in 1985, argued zoning was not possible online.32 Justice O’Connor 
focused her partial concurrence and partial dissent in Reno on the concept of online 
zoning. She explained that physical zoning laws are based on geography and identity, 
and speculated that it would be possible to zone the Internet at some point, but that the 
Internet was “fundamentally different” than the physical world.33 Justice O’Connor 
emphasized that zoning laws are only applicable if they do not restrict adults from 
accessing constitutionally protected content. She differed from the Court in that she 
would have only invalidated the CDA provisions in cases when the law, in an effort to 
                                                
29 Reno, 521 U.S. at 867. 
30 Ibid. 
31 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the Court’s opinion, wrote, “In our view, 
the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable 
opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us easily meets 
this requirement. In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid governmental response to 
the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters.” 
32 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. 
33 Ibid., 889 (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part). 
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protect minors, halted adults from obtaining constitutionally protected content.34 The 
Court’s broader conclusion, much like Justice O’Connor’s concern, was that the CDA 
provisions outlawed constitutionally protected messages in their efforts to protect  
minors. By providing a unanimous decision that recognized the Internet as an altogether 
unique form of communication, the Court articulated a strong precedent that set the 
starting point for later cases.  
Ashcroft v. ACLU I 
 The Court’s thinking in Ashcroft I was situated in the foundational ideas 
articulated in Reno, which was decided less than five years earlier. In many ways, the 
Ashcroft I decision represented a continuation of the Court’s discussion regarding 
freedom of speech on the Internet that started in Reno. In Ashcroft I and in the Court’s 
second examination of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) two years later in 
Ashcroft II, however, the Court started to show some divisions. While the members of 
the Court remained the same between Reno in 1997 and Ashcroft II in 2004, the more 
intricate questions posed by Congress’s second attempt to regulate online indecency 
started to divide the justices. 
COPA posed more complex questions than the CDA provisions that were 
ultimately struck down in Reno because the law was tailored to address the Court’s 
concerns from that case regarding freedom of speech on the Internet. The overly broad, 
sweeping language from the CDA provisions was replaced with a more narrowly 
tailored law in COPA in 1998, a year after the Reno decision.35 The law, which was 
                                                
34 Ibid., 887-888 (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part). 
35 Reder, “Ashcroft v. ACLU,” 143; Namita E. Mani, “Judicial Scrutiny of Congressional 
Attempts to Protect Children form the Internet’s Harms: Will Internet Filtering Technology Provide the 
Answer Congress has been Looking for?,” Boston University Journal of Science & Technology 9 (2003): 
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enjoined before it went into effect and spent four years in the court system before it 
reached the Supreme Court, addressed many of the Supreme Court’s concerns regarding 
the CDA provisions in Reno. The Court, however, focused on only one aspect of COPA 
in Ashcroft I. The Court considered if the use of the “community standards” part of the 
Miller Test36 made COPA unconstitutional.37 In an eight-to-one decision, the Court 
found the law’s use of  “community standards” criteria was constitutional and remanded 
the case. The lower courts, with the Supreme Court’s finding in mind, were to consider 
the constitutionality of the overall law.38 Justice Stevens, the author of the Court’s 
opinion in Reno, dissented. 
 Much as with the CDA provisions that were struck down in Reno, COPA was 
created to halt minors from gaining access to indecent materials online. COPA, 
however, focused only on the World Wide Web, rather than the Internet as a whole, and 
the law also only covered commercial interactions. The law defined “indecent” and 
“patently offensive,” by using the obscenity test developed in Miller v. California. 
While these factors narrowed the law’s breadth, they also led to the question before the 
Court. Recognizing that physical geography does not apply to online communication, 
the ACLU and other plaintiffs, argued the use of the “contemporary community 
standards” portion of COPA was unconstitutional because it would force all 
                                                                                                                                          
201, 203; Sue Ann Mota, “Protecting Minors from Sexually Explicit Materials on the Net: COPA Likely 
Violates the First Amendment According to the Supreme Court,” Tulane Journal of Technology & 
Intellectual Property 7 (2005): 95, 100. 
36 The Miller Test arose from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, in the Court’s opinion, outlined the three considerations in the test: “(a) whether ‘the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 




communities to live by the values of the “most puritan community standard in the entire 
country.”39 Web publishers, it was contended, do not have any way to control which 
communities their messages reach.40  
While the question led to an eight-to-one decision by the Court on the judgment, 
justices were divided in their reasoning and skeptical of the broader law’s 
constitutionality. Not a single justice agreed in full with Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
opinion for the Court. Justices Anthony Kennedy and O’Connor, in separate concurring 
opinions, contended that the overall law might be unconstitutional.41 Justice O’Connor, 
despite some concerns about the law, found that community standards did not vary 
widely enough across the nation to make COPA overbroad.42 Justice Kennedy, 
however, whose concurrence was joined by justices David Souter and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, foreshadowed some of the points he made in writing the Court’s opinion in 
Ashcroft II, when he asserted that “there is a very real likelihood that the Child Online 
Protection Act . . . is overly broad and cannot survive such a challenge. Indeed, content-
based regulations like this one are presumptively invalid abridgements of the freedom 
of speech.”43  
Writing for the court, Justice Thomas relied on three primary arguments. He 
posited that the community standards criterion could be subject-based, rather than 
focusing on the traditional geographic definition that emerged from the Miller Test.44 
Justice Stephen Breyer supported this argument in his concurring opinion when he 
                                                
39 Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
40 Ibid., 573. 
41 Ibid., 591 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Ibid., 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
42 Ibid., 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
43 Ibid., 591 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
44 Ibid., 576. 
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wrote that Congress intended “the word ‘community’ to refer to the Nation’s adult 
community taken as a whole, not to geographically separate local areas.”45 Justice 
Thomas’s second argument was that the other two portions of the Miller Test, the 
“prurient interest” and “serious value” criteria were strong enough to support the 
problems found in the “community standards” portion of the test. He wrote, “When the 
scope of an obscenity statute’s coverage is sufficiently narrowed by a ‘serious value’ 
prong and a ‘prurient interest’ prong, we have held that requiring a speaker 
disseminating material to a national audience to observe varying community standards 
does not violate the First Amendment.”46 Finally, Justice Thomas argued that if a 
communicator does not want to face a nationalized community-standards test, he or she 
should avoid using the Internet because the messenger “need only take the simple step 
of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into those 
communities.”47  
In his dissent, Justice Stevens used some of the same arguments he employed 
when he wrote the Court’s opinion in Reno. He argued that COPA holds the Internet to 
standards that were created during a different time, because it “covers a medium in 
which speech cannot be segregated to avoid communities where it is likely to be 
harmful to minors.”48 He emphasized that the Internet is unique and that it cannot be 
regulated using the same means that were used in the 1970s, when the Miller Test was 
developed. Justice Stevens argued that since web publishers cannot control who views 
their messages, COPA is overly broad and, therefore, unconstitutional. He wrote that 
                                                
45 Ibid., 589 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
46 Ibid., 580. 
47 Ibid., 583. 
48 Ibid., 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the Court has “repeatedly rejected the position that the free speech rights of adults can 
be limited to what is acceptable for children.”49 
United States v. American Library Association 
 While COPA remained enjoined and mired in the federal court system, Congress 
passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, another law that sought to 
limit the availability of indecent content to minors. The law, which was enjoined before 
it could take effect, stipulated that public libraries, in order to receive two forms of 
federal funding, must install software designated to filter out indecent content. The law 
required that for a library to be eligible for the federal funding, the software must be on 
every computer connected to the Internet.50 The law included an option for patrons to 
request that the library temporarily disable the filter.51 Legal scholars have argued that 
CIPA represented a new, incentive-based approach by lawmakers to limiting children’s 
access to indecent content.52 Attorney Kate Reder contended, for example, that the fact 
that CIPA was upheld by the Court would mean “Congress is likely to draft legislation 
that includes powerful incentives . . . in order to encourage and functionally require the 
use of filters on computers across the country.”53 
  The Court, however, was far from unanimous in upholding CIPA, and the 
justices’ relatively fractured conclusions regarding CIPA provided further evidence of 
the growing divisions within the Court regarding Internet speech protections that had 
began to emerge in Ashcroft I. The Court upheld CIPA in a six-to-three decision on the 
                                                
49 Ibid., 604 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50 American Library Association, 539 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
51 Ibid., 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52 Reder, “Ashcroft v. ACLU,” 147; Katherine A. Miltner, “Discriminatory Filtering: CIPA’s 
Effect on Our Nation’s Youth and Why the Supreme Court Erred in Upholding the Constitutionality of 
the Children’s Internet Protection Act,” Federal Communications Law Journal 57 (2004-2005): 555, 560. 
53 Reder, “Ashcroft v. ACLU,” 147 
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judgment, but only three justices joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion for 
the Court. Justices Kennedy and Breyer wrote separate concurrences and Justices 
Stevens and Souter penned separate dissents. The Court’s opinion, and the dissents, 
included a lively, comparison-infused discussion regarding how the holdings of 
traditionally conceptualized libraries related to the content available on the Internet, and 
how the law’s filtering requirements might influence what was made available to the 
public. Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in the Court’s opinion that libraries have 
never attempted to provide every book and other source of information to their 
patrons.54 Libraries choose materials that are most likely to benefit the community they 
serve, he explained. As part of those decisions, the chief justice asserted that libraries 
traditionally do not provide pornography to their patrons. Thus, he declared, “It would 
not make sense to treat libraries’ judgments to block online pornography any 
differently.”55 He reasoned that libraries are not public forums and not akin to sidewalks 
or parks, as the district court had argued.56 Chief Justice Rehnquist compared viewing a 
library as a public forum to allowing the public to control the editorial content of a 
public television station’s news reports. He wrote, “Public library staffs necessarily 
consider content in making collection decisions and enjoy broad discretion in making 
them.”57 The government, he explained, has traditionally stayed out of controlling what 
libraries can and cannot place in their collections.58 Library acquisition processes, he 
contended, are not open to the public’s demands in the sense that a park or other forum 
is open to the public.  
                                                
54 American Library Association, 539 U.S. at 204. 
55 Ibid., 208. 
56 Ibid., 202. 
57 Ibid., 205. 
58 Ibid., 202. 
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The fact that the law allowed libraries to unblock sites or temporarily turn off 
filters at the request of patrons was enough to alleviate a majority of the justices’ 
concerns about the possibility of filters blocking legitimate sites.59 Justice Breyer, in his 
concurring opinion, stated that the requirement that patrons request the filtering 
software be turned off represented no more of a burden than libraries’ traditional 
practices of using interlibrary loan systems that require the patron to work with a 
librarian to obtain a desired source of information.60 However, that specific part of the 
law was at the center of Justice Souter’s dissent, because he found it problematic that an 
adult would have to convince a librarian that his or her need for the filter to be removed 
was justified. For that reason, Justice Souter maintained that the law amounted to 
constitutionally protected material being kept from adults in an effort to protect 
children. He wrote that the unblocking portion of the law’s wording led to “a substantial 
amount of unobscene material harmful to children but lawful for adult examination, and 
a substantial quantity of text and pictures harmful to no one” being blocked.61 He 
argued less-restrictive means were available, such as the libraries installing filtering 
software on designated terminals for children, but leaving others unblocked for adults. 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, added that patrons might not know if information was 
valuable enough to make it worth asking the librarian to unblock a site. He compared 
the effect of the filters to a library that kept a portion of its collection locked away, only 
available upon request. Justice Stevens wrote, “Some curious readers would in time 
obtain access to the hidden materials, but many would not.”62 
                                                
59 Ibid., 209. 
60 Ibid., 219 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
61 Ibid., 233-234 (Souter dissenting). 
62 Ibid., 224-225 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Souter also emphasized that the unique characteristics of the Internet 
made comparisons between physical library collections and what was available online 
problematic. He asserted that librarians make content-based decisions about which 
materials to make available to patrons, but those decisions are the result of budgetary 
and shelf-space limitations, concerns that do not apply to the Internet. He wrote, “The 
proper analogy therefore is not to passing up a book that might have been bought; it is 
either buying a book and then keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable ‘purpose’ or 
to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought to be 
unsuitable for adults.”63 He concluded that because the filtering requirement involved 
no budgetary or shelf-space justification, the law’s requirements represented a form of 
censorship.  
 Justice Stevens repeated the arguments he used in writing the Court’s opinion in 
Reno and in his dissent in Ashcroft I: No provision to protect children from indecent 
material online can, at the same time, stop adults from having access to constitutionally 
protected speech.64 To this end, his primary concern was the likelihood that the filters 
would block constitutionally protected material. He wrote that “overblocking is the 
functional equivalent of a host of individual decisions excluding hundreds of thousands 
of individual constitutionally protected messages from Internet terminals located in 
public libraries throughout the nation.”65 Justice Stevens’s final concern was in regard 
to the act’s threat that funding would be withheld from libraries that did not comply, a 
penalty which he found equally as severe as jail time or fines. He wrote, “The 
                                                
63 Ibid., 237 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
64 Ibid., 220-221 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65 Ibid., 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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abridgement of speech is equally obnoxious whether a rule like this one is enforced by a 
threat of penalties or by a threat to withhold a benefit.”66 
 The issues that were tied to CIPA placed the ways individual justices 
conceptualized the Internet in stark contrast. Chief Justice Rehnquist compared the 
filtering requirements within the context of how libraries manage their physical 
collections, while justices Stevens and Souter argued Internet access was something far 
different than anything libraries physically held within their collections, and therefore 
something that must be uniquely considered. These growing fractures within the Court 
regarding how to conceptualize the Internet reached their apex in the next case, Ashcroft 
II. 
Ashcroft v. ACLU II 
 In 2004, two years after the Supreme Court ruled on a narrow constitutional 
question and remanded Ashcroft I, the case, and the constitutionality of COPA were 
again before the Court. In the intervening time, the federal appeals court found the act 
likely violated the First Amendment and upheld the injunction that was stopping the law 
from going into effect.67 As was the case in Ashcroft I, the Court did not specifically 
consider the act on its own. Since the act had not gone into effect, no party could claim 
that its rights were violated. Therefore, the question before the Court centered on 
whether the appeals court’s decision to uphold the injunction that was keeping the law 
from going into effect was correct.68 In the final time the Rehnquist Court addressed 
freedom-of-speech issues relating to the Internet, the divided justices voted five-to-four 
to uphold the injunction against COPA and, to the great frustration of Justice Breyer, 
                                                
66 Ibid., 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 




again remanded the case. In 2008, after Ashcroft II, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit upheld the trial court’s finding that the law violated the First 
Amendment, and the government appealed the decision only to have the Supreme Court 
decline to address the law for a third time, ending COPA’s more than ten-year journey 
through the court system. 69  
 While it upheld the injunction that kept COPA from going into effect, the Court 
showed sensitivity toward Congress’s work to protect children from indecency online. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, recognized that the Court should be careful to 
not overstep its bounds by overturning laws, but concluded, “The imperative of 
according respect to the Congress, however, does not permit us to depart from well-
established First Amendment principles. Instead, we must hold the Government to its 
constitutional burden of proof.”70 Since COPA focused on limiting content, rather than 
time, place, or manner restrictions, for example, the Court used the strict-scrutiny 
standard to examine the law’s constitutionality. Strict scrutiny requires a law to have a 
compelling governmental interest, be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, and that 
there are no other less-restrictive ways of achieving the government’s goal. The Court 
focused on the fact that filtering technology, which the justices had carefully examined 
in American Library Association a year earlier, provided a less-restrictive way for the 
government to protect children from indecent material online.71 It wrote that filters 
“impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions 
at the source.”72 The Court concluded the filters limited the likelihood that indecent 
                                                
69 ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3rd Cir. 2008); Mukasey v. ACLU, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009). 
70 Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 660. 
71 Ibid., 666-668. 
72 Ibid., 666-667. 
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speech that was constitutionally protected for adults would be criminalized in the effort 
to protect children, and that filters were more effective in achieving the government’s 
interest because they could halt indecent content from around the world. COPA, on the 
other hand, could only criminalize content posted in the United States, the Court 
contended.73 The Court’s reasoning in this area led Reder to postulate that the only way 
Internet legislation will be successful will be if it is global — because no national 
solution can address the international nature of online communication — and if it 
focuses on incentives for using filters, rather than content-based laws such as COPA.74 
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his terse, one-page dissent, argued COPA did not raise 
First Amendment issues and, therefore, did not necessitate the use of the exacting strict-
scrutiny standard.75 Justice Breyer, agreeing with Justice Scalia in his dissent, 
contended the material regulated by COPA “does not enjoy First Amendment 
protection.”76 Justice Breyer also disagreed that the filtering software could be seen as a 
less-restrictive alternative because the software costs money and depends on parents 
who are willing and capable of using it properly. He also emphasized that the software 
is not precise because it blocks some sites that are not problematic and fails to block 
others that include indecent content.77 The Court’s opinion recognized that filtering 
software was an imperfect solution, but argued that it was not up to the ACLU and other 
organizations in the case to solve the problem of indecent material being available to 
children online. Instead, the government had to meet the burden of showing there were 
no other effective means that would meet its goal. The government, in the Court’s 
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opinion, failed to meet that burden. Justice Breyer flatly disagreed, and he conveyed his 
frustration with the Court’s decision to remand the case for a second time by writing: 
After eight years of legislative effort, two statutes, and three Supreme Court 
cases the Court sends this case back to the District Court for further proceedings. 
What proceedings? I have found no offer by either party to present more 
relevant evidence. What remains to be litigated?78 
 
Justice Breyer went on to emphasize that COPA was written by Congress to 
fulfill the directions the Court provided when it struck down the CDA provisions in 
Reno. To this end, Justice Breyer decried that the Court had missed an opportunity to 
conduct a “constructive discourse” with Congress.79 Despite Justice Breyer’s concern, 
when the Court remanded COPA in 2004, it marked the final significant analysis by the 
Rehnquist Court of any major congressional legislation regarding freedom of speech on 
the Internet. 
Document Analysis 
The following subsections utilize Altheide’s method of document analysis to 
categorize representations that emerged through the analysis of the preceding four 
Supreme Court decisions. The considerations related to the press clause or arguably 
related protections as understood in terms of particular concerns that were emphasized 
in the courts’ conceptual rationales. In Altheide’s conceptualization of the central idea 
of his methodological approach, the “actual words and direct messages of documents 
carry the discourse that reflects certain themes, which in turn are held together and 
given meaning by a broad frame.”80 As outlined in the introductory section, the themes 
that emerged in that analysis were: the Internet as (1) an idealized public sphere, (2) a 
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vehicle connected to the speech clause and not the press clause, and (3) a socially and 
technologically unique form of communication. 
 
The Internet as an Idealized Public Sphere 
 The discourse in these cases conceptualized the Internet as an emerging 
opportunity for the formation of a new, relatively unhindered virtual public sphere. The 
opinions consistently articulated representations and understandings that strongly 
supported the theme that justices recognized, even from the beginning in Reno in 1997, 
that the Internet presented a unique opportunity for an idealized form of the public 
sphere. In the Reno ruling, Justice Stevens asserted, “Through the use of chat rooms any 
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox.”81 In passages such as this, the narrative communicated 
that the Court understood the Internet as empowering individuals to engage with others 
in democratic society. Furthermore, in constructing this theme, the discourse conveyed 
an understanding that because the justices conceptualized the Internet as an idealized 
form of the public sphere, few laws would be allowed to stand if they were found to 
diminish the near-absolute standard they established as the appropriate level of First 
Amendment protection for nearly all online communication. The discourse further 
contributed to this theme in the Reno ruling when the Court declined to accept 
government arguments that the Internet should be regulated like broadcast 
communication. The Court wrote, “Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA 
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have the vast democratic fora of the Internet been subject to the type of government 
supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.”82  
 The way the opinions communicated understandings regarding the value of the 
Internet as an emerging space for public discussion related, in several ways, to 
Habermas’s description of seventeenth-century coffeehouses in England.83 The 
coffeehouses, to Habermas, were forums where individuals interested in taking part in 
discussions about issues in society stepped from their private lives into the public 
sphere. Similarly, the justices, in the discourse in these cases, conceptualized the 
Internet as a space that individuals in society could step into so they could take part in 
discussions about a variety of issues.84 To this end, the meanings communicated in the 
decisions indicated that the justices were hesitant to allow any form of legislation to 
create barriers that would make it more difficult for speakers to step into the virtual 
public sphere. Justice Stevens, for example, postulated in the Reno decision that one of 
the advantages of the Internet was that so many people could gain access to discussions 
that were happening throughout the world regarding a variety of topics. He contended, 
“Taken together, these tools constitute a unique new medium — known to its users as 
‘cyberspace’ — located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone 
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”85 The discourse in Reno further 
contributed to the theme when it recognized how people were using the Internet to both 
inform themselves and to communicate ideas regarding an endless range of topics.86  
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Having identified the ease of entry into online interactions, the discourse 
revealed that the justices paused when aspects of the CDA, COPA, and CIPA, the three 
acts discussed in these cases, sought to make entry into certain discussions more 
difficult. When the government, for example, argued in Reno that websites that were 
concerned about government prosecution because minors might see indecent content on 
their pages should require users to enter credit-card numbers for access, the Court 
refused to consider that approach to be a viable option. The narrative communicated 
that the Court understood such a requirement would make otherwise protected speech 
inaccessible to adults who did not have credit cards.87 Similarly, the narrative in 
American Library Association, a case in which the justices’ decision-making appeared 
to turn on their interpretation of the part of the law that allowed patrons to ask a 
librarian to turn off the filter, conveyed an understanding that the ability to enter online 
discussions was of central importance. Justice Kennedy’s short concurring opinion, for 
example, emphasized that his decision hinged on the ability of individuals to have the 
filter turned off. He wrote, “If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock 
specific Web sites or to disable the filter or it if it is shown that an adult user’s election 
to view constitutionally protected Internet material is burdened in some other 
substantial way, that would be the subject for an as-applied challenge.”88 Justice 
Souter’s dissent carried a similar emphasis upon the ability of individuals to gain access 
to information, finding that no adult should have to ask for permission to view 
constitutionally protected speech.89 Finally, in Ashcroft II, the discourse further 
contributed to this theme by communicating that it favored the voluntary use of Internet 
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filters, rather than legally imposed restrictions and penalties, because it sought to avoid 
the chilling effects that COPA would have created in individuals who were afraid to 
step into the discussion and communicate.90 All of these perspectives conveyed the idea 
that part of the Court’s understanding of the Internet as an idealized public sphere 
requires that entry into the sphere receive relatively strong protection. 
 The opinions in these cases also communicated a substantial level of concern 
regarding the legal controls put forth in the four cases. Despite the fact that the laws, 
especially CIPA and COPA, focused on a relatively narrow set of indecent content, the 
narrative carried in the opinions conveyed a high level of reticence regarding limiting 
the potential for discussion on the Internet. In Ashcroft I, for example, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion communicated an understanding of the Internet as an 
inexpensive and easy vehicle through which people can communicate. He wrote, 
“When Congress purports to abridge the freedom of a new medium, we must be 
particularly attentive to its distinct attributes.”91 Similarly, Justice Stevens’s concurring 
opinion in Ashcroft II characterized filtering as a better option than “attempting to 
regulate the vast content of the World Wide Web at its source, and at a far less 
significant cost to First Amendment values.”92 In this sense, the meanings conveyed by 
the opinions in these cases communicated that the Court understood the Internet as 
holding vast potential for discourse, and therefore approached each of the laws in 
question with deep reservations about congressional efforts to temper speech, even 
indecent speech, online.  
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The Internet as a Vehicle Connected to the Speech Clause and Not the Press Clause 
 In another consistent theme that emerged through the document analysis, the 
discourse put forth by the Court conceptualized the Internet as a powerful new avenue 
for individual speech. In the narrative in these cases, justices conveyed considerable 
concern regarding congressional efforts to limit the ability of individual speakers to 
communicate messages using the Internet. This conceptualization of the Internet as a 
tool that is primarily associated with speech, and the speech clause of the First 
Amendment, also indicated that the Court did not understand the Internet to be a press 
or a form of media that should be associated with the press clause in regard to 
individual communication. Justice Stevens in Ashcroft II, for example, asserted that 
COPA threatened “Web speakers,” not publishers.93 Similarly, Justice Kennedy in 
Ashcroft I wrote, “There is a very real likelihood that the Child Online Protection Act is 
overbroad and cannot survive such a challenge. Indeed, content-based regulations like 
this one are presumptively invalid abridgements of the freedom of speech.”94 In Reno, 
Justice Stevens compared the Internet to a “town crier” and as something more 
powerful than a “soap box.”95 Comparisons such as these, rather than those that might 
have been utilized to relate the Internet to a printing press or traditional news outlet, 
further contributed to the the theme that the Court understands the Internet as a speech 
tool and speech-clause-related form of media. 
 Within this line of thinking, it is important to consider the types of legal 
questions that the cases brought before the Court. All four of the cases dealt with the 
constitutionality of congressional efforts to limit the availability of indecent content to 
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minors on the Internet. As a result of this focus, the cases primarily addressed the ability 
of individuals to communicate messages and to receive information using the Internet. 
The cases did not generally ask the Court to address the ability of organizations, 
businesses, or traditional news organizations, for example, to communicate messages to 
audiences. For this reason, the Court’s conceptualization of the Internet as a new avenue 
for speech in the discourse contained within these cases indicated that it understands 
individuals who communicate messages online as speakers, not publishers, and 
therefore relates such communications to the speech clause, rather than the press clause. 
These four cases represent the foundational Supreme Court precedents regarding how 
the Internet is conceptualized. Reno alone has been cited in nearly two-dozen Internet-
related Supreme Court decisions and in hundreds of lower-court rulings.96  
 It is also important to highlight that although the justices in some instances 
utilized the term “publish,” the narrative much more consistently articulated an 
understanding of the Internet as a tool for speech. In American Library Association, for 
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “A public library does not acquire Internet 
terminals to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any more 
than it collects books in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to 
speak.”97 In this sense, the chief justice employed the term “Web publishers” but he 
clearly distinguished it as something separate from what was in question in the Internet 
First Amendment case before the Court. Similarly, Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent 
in Ashcroft I that, “Web publishers cannot control who accesses their Web sites . . . [and 
therefore] using community standards to regulate speech on the Internet creates an 
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overbreadth problem.”98 Much as in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s passage, Justice Stevens 
utilized the term “Web publishers” but related the usage to speech regulations. 
 The absence of any discussion of the press clause as dispositive in the relevant 
understandings articulated in these four cases indicated that the justices by every 
indication viewed individuals’ communications online as something more squarely 
within the purview of the speech clause. A central change in the paradigm shift from the 
mass media to the network-society era has been the newfound ability of individuals who 
are not part of traditional media to communicate messages to audiences large and 
small.99 In representations of the Court as indicated through this analysis, individual 
communicators were understood to be speakers, rather than publishers. 
 
The Internet as a Socially and Technologically Unique Form of Communication 
The narrative in these cases consistently conceptualized the Internet as an 
entirely new and unique form of communication. The recognition of the Internet as 
distinctive went beyond the characteristics of the form of communication as compared 
to older types of media. Instead, the discourse put forth by the justices in these first 
cases regarding online communication showed the Court conceptualized the Internet as 
fundamentally different socially and technologically than all other forms of 
communication. In Reno, the Court’s first examination of First Amendment questions 
concerning the Internet, Justice Stevens wrote, “Each type of media presents its own 
problems — so the Court has recognized times when a certain type of media can have 
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certain regulation.”100 While Justice Stevens indicated in this passage that some forms 
of communication can be regulated differently, his articulated understandings 
contributed to a broader narrative from the justices, one that may be seen as reflecting 
some commonality with the first theme in this section, that the Court understands the 
Internet as an idealized form of the public sphere. To that end, the Court in its discourse 
isolated the Internet as unique from other forms of media, not because “each type of 
media presents its own problems,” but because it conceptualized online communication 
as carrying a unique potential for fostering deliberation in a democratic society.  
Justice Kennedy articulated a similar understanding in his concurring opinion in 
Ashcroft I. He wrote, “Each mode of expression has its own unique set of 
characteristics, and each ‘must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards 
suited to it.’”101 So again an understanding was articulated that each type of media had 
to be assessed independently regarding the First Amendment. The broader narrative, 
however, indicated that Justice Kennedy, like Justice Stevens, identified the Internet as 
separate from other media in that it carried a unique potential for fostering deliberation 
among individuals and groups in society. In Reno, this theme was further constructed 
through the way the Court’s discourse evaluated the government’s arguments that the 
precedent from Pacifica could be applied to questions regarding the CDA. The Court 
wrote, “Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic 
fora of the Internet been subject to the type of government supervision and regulation 
that has attended the broadcast industry.”102 To that end, the opinion both rejected the 
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idea that the Internet can be regulated in ways that are similar to broadcast and 
communicated a related understanding that it sees the Internet as a powerful, new, and 
democratizing form of media. 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist communicated a variation of this theme in the Court’s 
opinion in American Library Association, when he compared librarians’ efforts to select 
materials that best serve the needs and interests of their communities with the need for 
libraries to filter online content. The opinion conceptualized the Internet as another tool 
libraries have available to them to make information available to their communities.103 
While the opinion recognized the Internet as providing “a vast amount of valuable 
information,” it did not represent the Internet as having the same level of unique social 
or technological significance as was communicated in the justice’s broader narrative. In 
fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s conceptualization of the Internet as just another tool for 
librarians appears to be an anomaly in the cases that were analyzed. Justice Souter, in 
his dissent with Justice Ginsburg, in American Library Association articulated an 
understanding of the Internet that was more in line with ideas articulated in Reno and 
Ashcroft II when he wrote,  
The Internet blocking here defies comparison to the process of acquisition. 
Whereas traditional scarcity of money and space require a library to make 
choices about what to acquire, and the choice to be made is whether or not to 
spend money to acquire something, blocking is the subject of a choice made 
after the money for Internet access has been spent or committed.104 
 
 Justice Souter’ asserted that blocking the Internet was not the same as exercising 
choices regarding which books to buy for the library. Instead, the he understood 
filtering as being analogous to buying the book and then keeping it away from patrons, 
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which by his reasoning made utilizing blocking software a form of censorship. He 
wrote, “There is no preacquisition scarcity rationale to save library Internet blocking 
from treatment as censorship.”105 Justice Souter, in making the fundamental distinction 
between physical library collections and the information made available through 
terminals in libraries through the Internet, further articulated an understanding that 
online communication was unique in both technological and social aspects. The 
technological aspect of his conceptualization was primarily made in the explicit 
distinction between physical library collections and the Internet. The social aspect was 
communicated more implicitly through his concern that the filters could limit the vast 
potential for deliberation that was made possible by online communication. To this end, 
Justice Souter wrote that the filters blocked “adult enquiry” and therefore amounted to 
censorship.106 
 The discourse in Ashcroft II further contributed to the theme that the Internet is a 
new and unique technological and social tool. The opinion utilized phrases such as 
“obtain access” and “gain access” when discussing how filters, rather than the legal 
restrictions outlined in COPA, were a less-restrictive way to limit minors’ access to 
indecent content online.107 By focusing on “gaining” and “obtaining” access, the 
narrative represented the Internet as a gateway to socially valuable material, one that 
operated as a unique tool similar to no other form of media. The filtering option put 
forward in the Ashcroft II opinion also placed the ability to choose content in the hands 
of users, rather than halting the content before it was created. While this idea certainly 
relates to traditional understandings of how an informed democracy functions, it also 
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contributes to an understanding that the Court viewed this particular form of media as 
uniquely valuable to modern democracy.  
The document analysis in this section indicated that the Court understands the 
Internet as an idealized form of the public sphere, which requires a high level of 
protection from regulation. The justices’ discourse also conceptualized communication 
that occurs on the Internet as being related to speaking in a virtual space and the speech 
clause, rather than publishing and the press clause. Finally, the narrative in these cases 
articulated an understanding of the Internet as a socially and technologically unique 
form of communication. The next section considers the same three themes through the 
understandings that were communicated by the Supreme Court in two more-recent 
cases that considered Internet question that related to the Internet. 
Roberts Court Cases 
This section considers two more recent Supreme Court cases that dealt with 
Internet questions as they related to the First Amendment. After a detailed discussion of 
each case, the themes that emerged through application of Altheide’s process of 
document analysis are presented. The facts, central questions, and key ideas regarding 
each case are outlined before the themes are discussed. The cases in this section are 
United States v. Williams (2008) and Doe v. Reed (2010).108  
United States v. Williams 
 In 2008, Williams signaled a shift in the Court’s focus from cases that were 
specifically about attempts to regulate online communication to instances when the 
Court, in light of a broader question, examined the impact and role of the Internet on 
society and social issues. Williams is also noteworthy because it represents the first time 
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the Roberts Court examined First Amendment issues as they relate to the Internet. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist died in 2005 and Justice O’Connor stepped down in 2006. Both 
contributors to the opinions in the four preceding cases, they were replaced by Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Souter, who also was outspoken 
at times in the preceding four cases, left the Court in 2009 between the Williams and 
Reed decisions. He was replaced by Justice Sonya Sotomayor. 
In Williams, the Court voted seven-to-two to uphold the Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT) of 2003. 
The Court’s judgment in the case, with seven justices signing on to the opinion of the 
Court and only one concurrence and one dissent, showed more agreement between the 
justices when compared to Rehnquist Court decisions, such as American Library 
Association and Ashcroft II. The PROTECT Act made it a crime to use any form of 
communication, including computerized transactions, to intentionally lead someone to 
believe that a person possessed child pornography.109 The case centered on an Internet 
chat-room interaction between Michael Williams and an undercover Secret Service 
agent in which Williams claimed he had child pornography and offered to show it to the 
agent. During the interaction, Williams posted several pornographic images involving 
children. He pleaded guilty to child pornography charges for the images he posted, but 
challenged the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act because he argued the law was 
overbroad in that it criminalized merely stating that a person had child pornography or 
that he or she wanted to see such material.110  
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 The Court’s opinion contended that the law was created in light of the changing 
technological environment in which photos could be duplicated and posted on the 
Internet quickly, repeatedly, and in many cases, without any way to know whether the 
image involved real children.111 The Court emphasized that since the First Amendment 
does not protect illegal transactions, such as exchanging child pornography, the law was 
constitutional because it did not halt any form of protected speech. 112 The Court 
highlighted that the law’s requirements did not make it a crime to advocate for child 
pornography; it merely criminalized offers of and requests for child pornography.113 It 
is noteworthy that Justice Stevens, a strident defender of free speech on the Internet in 
Reno, American Library Association, and both of the cases concerning COPA, found no 
constitutional problems regarding the PROTECT Act. Justice Stevens wrote, “It is 
abundantly clear from the provision’s legislative history that Congress’s aim was to 
target materials advertised, promoted, presented, distributed, or solicited with a 
lascivious purpose — that is, with the intention of inciting sexual arousal.”114 He 
contended it was possible that protected speech, such as pornography that appears to 
depict children but does not, could be viewed as illegal under the act, but the wording of 
the law specifically requires that the person has to believe or convince someone else to 
believe that the images included real children.115 
 While Justice Stevens found the wording of the law sufficient to safeguard 
constitutionally protected speech from prosecution, justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
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dissented for similar reasons. Justice Breyer found that constitutionally protected 
material, such as computer renderings or images of adults who were made to look like 
children, were criminalized by the act.116 He asked, “What justification can there be for 
making independent crimes of proposals to engage in transactions that may include 
protected materials?”117 Based on that reasoning, he argued the law should have been 
overturned because it was overly broad. 
 It is noteworthy that the law in question in Williams pertained to physical and 
virtual communication. The facts of the case and the Court’s focus in its opinion, 
however, focused on online communication. And despite Justice Breyer’s concerns, the 
Roberts Court’s first case relating to freedom-of-speech issues on the Internet did not 
appear to employ the same high level of scrutiny for laws that affect online 
communication as Rehnquist Court decisions, such as Reno and Ashcroft II. 
Doe v. Reed 
 Much like Williams, Reed, a 2010 case, did not deal with a law that was 
specifically crafted to regulate a form of speech on the Internet. The case arose after the 
Washington State legislature passed a law that provided certain marital benefits to 
same-sex couples in 2009. Protect Marriage Washington conducted a drive and gathered 
the necessary number of signatures to have a referendum item regarding the same-sex 
benefits law placed on the ballot for the next election. Four groups made public 
information requests regarding the referendum petition, including WhoSigned.org and 
KnowThyNeighbor.org, who stated they requested the information so they could post 
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the names and addresses of the petition’s signers online in a searchable format.118 
Protect Marriage Washington and some of those who signed the petition filed for an 
injunction to stop the state from releasing the documents. The groups made two claims: 
that the state public-records law violated the First Amendment when it was used for 
referendums, and that the law violated the First Amendment when applied to the 
referendum regarding the Washington law that extended marriage-like benefits to same-
sex couples.119 The Supreme Court, by an eight-to-one vote, found that releasing the 
referendum petitions was constitutional in both instances. 
The Court’s opinion highlighted that the central argument made by the petition 
groups was that if their names and addresses were provided to the groups and posted 
online, they would be subjected to harassment and intimidation, which would violate 
their right to free speech and chill further petition efforts because potential signers 
would fear recourse as a result of their participation.120 The petition organizers and 
signers only mentioned concerns about the information being placed on the Internet. 
Though the groups who sought the information, once they possessed it, could have 
communicated it using any form of media, no other form of communication was 
mentioned in the case. The Court identified that in past cases, under certain 
circumstances, it had found that public disclosure could be halted to protect a speaker if 
he or she faced a “reasonable probability” that the information would lead to reprisals 
from the government or private groups.121 The Court did not see the petitioners’ 
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concerns as qualifying for such protections. The Court wrote, “Voters care about such 
issues, some quite deeply — but there is no reason to assume that any burdens imposed 
by disclosure of typical referendum petitions would be remotely like the burdens 
plaintiffs fear in this case.”122  
The Court rejected the groups’ concerns for two main reasons: it found signing a 
petition to be form of public political expression, and it concluded that the disclosure of 
petition information supported the integrity of the democratic process. In regard to the 
first reason, the Court wrote, “An individual expresses a view on a political matter when 
he signs a petition under Washington’s referendum procedure.”123 The petition groups 
argued signing a petition was a legislative act, not a form of political expression, but the 
Court dispatched that claim by arguing that signing a petition was expressive whether it 
was a legislative act or not.124 In regard to the second reason, the Court explained that 
releasing the petition information to the public allowed citizens to check for invalid 
signatures, fostered government transparency, and combated fraud.125 Justice Stevens, 
in his concurring opinion, boiled the issue before the Court to a few simple ideas: “This 
is not a hard case. . . . [The law] does not prohibit expression, nor does it require that 
any person signing a petition disclose or say anything at all.”126 To Stevens, in the 
absence of any form of regulation on speech or limitation on expression, there was no 
problem releasing the information.127 
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 In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the majority that the public-
records law was constitutional in regard to referendum petitions in general, but he 
suggested that the petition groups’ claim in the instance of the same-sex-benefits 
referendum could be viewed as qualifying for protection.128 He wrote, “If this 
information is posted on the Internet, then anyone with access to a computer could 
compile a wealth of information about all of those persons.”129 Justice Alito listed 
different types of information people place on the Internet, such as photographs of 
family, children’s school information, and wedding announcements.130 Such 
information, Justice Alito concluded, could be used to harass petition signers if their 
information were released. He found that the public interest in having access to the 
information through the public records law was not greater than the right of the 
petitioners to be free of harassment when they signed a petition.131 In his dissent, Justice 
Thomas raised similar concerns when he found that the petitioners’ concerns for 
protection were of greater importance than the public’s need to receive the information. 
He suggested that the government create a website and post the signatures and 
addresses behind a password-protected wall. In this way signers could log in and see if 
their names were properly placed on the petition, and the technology could be used to 
check for duplicate and fraudulent signatures. To Justice Thomas, this approach meant 
the governmental process could be monitored without the information’s release to the 
public.132 
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 While the court’s vote in Reed was eight-to-one, the justices appeared to come 
closer to mirroring the more fractured opinions found in American Library Association, 
Ashcroft I, and Ashcroft II. The case included five concurrences, ranging from a 
relatively short and simply stated point about balancing competing constitutional 
protections made by Justice Breyer to Justice Alito’s lengthy examination of ways 
online information could be used to harass people.133 Justices Alito and Thomas 
considered the characteristics of the Internet and put forth ways the petition information 
could have been placed online and monitored so certain people could access 
information while other could not. Justice Scalia contended, in his terse concurrence, 
that he doubted signing a petition had anything to do with freedom of speech in the first 
place.134 Taken together, the Court’s opinion, five concurrences, and one dissent in 
Reed indicated that the individual justices had diverging ideas regarding how Internet 
questions regarding the First Amendment should be resolved. 
Document Analysis 
The following subsections utilize Altheide’s method of document analysis to 
categorize representations that emerged through the analysis of the preceding Supreme 
Court decisions. The considerations related to the press clause or arguably related 
protections, as understood in terms of particular concerns that were emphasized in the 
courts’ conceptual rationales. In Altheide’s conceptualization of the central idea of his 
methodological approach, the “actual words and direct messages of documents carry the 
discourse that reflects certain themes, which in turn are held together and given 
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meaning by a broad frame.”135 As outlined in the introductory section, the themes that 
emerged in that analysis were: the Internet as (1) an idealized public sphere, (2) a 
vehicle connected to the speech clause and not the press clause, and (3) as a socially and 
technologically unique form of communication. 
 
The Internet as an Idealized Public Sphere 
 The discourse in Williams and Reed conveyed an understanding of the Internet 
as a virtual public sphere, a place where people could step forward, via their computers, 
into a variety of discussions and communities. The narrative carried in these cases 
consistently articulated that the Court understood the Internet as a place that enabled 
people to gather and deliberate. The Williams decision, for example, emphasized that 
Williams stepped into a “public Internet chat room,” and that he sent a “public message 
in the chat room.”136 The use of “public” in this context appeared to articulate an 
understanding of the Internet as a place where people choose to step from their private 
lives into the public sphere. The Court could have left “public” out of the two passages, 
stating simply that Williams signed into an “Internet chat room” and that he posted a 
message “in the chat room.” But “public” was included because it was a part of the 
Court’s broader understanding of the Internet as an idealized form of the public sphere.  
Similarly, in the Reed ruling, the discourse represented the Internet as a space 
where people could vet signatures on referendum petitions, further indicating an 
understanding that people can step into public discussions in a variety of ways on the 
Internet. The Court wrote that the groups who sought the referendum petitions were 
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interested in “preserving the integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud, 
detecting signatures, and fostering government transparency.”137 In this sense, the 
discourse communicated an understanding of the Internet as a space where people can 
both gather information and engage with others regarding national issues. The issue at 
the center of the referendum petition controversy in Reed was Washington State’s 
decision to extend some marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples. The narrative in the 
case articulated an understanding of the petition drive as concerning a national issue 
that was being deliberated upon by the public and that posting the petition information 
online would contribute information to citizens in democratic society, who could then 
step forward into the online public sphere to deliberate with others.138 Though the case 
centered on a state-related issue, the opinion conveyed an understanding that the 
petition information, if released and published on the Internet, would allow individuals 
from throughout the nation to carry information into discussions in the online public 
sphere. Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, asserted that “anyone with a computer” 
could gather information about the individuals who signed the petition.139 To that end, 
his concurring opinion conveyed an understanding that the Internet does not include 
geographic boundaries and that it allows people from diverse locations to discuss issues 
facing the nation. This understanding relates to the broader theme that a part of the 
Internet’s potential for an idealized public sphere is that it reduces the limitations 
regarding who can take part in deliberation in a democratic society.  
In a related sense, the discourse in Williams conceptualized virtual spaces as 
something people chose to enter. This understanding was seen in that the narrative 
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conveyed a recognition by the Court that Williams “signed into a public Internet chat 
room.”140 The discourse characterized the exchange Williams had with the Secret 
Service agent as “an electronic exchange” where he stepped from his private life into 
public discussions.141 By conceptualizing Williams’s interaction in the chat room as an 
exchange of information, the opinion further articulated an understanding that Internet 
is a place where people conduct discussions in virtually public spaces. Furthermore, the 
discourse regarding this theme indicated that justices were careful to ensure that 
communication was not regulated in a way that weakened the idealized public sphere it 
saw the Internet as fostering. The opinion in Williams emphasized that the PROTECT 
Act “does not prohibit advocacy of child pornography, but only [penalizes] offers to 
provide or requests to obtain it.”142 In this sense, the Court was careful in its discourse 
to highlight that debate about the issue would not be diminished by the act.  
The discourse in the Reed and Williams opinions communicated that the Court 
understood the Internet to be an idealized public sphere and that it would work to assure 
that no regulations would limit individuals’ access or ability to deliberate online. As 
part of this understanding, the narrative put forth by the Court in these cases 
communicated that it viewed the provision of information as central to the functioning 
of the public sphere and that the Internet made it possible for people in nearly any 
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The Internet as a Vehicle Connected to the Speech Clause and Not the Press Clause 
 The discourse in Reed and Williams characterized communication on the 
Internet as a form of speech, something relating to First Amendment free-speech 
protections, and not as a form of publishing, or something related to the press clause. 
This understanding could be seen in the legal concepts the justices chose to utilize in 
Williams, and to a lesser extent Reed. In Williams, for example, the Court wrote early in 
its opinion that “according to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is 
facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.”143 The ruling in 
the case focused upon the fact that the PROTECT Act limited only “collateral speech,” 
which in Williams included communication that involved the distribution of child 
pornography, something that the Court has found lacks First Amendment protection.144 
The solicitation of child pornography, even when it was done through postings in chat 
rooms, was characterized in the narrative as form of speech. In the understandings put 
forth in the Court’s discourse, the online communicator, Williams in this case, was not 
publishing messages, he was speaking in a virtual space. 
 The discourse in Reed was not as explicit regarding this theme, mainly because 
the case focused on the free-speech rights of the petition signers, and no mention was 
made relating to concern for the rights, speech or press, of the groups that sought to 
gather and communicate the petitioners’ information. In that opinion, the justices 
communicated that they understood signing a petition to be a form of political speech, 
and articulated that having that speech placed online did not hinder the signers’ rights. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia contended that “petitioning the government and 
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participating in the traditional town meeting were precursors of the modern initiative 
and referendum.”145 In this sense, the meanings conveyed in Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion related signing a petition to entering the town hall to speak about a public issue.  
 While the discourse regarding this theme was more clearly articulated in the 
Rehnquist Court’s cases, the narrative in Williams clearly conveyed an understanding 
that the Court conceptualized online communication as a form of speech. And while the 
Reed opinion did not convey similarly clear understandings regarding this theme, the 
meanings carried within the text did nothing to contradict it. The Court’s attention in 
Reed simply appeared to be focused on the petition-signers, not the groups who sought 
to place the information online. 
 
The Internet as a Socially and Technologically Unique Form of Communication 
 The narrative in Williams and Reed carried a conceptualization of the Internet as 
a socially and technologically unique form of communication. In constructing this 
theme, the discourse continually drew the Internet’s distinctive characteristics into the 
center of the Court’s deliberations in the two cases. In Williams, for example, the Court 
declared, “The emergence of new technology and the repeated retransmission of picture 
files over the Internet could make it nearly impossible to prove that a particular image 
was produced using real children.”146 Importantly, while the PROTECT Act that was at 
the center of the Williams case was created to prevent the communication of child 
pornography in general, the Court’s narrative communicated a primary concern 
regarding the capabilities of new technologies, including the Internet, for spreading 
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child pornography, and for changing the way the government has sought to prosecute it 
in the past.  
The overall focus of the discourse in the Williams decision was on the Internet, 
further constructing the theme that the justices conceptualized the Internet as unique on 
social and technological levels. Certainly, some of the attention the Internet received in 
Williams came from the facts of the case, which revolved around a chat-room 
interaction between Williams and a Secret Service agent. But the question before the 
Court was not specific to the Internet. The Court was asked to resolve if the PROTECT 
Act violated the First Amendment by making it illegal to claim to have child 
pornography, whether a person has the illegal material or not. This included 
communication through the mail or through interpersonal interactions, for example. The 
narrative focused on the Internet in the case, however, because the Court recognized the 
unique technological changes that were brought about by the Internet and the related 
social dangers to the newfound ease of spreading child pornography online. This point 
was highlighted in the final portion of the Court’s opinion when it wrote, “Child 
pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of our citizens. Both the State and 
Federal Governments have sought to suppress it for many years, only to find it 
proliferating through the new medium of the Internet.”147 
 This theme was further constructed in the Reed opinion with the Court’s 
discourse repeatedly emphasizing the plaintiffs’ concern that if the referendum petition 
information that was at the center of the case were released, it would be posted on the 
Internet. The Court wrote, “Plaintiffs allege, for example, that several groups plan to 
post the petitions in searchable form on the Internet, and then encourage other citizens 
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to seek out the R-71 signers.”148 No other form of media was discussed in the case, and 
in that sense the narrative continued to communicate an understanding of the Internet as 
something that was both socially and technologically unique. Certainly, the plaintiffs 
brought the concern about their names being published on the Internet into the case, but 
the narrative indicated that the Court chose in its opinion to focus on this concern, never 
mentioning that releasing the names via other media formats could also lead to at least 
some similar repercussions as those the plaintiffs listed regarding the Internet. Also, the 
laws in question in the case did not require the justices to consider the Internet. Neither 
the state’s referendum law, nor its open records law includes any Internet-specific 
language. The discourse contained within these cases indicated that the Court chose to 
make the Internet central to the case because it understood it to be a socially and 
technologically unique form of communication. 
Furthermore, the unique nature of online technology was emphasized throughout 
the Reed opinion. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito wrote, “If this information is 
posted on the Internet, then anyone with access to a computer could compile a wealth of 
information about all of those persons.”149 Justice Thomas, in his dissent, suggested the 
state use Internet technology to limit access to the information. He wrote, “Washington 
could create a Web site, linked to the electronic referendum database, where a voter 
concerned that his name had been fraudulently signed could conduct a search using his 
unique identifier to ensure that his name was absent from the database.”150 In both of 
these instances, the opinions conceptualized the Internet as possessing unique 
technological characteristics that could be utilized to influence society. The opinion in 
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Reed described the groups’ plans to post the information online as an intent “to 
broadcast the signers’ political views on the subject of the petition.”151 The use of the 
word “broadcast” in the opinion was in the context of spreading the message widely 
using the Internet. Instead of referring to broadcast as a medium, the discourse 
conveyed an understanding that the Court conceptualized the Internet as holding the 
potential to publish messages broadly to audiences. 
Finally, in the Reed case, as was seen in Williams, the discourse communicated 
that the justices understood there to be a relationship between the unique technological 
aspects of the Internet and its potential for social impact. The Reed opinion conveyed an 
understanding that if the information were released online, it would be readily available 
to anyone, anywhere, not just those in Washington State. The Court wrote, “Plaintiffs 
explain that once on the Internet, the petition signers’ names and addresses ‘can be 
combined with publicly available phone numbers and maps,’ in what will effectively 
become a blueprint for harassment and intimidation.”152 Similarly, Justice Alito wrote, 
“In this case, two groups proposed to place on the Internet the names and addresses of 
all those who signed Referendum 71, and it is alleged that their express aim was to 
encourage ‘uncomfortable conversations.’”153 In this sense, the justices conveyed an 
understanding in their discourse in this case that the unique technological characteristics 
of the Internet made it possible for people from anywhere in the world to compile 
information about the petition signers. For Justice Thomas, that concern was great 
enough that he dissented in the case. He wrote, “The state of technology today creates at 
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least some probabilities that signers of every referendum will be subjected to threats, 
harassment, or reprisals if their personal information is disclosed.”154  
The referendum petition information in Reed could have been released using any 
form of media once it was placed in the requesting groups’ hands. The plaintiffs 
identified concern regarding the fact that the information could be published online and 
the Court in its discourse in the case articulated an understanding that this was a valid 
concern. By recognizing this as a central concern, the narrative communicated an 
understanding that the justices saw the Internet as something socially and 
technologically unique. A similar idea could be seen in Williams, where the Court’s 
opinion, though it was dealing with a law that sought to limit exchanges of child 
pornography in every way, focused on how the Internet had changed the way child 
pornography was being communicated. Similarly, the discourse in these cases 
communicated that the Court understands the Internet as an idealized form of the public 
sphere, which carries vast potential to foster deliberation in society. In a related sense, 
the justices’ narrative indicated that they conceptualized messages that are 
communicated by individuals online as being related to speaking, rather than to 
publishing. 
Conclusion 
 Starting with Reno in 1997 and ending with Reed in 2010, the Court has showed 
consistent concern for First Amendment freedoms in its considerations of the Internet 
and the nature of online communication. While the Court’s rulings generally have 
strongly supported the idea that the Internet was a form of communication that should 
receive the greatest possible protection from government regulation, the justices were 
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often fractured in their reasons for why or how those protections should be extended to 
the Internet and divided in how they interpreted government efforts to regulate online 
content. In Ashcroft I, with its eight-to-one vote, no justice fully signed on with Justice 
Thomas’s opinion for the Court. Justices Scalia and O’Connor, along with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined parts of Justice Thomas’s opinion and then took part in three 
concurring opinions. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion. Similarly, Reed was an eight-to-one ruling but the decision included five 
concurring opinions and one dissent. American Library Association was decided by a 
six-to-three vote, but the decision included two diverging concurring opinions and two 
dissents. To this end, the Court showed agreement on the broader understandings about 
the First Amendment as it applied to Internet questions, but was often fractured in its 
reasoning and articulations for its decisions. The Court has also generally been 
consistent in its conceptualization that the Internet was an idealized public sphere, a 
vehicle connected to the speech clause and not the press clause, and as a socially and 
technologically unique form of communication. The variety of concurring and 
dissenting opinions in these cases, however, is noteworthy because they represent the 
first six cases where the Court ruled on First Amendment questions regarding the 
Internet. This is especially true with the first four cases, which dealt directly with 
legislation that was intended to regulate online communication. The diversity of 
concurring and dissenting opinions means that in many of the cases the Court did not 
present a strong, clear precedent for future Supreme Court and lower-court rulings to 
build upon. The next chapter examines the role of communication in a democratic 
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 Chapter Four: Philosophical Conceptualizations  
of the Role of Communication in Democratic Society 
 Computerized networks are being utilized to redefine how communities 
organize, groups communicate, and people contribute knowledge to helping to solve 
problems in society.1 The paradigmatic shift reflected in those trends has been termed 
the “network society” by scholars such as Castells, whose work focuses on sociological 
and communication technology concerns.2 Broadly, the network society has changed 
the way people interact. The theoretical discussion of these changes in the way people 
communicate includes three connected streams of ideas: the role of communication in 
democracy, network theory, and the place of mediated communication in society. In 
term’s of this study’s approach to proposing a framework for how future courts may 
interpret the press clause in the network society, considering the essential ideas asserted 
by scholars in each of these three areas of thought complements the analysis conducted 
in chapters Two and Three. To that end, this chapter begins with a discussion of 
communication-in-democracy theory that is centered upon what scholars have 
conceptualized as “the public sphere” and the central role that communication — 
especially journalism — plays in it. That discussion also considers the relationships 
among communication, freedom of expression, and knowledge generation in 
communities. After that, the network-theory section discussion considers identity and 
power structures in the twenty-first century, as well as the possibility of an emerging 
global public sphere. Finally, the discussion proceeds to the dynamics of twenty-first-
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century group organization, concerns about the problems networked communication has 
created for deliberation in democratic society, and user-generated versus journalistic 
content. With that broader discussion in place, this chapter will then move into applying 
Altheide’s discourse analysis in a similar way as in chapters Two and Three, but here to 
key components of discourse from the greater body of theoretical texts discussed in this 
chapter. 
Communication in Democracy 
Philosophers Dewey and Habermas represent two of the principle modern 
thinkers regarding publics and the role of communication in communities.3 Writing 
mostly in the first half of the twentieth century, Dewey is considered one of America’s 
greatest philosophers.4 Though his work spanned a relatively wide breadth of subjects, 
examinations of democracy and freedom were at the heart of his philosophical 
interests.5 About a decade after Dewey’s death, Habermas started his inquiries into the 
role of communication in democratic society. Beginning in the second part of the 
twentieth century, Habermas emerged as one of the most influential theorists of his 
time.6 Though they wrote at different times and followed different lines of inquiry, the 
authors are similar in that they became leading scholars regarding the role of 
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communication in democratic society.7 Philosopher Richard Rorty, who was heavily 
influenced by Dewey’s pragmatism, contended that both Dewey and Habermas could be 
considered distinct in that they focused on ideas based on shared social effort.8 He 
contrasted their approaches with philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Michael 
Foucault, who focused on the private, individual, and internal processes of 
understanding and meaning.9 While those who were more internally focused thinkers 
sought understandings of self-created, autonomous existence, Habermas and Dewey 
focused on “the effort to make our institutions and practices more just and less cruel.”10 
Importantly, Rorty’s insight into the fundamental differences between the approaches of 
other thinkers and those of Dewey and Habermas is a key reason the essential ideas of 
the latter two are examined in this chapter. Dewey and Habermas are distinct among 
modern philosophers in the way they understood and examined communication in 
democratic society. 
The Centrality of Communication in the Public Sphere 
Habermas’s conceptualization of what he most prominently described as the 
“public sphere” centered on the necessity of communication that is focused on creating 
knowledge and understanding in society.11 He articulated the public sphere as an 
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essential space reserved for communication in democratic society.12 To that end, 
Habermas’s understanding of the public sphere is that it requires certain nurturing and 
protective elements. Those elements include people who are invested in working 
together to solve the problems faced by society, independent media that provide the 
fodder for informed discussion about those problems, and a clear division between 
governmental and private roles in society.13 For Habermas, the public sphere flourishes 
when these elements are present. Habermas contended, however, that when these 
elements wane, communication, within his public-sphere framework, struggles. 
Habermas formulated that if members of the public cease to engage in working with 
others to solve society’s problems,14 if the independent media provide too little attention 
to the information needed for rational discussion,15 or if the government trespasses into 
the space the public sphere occupies between the state and people’s private lives,16 then 
the public sphere will cease to function properly.  
While Habermas’s initial work on the public sphere was published in 1961,17 its 
key aspects remain relevant to the discussion regarding communication in a democratic 
society. Castells, for example, used Habermas’s conceptualization of the public sphere 
to examine communication networks and global society.18 Howard Rheingold, one of 
the pioneers in virtual communities and other online-communication scholarship, 
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incorporated the concept of the public sphere into an examination of how new 
technology can be used to encourage civic engagement in young people.19 Habermas 
himself has continued to apply and refine the concept. In 2006, Habermas emphasized 
that an independent public sphere remains an integral part of modern democracy.20 He 
also concluded that the same forces that he initially outlined as factors that weaken the 
public sphere remained persistent threats to deliberation. Habermas postulated that the 
goal-oriented voices, those that seek to persuade rather than conduct communication for 
the purpose of reaching an understanding, have “colonized” the public sphere, limiting 
the public’s ability to come together to solve its problems through communication.21 
The philosopher’s concern regarding the problems created by strategic forms of 
communication relates to one of his central contributions to how communication is 
understood: the theory of communicative action. Habermas explained that 
communication that is oriented toward reaching understanding is the central and purest 
form communication.22 Other forms of communication are viewed as “derivatives” of 
communication aimed at agreement.23 Central to his theory is the requirement that 
“participants in communication be prepared to reach an understanding and that they 
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raise claims of truth, truthfulness, and rightness, and reciprocally impute their 
satisfaction.”24  
Habermas also examined the role of the mass media in a modern democracy in 
his more recent work. He contended that the press can only facilitate deliberation in a 
democracy when the press is self-regulated and its sources allow “feedback between an 
informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society.”25 He recognized elitist and 
commercial concerns that envelope the media while emphasizing that journalists are a 
required part of his understanding of how the public sphere functions.26 He asserted that 
when people receive information and are able to deliberate, they are more likely to 
change their minds and make more informed choices. When people do not have access 
to the type of information journalism has traditionally provided, the type that Habermas 
envisioned as nourishing the public sphere, people are more likely to become 
polarized.27 Habermas emphasized that an independent press remains one of the key 
components to the institutional design needed for democratic deliberation to operate.28 
To Habermas, the media provide information to the public sphere, which acts as a 
connector between face-to-face discussions among the public and those who are a part 
of the political system.29 The flow operates in both directions as politicians and interest 
groups seek legitimacy in their work through communicating messages to the public 
sphere and the public sphere, along with community advocacy groups, raises concerns 
and issues to be addressed by the politicians, who occupy the center of Habermas’s 
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model.30 In discussing the growth of citizen publishers on the Internet, Habermas 
argued that their work produced information, but it did not provide the same type of 
informational support to the public sphere that traditional media supplied.31 He wrote 
that the many citizen publishers create fragmentation and turn “politically focused mass 
audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics.”32 
Temporal Publics in Democratic Societies 
Habermas’s conceptualization of the public sphere focuses on a largely stable, 
constant body of deliberative communication in democratic society. He characterized 
the emergence of “the public sphere” as the “sphere of public authority.”33 Similarly, in 
more recent work, he explained a communication dynamic that included “securing the 
diversity of independent media, and a general access of inclusive mass audiences to the 
public sphere.”34 Dewey provided a different, more-temporal and plural model of the 
formation of “publics” in democratic society. To Dewey, publics form around problems, 
issues, or interests.35 When the concerns that lead to the creation of a public are 
alleviated, solved, or pass, the public is likely to dissolve.  
This approach from Dewey relates to his fundamental understanding of the 
difference between “public” and “private.” Dewey postulated that interactions between 
parties that do not have consequences for others are private.36 An action becomes public 
when its consequences go beyond those immediately concerned and affect the welfare 
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of others.37 He asserted, “Those indirectly and seriously affected for good or for evil 
form a group distinctive enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected 
is The Public.”38 In relation with these ideas, Dewey argued that it is essential and 
inherent in people’s nature to associate.39 These associations take the form of publics 
when “indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and 
interacting behavior call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling 
these consequences.”40 A governed state is formed in response to publics, groups of 
people concerned about coming to an understanding about a problem or issue. More 
directly, publics sometimes create governments or governmental functions to address 
those concerns.41 It is noteworthy that these governmental entities can outlast their use, 
kept in place perpetually, long after the reasons for their formation have passed and the 
public or publics that formed them dissipate.42 Political forms, Dewey emphasized, can 
even work to limit future deliberation that new publics embark upon because the public 
“cannot use inherited political agencies.”43  
Dewey did not view forms and vehicles of government, such as courts and legal 
documents, legislators and presidents, as the constituent driving forces of democracy. 
Dewey viewed democracy as a way of life, and was concerned that many saw 
democracy as something distant and removed from their lives.44 In this sense, Dewey’s 
conceptualization can be seen as relating with Habermas’s articulation of the public 
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sphere. Habermas viewed the engagement of the middle class in the seventeenth century 
as a key ingredient in the creation of the public sphere. He also saw the development of 
a consumer culture, versus an engaged body of people, as one of the downfalls of the 
public sphere.45 Similarly, Dewey wrote in favor of engagement, via understanding-
based communication. He contended: 
Democracy as a way of life is controlled by personal faith in personal day-by-
day working together with others. Democracy is the belief that even when needs 
and ends or consequences are different for each individual, the habit of amicable 
cooperation — which may include, as in sport, rivalry and competition — is 
itself a priceless addition to life.46 
 
In this sense, communication is integral to Dewey’s conceptualization of publics, and 
deliberation within publics is central to democratic self-governance.47  
Knowledge Through Communication 
It is not enough that publics are free to form — they have to communicate.48 
Only through communication, Dewey argued, can publics contribute to society.49 This 
concept relates to Dewey’s broader ideas regarding the nature and place of knowledge 
in individuals and society. He contended that man’s “quest for certainty can be fulfilled 
in pure knowing alone.50 To this end, he stated that superstition, philosophy, and 
science are each by themselves incapable of providing certainty and security for man.51 
Only knowledge, gleaned from communication, can guide publics.52 In this realm, 
Dewey’s ideas provide support for the value of both interpersonal and mass 
communication in society. Dewey identified the importance of “free gatherings of 
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neighbors” and “gatherings of friends in living rooms” as central to publics’ abilities to 
solve problems.53 The conversations that occur at these gatherings related to Dewey’s 
broader understanding of how the emergence of knowledge occurs through 
communication. These ideas also relate, though the wording and setting are quite 
different, with the coffeehouse conversations discussed by Habermas in his explication 
of the formation of the public sphere.54 In both cases, comings together by groups of 
people, for the purpose of understanding, were used to discuss ideas and issues facing 
those communities.  
These gatherings, and their role in forming knowledge, both on personal and 
public levels, are conceptually different than the traditional Miltonian-based 
marketplace of ideas. British author and philosopher John Milton’s discussion of the 
free exchange of ideas was based on competition between truth and falsity. Milton 
wrote, “Where there is much to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much 
writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making.”55 
Habermas’s and Dewey’s understandings related with Milton’s view regarding 
deliberative communication as a driver for knowledge among groups of people. They 
depart somewhat, however, regarding the “arguing” and “competition” aspects of the 
idea. Habermas and Dewey conceptualized knowledge as emanating from amicable 
discussion among people who share common problems, issues, or interests, for the 
purposes of solving problems or garnering knowledge through association.56 The 
pivotal difference between the marketplace of ideas and the discursive models outlined 
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by Habermas and Dewey is the matter of competition between ideas.57 Rather than ideas 
independently presenting themselves for consideration in the marketplace, Habermas 
explained that reaching understanding presents the opportunity for all involved to 
communicate and to reach a new definition of the issue or problem.58  
Mass communication also plays a role in Dewey’s and Habermas’s 
conceptualizations of how publics operate and, within that operation, how knowledge 
emerges through interactions between individuals. They viewed the media as providing 
the initial fodder publics utilize to begin deliberation about issues and problems. Dewey 
wrote that “public policy cannot be generated unless it be informed by knowledge, and 
this knowledge does not exist except when there is systematic, thorough, and well-
equipped search and record.”59 Dewey, however, saw much of the media’s ability to 
connect people as unrealized. He found that the tools for communication had evolved 
significantly in the early part of the twentieth century, but the way the new technologies 
were being utilized was not conducive to sharing knowledge for the purpose of 
meaningful deliberation.60 Dewey lamented that events were being reported without 
connections or context regarding how they related to other ideas.61 Dewey’s placement 
of the mass media as central to informing publics carries some similarity to Habermas’s 
placement of the early press as a necessity to informing the emerging merchant class in 
the seventeenth century.62 Habermas wrote that “media professionals” are needed for 
the public sphere to function.63 He also recognized that journalists are subject to 
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influence by interest groups such as politicians, lobbyists, and “moral entrepreneurs.”64 
Habermas, however, did not describe this as a problem as much as a matter of fact. He 
wrote, for example, “Media professionals produce an elite discourse, fed by actors who 
struggle for access to and influence on the media.”65 Despite his concerns, in his early 
investigations of the public sphere and his later writings, Habermas made journalism a 
key part of his ideas regarding how the public sphere is nourished with information. In 
the context of this section, Dewey and Habermas both place the media in a key role 
because their conceptualization of deliberative communication is based on the idea that 
knowledge emerges from informed interactions with others, and therefore, deliberation 
among people requires a baseline of relevant information. 
Concepts of Freedom in Communities 
The vital functions in a democracy of publics, groups of people who come 
together to generate knowledge to solve problems or pursue common interests, cannot 
occur without the freedoms to communicate and gather. To this end, Habermas and 
Dewey emphasized the need to protect both interpersonal and mediated communication. 
Dewey wrote, “The heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of 
neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news 
of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to 
converse freely with one another.”66 Similarly, Habermas made the autonomy to think 
and communicate a central part of his requirements for the functioning of a modern 
democracy. In regard to government, he asserted that the only regulation should be that 
which secures the independence of the public sphere from the state and the “diversity of 
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independent mass media, and a general access of inclusive mass audiences to the public 
sphere.”67 Dewey and Habermas were not solely concerned with government 
interference with freedom of expression and the flows of information throughout 
society. They also feared society itself would choose to choke off or devalue the 
knowledge-fostering communication needed for democracy to function. Dewey wrote, 
“Merely legal guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free 
assembly are of little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take 
of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and 
hatred.”68 In another work, Dewey argued, “It is false that freedom of inquiry and of 
expression are not modes of action. They are exceedingly potent modes of action.”69 To 
that end, Dewey and Habermas cautioned against both government-originated attacks 
on the freedom to communicate as well as internal, societal limitations on inquiry and 
the flow of information. 
Networks, Communication, and Community 
 The ways that Dewey and Habermas conceptualized communication, 
community, and social action bears commonalities with the second stream of 
philosophical conceptualizations of communication in a democratic society in this 
chapter, which examines the way that computerized network communication is 
understood by scholars. Online communication has shifted the ways individuals in 
communities identify themselves and the ways that power relationships function on 
local, national, and global levels. This section focuses on Castells’s ideas because they 
have shown themselves to be central to understanding how communication and 
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community operate in the “network society.”70 To Castells, the term “network society” 
refers to the social structure that has emerged as a result of the formation of global-
digital networks.71 He contended that the social structure is constructed around digital 
communication networks and that such networks do not determine social structure.72 
The network society, to Castells, fundamentally refers to an information revolution and, 
as a result, an emerging global-social structure that is influencing the way people live 
on every level.73 Castells argued that the characteristics of the network-society 
revolution are different than those of previous eras. He postulated that the network 
society is uniquely characterized by the facts that information is the primary raw 
material of the new era, that new technologies are being used pervasively in society, 
that computerized networks have created unprecedented levels of interaction among 
people, that new technologies are relatively flexible in the ways that they can be used, 
and that new technologies have converged into integrated systems.74 These 
characteristics of the network era separate it from its predecessors and influence the 
way people communicate, Castells contended. 
While a flood of scholarship has emerged regarding how networked 
communication is understood and its effects on society, Castells’s ideas provide a 
unique perspective in that he is involved in sociological, public policy, and community-
planning aspects of understanding how network technology is changing people’s lives.75 
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The areas from which he draws his ideas for how the network era is to be understood 
are uniquely suited to the broader questions of this dissertation. No other scholar has 
focused as directly or prolifically on the impact of the network society on communities 
and communication.76 In addition, this section utilizes media scholar Brian McNair’s 
ideas to consider ways in which the discursive concepts put forth by Dewey and 
Habermas can be related to the idea of a global-public sphere that is emerging through 
the advancement of the network society. This section in particular focuses on the role 
McNair visualized for journalism in the network era. McNair asserted a slightly 
different visualization of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, proposing a global-
social structure that includes many public spheres that are tied together by a three-tiered 
media system. McNair’s broader discussion of communication in a globalized world is 
based on the “chaos paradigm,” which refers to the non-linear, decentralized, 
interconnected, and largely contingent nature of how information is exchanged in the 
network society.77 
Government and Communication Power Dynamics 
Castells approached power dynamics in the network era from the position that 
all social structures are based on power relationships.78 The “power” he referred to, in 
this instance, is not necessarily related to force or the threat of force. Power, as Castells 
defined it, can be exercised as violence or communication, coercion and persuasion, or 
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political and cultural framing.79 The power is made a part of institutions and 
organizations, and a part of government. To that end, Castells’s consideration of power 
dynamics in the network society started by examining Habermas’s ideas regarding how 
power is legitimized in democratic society.80 He supported Habermas’s position that 
communicative action is the source of meaning-creation in society.81 Castells argued a 
democratic state maintains its power through legitimacy and that legitimacy is 
preserved by a flow of communication from the discursive process within the public 
sphere to representatives of the people who move to exercise power. He wrote that 
power, in this instance, “is what ensures democracy and ultimately creates the 
conditions for legitimate exercise of power.”82  
 Networked communication is changing some of these fundamental dynamics.  
Castells contended that the network society is one in which the social structure is built 
around a computerized network of communication tools and information.83 The network 
society, to Castells, is a global society, and its boundaries are not based on physical, 
geographic lines, as in societies of the past.84 As a result, a unique power exchange 
occurs. On one hand, nations have lost power in the network society because their 
governments are established on the basis of geographically outlined boundaries, but the 
meaning-making and communication functions that are central to government are now 
global.85 Also, the global nature of the network revolution has reduced the powers 
governments have to control the flow of information, communication, technology, 
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capital, goods, and services across their borders and to their people.86 Fluctuations in 
economic markets, for example, are no longer primarily tied to national financial 
considerations. Managing these global fluctuations is often out of the control of national 
governments. On the other hand, governments continue to have substantial influence on 
how societies form and operate — even a networked society that has no physical 
boundaries.87 Castells theorized that the result of the continuing interplay between 
governments losing their power and influence on communication in society and their 
attempts to retain it will lead to the creation of the network state.88  
Philosophically, Castells identified the network state as the fruition of 
Habermas’s ideas regarding communication in society.89 Part of this relationship with 
Habermas’s ideas is the result of the increasing role communication can play when 
citizens have more power in how they are governed.90 The information and 
communication bases of the move to the network era shifts some of the power from the 
institutions in society to citizens.91 In an attempt to retain power, governments have 
formed pacts among nations. Examples include the European Union and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, where some sovereignty was given up to protect an 
area of weakening power. By banding together, nations can help protect financial or 
military power, but they also lose some power to represent their immediate, physical 
constituencies.92 Castells wrote, “In the past ten years, nation-states have moved from 
                                                
86 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity: Economy, Society, and Culture (Malden, Mass.: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 301. 
87 Castells, Communication Power, 27. 
88 Ibid., 39. 
89 Castells, The Power of Identity, 350. 
90 Castells, Communication Power, 40. 
91 Castells, The Power of Identity, 22; Castells, Communication Power, 40. 
92 Castells, The Power of Identity, 419; Castells, Communication Power, 39-40. 
 
 201 
sovereignty to social actors in a network. They play for their interests in a global system 
of interaction.”93 
 The power shift governments face affects communication in society in two 
ways: some of the power has gone to powerful media entities that have concentrated 
their ownership, and some of the power has gone to the people who were once thought 
of as the audience.94 In both cases, the conceptual elements that form these groups are 
not tied to national boundaries. Therefore, these groups, unlike physically bordered 
nations, are not hindered by globalization. Media companies have taken advantage of 
deregulation in many parts of the world to form large conglomerates.95 Castells 
contended that the move toward large conglomerates that own the majority of the media 
outlets, along with other moves to control the Internet for economic purposes, are 
limiting free expression in ways that are more dangerous than governmental uses of 
power.96 He wrote, “While the attention of the world was focused on free expression on 
the Internet, the transformation of the communication infrastructure into a series of 
‘walled gardens’ . . . [has] imposed fundamental constraints upon the expansion of the 
new digital culture.”97 
 While governmental and economic shifts in power have influenced the network 
society, the change in information usage and communication capability for individuals 
has been most profound. The revolution that brought about the network-society era was 
based on information technology.98 The revolution went beyond a set of centralized 
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information and created a cycle of information creation and processing using 
communication devices. Castells described this as a “feedback loop between innovation 
and the uses of innovation.”99 The feedback loop has placed the power to choose and 
communicate messages in the hands of individuals. In this sense, according to Castells’s 
ideas regarding power, if communication is central to control and power in society, 
much of that power has been transferred to individuals. He wrote, “With the diffusion of 
the Internet, a new form of interactive communication has emerged, characterized by 
the capacity of sending messages from many to many, in real time or chosen time.”100 
Castells asserted that the shifts in power taking place in the network society have 
allowed citizens to take some measure of control in communication. He declared, 
“Social actors and individual citizens around the world are using the new capacity of 
communication networking to advance their projects, to defend their interests, and to 
assert their values.”101 
Identity in the Network Society 
 Individual and group identities play a vital role in the shifts in power structures 
and overall changes brought about by the network-society era. The network is global in 
reach and influence and, as a result, a unique interplay between local and global 
influence is playing out in communities around the world. Members of physically 
localized communities reach out for information found on the globalized network and, 
at the same time, defensively turn inward, to local communities, for identity and 
protection from the societal shifts the network society’s emergence has helped to 
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create.102 Castells asserted that while the Internet creates uncertainty, groups shrink “the 
size of human experience to a dimension that can be managed and defended by people 
feeling lost in the whirlwind of a destructured world.”103 This move toward localized 
identities addresses one of two shifts in how people view themselves as a result of the 
emergence of the network society. People are forming “communes,” or groups that use 
“resistance identities,” to define the world around them.104 Resistance identities, to 
Castells, form in individuals as a type of defense against rapid, uncontrolled shifts in the 
society around them.105 He postulated that the globalized nature of the network society 
has intensified the construction of resistance identities around the world. Resistance 
identities, Castells wrote, are built utilizing carefully selected and commonly rewritten 
local histories, religious beliefs, and ethnic influences.106 Communes represent 
collectives that are formed by those who share common resistance identities.107 At the 
same time these defensive identities and communes are forming, others are reaching 
across geographic boundaries to encounter previously unavailable information and to 
form virtual communities with those who share common interests.108 
 The underlying uncertainty that is caused by fundamental changes in economics, 
social institutions, culture, media, and education, and is driven by expanding network-
communication technologies has caused many to redefine their identities in ways that 
reconstruct the world using specifically and intentionally defined building materials 
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from history, nationalism, religion, and culture.109 Castells wrote that, in a world of 
“uncontrolled, confusing change, people tend to regroup around primary identities: 
religious, ethnic, territorial, national.”110 These identities are different than primary 
understandings in that they form a defensive response to uncertainty. They are created 
as castles to protect against a changing, hostile world.111 These identities are a reaction 
to perceived threats and uncertainty. Castells concluded, “Identity is becoming the 
main, and sometimes the only, source of meaning in a historical period characterized by 
widespread destructuring of organizations, delegitimation of institutions, fading away of 
major social movements, and ephemeral cultural expressions.”112  
On the community level, these resistance identities lead to the formation of 
communes. Communes pull from the same materials that are traditionally understood by 
scholars as the building blocks of identity. To that end, Castells asserted, “These 
defensive reactions become sources of meaning and identity by constructing new 
cultural codes out of historical materials.”113 Communes are not formed on the basis of 
reason or fact, but are formed on beliefs, Castells postulated.114 Castells related the 
formation of these resistance communes to the growth of religious fundamentalism 
around the world. He also explained that these communes are a threat to democratic 
government because they represent groups that are turning inward, away from 
communication that is based on creating understanding in society. Castells argued these 
commune groups “cannot, and will not sustain democracy (that is, liberal democracy) 
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because the very principles of representation between the two systems (national 
citizenship, singular identity) are contradictory.”115 In this sense, democracy is 
undermined by the formation of communes that emerge as a result of uncertainty that is 
partially created by the weakening of traditional governmental power structures. 
 Castells’s ideas regarding how democracy can be reformed and how the 
defensive walls of communes can be lowered relate to virtual communities and the 
creation of relationships between people using network technology. He asserted that the 
same technologies that have contributed to uncertainty and defensive identities can be 
used to bring people together and to encourage participation in government.116 Castells 
argued that local governments in democratic nations have shown the ability to use 
technology to increase connections between groups and the problems in their 
communities.117 The Internet allows people to have access to information and to share it 
in ways that facilitate communication about issues, problems, and interests. In this 
sense, the Internet helps to facilitate Dewey’s and Habermas’s ideas regarding 
communication in democracy. The new technologies also bypass the media’s traditional 
gatekeeping role.118 Castells wrote, “Access to the Internet, which bypasses the 
controlled world of the mass media, has democratized information, making it less 
dependent on money and political bureaucracies.”119 This conclusion, however, does 
not mean the media no longer play a central role in Castells’s conceptualization of the 
network society. Media organizations occupy central roles in communication networks, 
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but alongside them are virtual communities that form around interests.120 In many ways, 
the communities resemble the publics Dewey described,121 because, as Castells 
characterized them, they are “fragmented, localistic, single-issue oriented and 
ephemeral.”122 Virtual communities create horizontally oriented communication 
dynamics that Castells conceptualized as being “built around people’s initiatives, 
interests, and with desires that are multimodal and incorporate many kinds of 
documents.”123  
Networks as the Carriers of the Global Public Sphere 
 McNair took many of the concepts that were put forth by Castells regarding the 
network society and related them to Habermas’s conceptualization of the public sphere 
in order to assert the possibility of an emerging global-public sphere.124 Like Castells, 
McNair argued that the globalized nature of the network society has undermined 
political, social, and journalistic institutions.125 He also recognized that the network 
society has both connected people to information in new ways and caused ideological 
divides.126 Finally, McNair argued democracy and the media are historically tied to one 
another — as one experiences expansion and freedom, the other does as well.127 These 
understandings regarding the network and the relationship between democracy and 
journalism undergird McNair’s ideas regarding the global-public sphere. 
In constructing his global model, McNair departed from Habermas’s initial 
conceptualization of the public sphere, postulating that it is not a singular realm, but 
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rather that there are many public spheres within a broader public sphere.128 McNair 
asserted that the public sphere comprises “a virtual, cognitive multiverse of spheres 
within spheres; sets of cultural institutions serving overlapping, intersecting, 
interconnected communities . . . linked by their shared consumption of the information 
contained in particular media.”129 In McNair’s understanding of public spheres, the 
media play a substantial, connective role that in some ways is elevated in comparison to 
what Habermas asserted in his original articulation of the idea. The media, to McNair, 
act as tying agents, pipelines that cross physical boundaries. The theorist articulated 
three media-based vehicles that work together to make a global-public sphere possible: 
(1) national-public spheres, (2) transnational-satellite news, and (3) the Internet.  
The national-public spheres, in McNair’s formulation, are fed and linked by 
traditional-print and broadcast-media outlets.130 McNair contended that the media on 
this level, in their diversity of styles and forms, combine to create a singular national-
public sphere.131 He wrote, “National media (including local and regional) remain the 
dominant providers of information within nation-state boundaries, and will do so for 
some time to come.”132 The transnational-satellite-news networks, such as CNN and Al 
Jazeera, make up the second tier of McNair’s media-based conceptualization of the 
global-public sphere. These news sources play a connective role in that their 
information is geared toward international audiences.133 They are not, however, 
connective in the sense that they are a network or operate in the more-horizontal 
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dynamic of network communication. McNair wrote this type of media are “conveyor 
belts of always-on information, running in parallel.”134 The third tier, the Internet, 
represents the true global-connective tissue in McNair’s scheme. The Internet brings 
together websites from traditional news outlets and citizen publishers, and the messages 
on the sites are created in nation-states but the content connects “communication 
environments, or public spheres of those locations, to the world wide web, which 
encloses everything within it in a network of independent voices.”135 Though the three 
tiers work together to create McNair’s vision of the global-public sphere, the Internet 
tier serves two roles. The first two tiers, and the Internet tier, are conceptualized as 
providing the baseline of information public spheres need, locally and globally, to 
facilitate communication regarding problems and issues. The Internet tier, however, 
also mimics the coffeehouses Habermas discussed in that it provides a forum for 
discussion.136  
McNair did not claim the global-public sphere is fully formed. Much as 
Habermas outlined forces that led to the demise of the eighteenth-century public sphere 
he examined, McNair asserted that certain conditions could quash the global-public 
sphere’s formation — or encourage its growth. He contended that people must have 
access to information, the information must be of high-enough quality to provide the 
baseline of knowledge needed, and the public must be capable of absorbing the flood of 
information created by the network society.137 Only the third concern is distinct from 
Habermas’s original concerns. McNair, who comes from a critical approach that is not 
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too distant from Castells’s views, focused much of his attention on access and media 
freedoms, asserting that elites in society who have lost control of media messages and 
other forms of control in the network society might seek to regulate and limit the flow 
of information, use coercive techniques to limit offending voices, or use persuasive 
messages to flood the sphere with manipulative communication.138 Again, these 
concerns relate to Habermas’s key assertions regarding the necessity for a free flow of 
information in order for the public sphere to flourish. 
Communication in the Network Era 
The third stream of philosophical conceptualizations regarding the role of 
communication in a democratic society in this chapter is concerned with mediated 
communication in the twenty-first century. The authors in this stream built upon 
Dewey’s and Habermas’s ideas regarding the formation of publics and the role of 
communication in democratic society and applied them to the network-society setting. 
Jenkins and Clay Shirky examined the characteristics of groups and group efforts 
online. Jenkins, a media-studies scholar, has focused most of his research on the 
relationship between people’s media use and popular culture.139 Of specific value to this 
section are Jenkins’s ideas regarding how people who have an interest in a topic or issue 
have used online tools to join or create communities. Jenkins focused on the 
characteristics of online fan communities but considered how the characteristics of 
these communities could translate into deliberation regarding political matters in the 
network-society era. Like Jenkins, Shirky has focused much of his writing on the 
formation of online communities and the influences these communities are having on 
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society, especially traditional institutions.140 The authors put forth insights regarding 
how people are using new technologies to organize, communicate, and realize their 
abilities to contribute to society. They did not assert that networked communication has 
not occurred before but rather sought to highlight how people are using new 
technologies to network in societally changing ways.  
Cass Sunstein, a legal and political-science scholar who has focused much of his 
research attention on the Constitution and the Supreme Court, contributed a different 
perspective regarding the effects of online group action. He outlined problems that 
come with the unique possibilities for communication that are a part of the network-
society era. Sunstein did not disparage the emergence of online communities, but 
articulated a set of constructive concerns that were uniquely informed by his extensive 
research into the workings of the American legal system.141 Much like Castells and 
McNair, Shirky, Jenkins, and Sunstein each considered, from different perspectives, 
how people are using new technologies to shift power structures and identities in 
democratic society. The ideas regarding power structures and identities found in the 
second stream of theoretical conceptualizations of the role of communication in a 
democratic society and the ideas put forth by the authors in the third stream focus on the 
future of democracy and the advantages and disadvantages of the empowerment and 
choice made available to individuals in the network society.  
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Twenty-First Century Communicative Structures 
 The Internet has connected people in new ways and has alleviated many of the 
traditional barriers to organization.142 Shirky, much as Dewey contended several 
decades before, argued that people inherently organize because communication is part 
of human nature.143 For this reason, Shirky asserted that shifts in communication equal 
shifts in the way society operates.144 Online communication has allowed people to 
interact more quickly across greater distances than in the past and it has changed the 
way people organize, he concluded. 145 The shift has changed society by undermining 
traditional institutions that have historically been relied upon to foster community.146 
Shirky wrote, “For most of modern life, our strong talents and desires for group effort 
have been filtered through relatively rigid institutional structures because of the 
complexity of managing groups.”147 The structures were created, Shirky postulated, to 
help solve the problems of community organization with the tools that were available at 
the time. Shirky argued new tools have become available that make these socializing 
institutions less central to community.148 In this sense, Shirky’s and Jenkins’s ideas 
relate with Castells’s observations regarding how social institutions are being weakened 
as a result of new technology. Shirky and Jenkins went beyond Castells’s recognition 
that social institutions are being undermined and circumvented to consider how people 
are using new technologies to organize. 
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 Jenkins explained that online communities, much like the publics described by 
Dewey, are voluntary and temporary and are formed to solve a problem or address a 
shared interest.149 Jenkins added that the Internet has provided the means for people to 
form interest- or issue-based communities across any distance, putting the focus on the 
enterprise that binds the group, not on the limitations of who is near enough to 
contribute. He concluded that online communities are distinct from physical groups 
because they are based on knowledge and interest. A “knowledge community,” to 
Jenkins, is formed to take advantage of the aggregate power of the group.150 The 
communities form to gather information and process knowledge.151 Within a knowledge 
community there is a “collective intelligence,” which is “the sum total of information 
held individually by the members of the group that can be accessed in response to a 
specific question.”152 Within the dynamic of knowledge communities, and the collective 
intelligences they hold, is a shift in paradigms regarding how information is viewed and 
communicated. Traditionally, the “expert paradigm” has placed the information holder, 
such as a journalist, in a vertically higher position than the receiver.153 Jenkins 
postulated that knowledge communities are based on a more-horizontal model where it 
is assumed “each person has something to contribute, even if they will only be called 
upon on an ad hoc basis.”154 Knowledge communities are also more disorganized and 
undisciplined than groups that interact using the expert paradigm.155 Jenkins asserted, 
“What holds a collective intelligence together is not the possession of knowledge, 
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which is relatively static, but the social process of acquiring knowledge, which is 
dynamic and participatory, continually testing and reaffirming the group’s social 
ties.”156 The social ties found in these communities are not, comparatively, as strong as 
those found in the past in social institutions, such as families or religious organizations. 
The communities do not require a strong commitment, and if people no longer find their 
needs met, they leave. Importantly, Jenkins explained that people do not simply leave a 
group and disappear, they move to another knowledge community.157 Using wording 
that shared similarities with Dewey’s understanding of publics, Jenkins wrote, “Because 
they are tactical, they tend not to last beyond the tasks that set them in motion.”158 
 While Jenkins primarily discussed knowledge communities in connection with 
fandom, he postulated that they have the potential to contribute to democratic 
deliberation.159 Harnessing the abilities of knowledge communities requires a shift in 
focus from thinking mainly of an individualized informed citizen to a more-
collaborative model.160 This approach lines up with Dewey’s understanding of how 
knowledge is created through communication.161 To explain his idea, Jenkins outlined 
the concept of the “monitorial citizen,” which is based on the idea that the average 
person cannot keep up with all of the political information being made available in the 
network era.162 The idea relates with knowledge-communities concept because it 
assumes that not everyone can know everything, but each person has something to 
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contribute.163 The monitorial-citizen concept helps explain how people use new 
technologies to participate in democratic societies. People are not information-gatherers 
as much as observers who act when called upon.164 Jenkins cautioned, however, that 
this approach required citizens to develop greater critical thinking skills regarding the 
messages they encounter. 
Information Blindness 
 Jenkins’s caution regarding the critical skills that citizens apply to messages 
they encounter as they monitor the flood of information around them in the network era 
relates to Sunstein’s concerns regarding how democracy can function when people only 
encounter self-selected messages. Sunstein made the case that the Internet and other 
new technologies have the potential to improve democratic society, but they also create 
dangers. Primarily, he listed two requirements for democracies in the network era: 
citizens must encounter ideas they did not select or intend to encounter, and people 
must share a range of common experiences.165 Sunstein lamented that new technologies 
allow information customization to the point that people only encounter ideas similar to 
their own. Historically, “general intermediaries” in society — traditional media outlets 
such as newspapers, for example — helped protect against both of Sunstein’s 
concerns.166 Sunstein wrote, “People who rely on such intermediaries have a range of 
chance encounters, involving shared experiences with diverse others, and also exposure 
to materials and topics that they did not seek out in advance.”167 Much as other authors 
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stated, the influence of these traditional-media outlets has waned.168 People skip past 
stories and ideas they once had to encounter in general intermediaries, such as the 
assortment of news in the nightly news broadcast, and focus on information that only 
strengthens preexisting beliefs.169 Sunstein wrote, “Members of a democratic public will 
not do well if they are unable to appreciate the views of their fellow citizens, or if they 
see one another as enemies or adversaries in some kind of war.”170 
 Much like Jenkins, and Dewey before him, Sunstein argued collective 
deliberation is an important part of democratic government.171 Sunstein asserted that 
this perspective is different than Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
marketplace-of-ideas approach. The marketplace approach is more individual-based and 
is focused on protecting against government censorship.172 Sunstein argued more is 
needed in the network era. He explained, citing Dewey, that the government-by-
discussion perspective goes beyond protection from censorship to taking part in 
deliberations to solve the problems of society. Sunstein wrote, “Each of us has rights 
and duties as citizens, not simply as consumers. . . . Active citizen engagement is 
necessary to promote not only democracy but social well-being too.”173 To Sunstein, 
individual self-government is not enough; citizens must be engaged with others, 
something network technology has made more possible than in the past.174 The 
consumer-focused marketplace approach, Sunstein argued, encourages polarization,  
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fragmentation, and “cybercascades,” which are untruths that are accepted as truths 
across the Internet because so many believe them.175 His approach encouraged 
community engagement in political deliberation.176  
User-Generated Versus Journalistic Content 
 The communities that form online, whether they are called knowledge 
communities or publics, are nourished by information. They are inherently 
communication-based, since communication is at the center of community.177 Shirky 
argued that the definition of what is news has been changed from an institutional 
understanding based on a professional class of gatekeepers to “part of a 
communications ecosystem, occupied by a mix of formal organizations, informal 
collectives, and individuals.”178 He found that user-generated messages account for a 
large part of the shift in communication dynamics. User-generated messages are defined 
by their group-oriented nature and how they are entirely composed and communicated 
by amateurs.179 Shirky contended these messages, such as Facebook posts, are often 
viewed as self-centered, mundane, and of little use to society.180 He argued that the 
reason the messages seem useless to many observers is because the communicator is not 
“talking to you.”181 The messages are narrowly tailored to small communities. Shirky 
wrote, “We misread these seemingly inane posts because we’re so unused to seeing 
written material in public that isn’t intended for us.”182 User-generated content, to 
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Shirky, is a fundamental part of community activity in the network era.183 Shirky 
compared the small, online conversations that make up much of user-generated content 
to people speaking to one another at a table in a crowded restaurant or mall food court. 
He wrote, “They are in the public, and you could certainly sit at the next table over and 
listen in on them if you wanted to.”184 To Shirky, community deliberation often occurs 
at these small-scale levels using user-generated content.  
 Shirky’s understanding of mediated communication in the network era left little 
room for traditional media. Newspapers, magazines, and broadcast media were framed 
as relics that were created to solve the problem of informing the public when different 
technological limitations existed. Shirky wrote, “The media industries have suffered 
first and most from the recent collapse in communications costs. It used to be hard to 
move words, images, and sounds from creator to consumer, and most media businesses 
involve expensive and complex management of that pipeline problem.”185 Shirky also 
identified the traditional media’s editorial process as a holdover from when information 
was a scarce resource.186 The network society, he concluded, allows for a system in 
which publishers send out information and then filter it. Shirky asserted that people 
have always talked about information, whether they read it in a newspaper or other 
media source or heard it from someone else. The difference, to Shirky, is people now 
have the capability of sharing information and talking about it at the same time.187 By 
publishing information before filtering it, and discussing it, communities can deliberate 
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to solve problems or reach understandings, concepts that relate directly with 
Habermas’s and Dewey’s foundational ideas regarding democratic communication.188 
Overall, the preceding discussion examined philosophical conceptualizations of 
communication in democratic society as they relate to this study’s broader approach 
toward proposing a framework for how future courts should interpret the press clause in 
the network society. These central thinkers postulated that informed deliberation is 
central to the functionality of a democracy.189 Within this overall focus, Dewey and 
Habermas laid out the necessary components for people in democratic society to come 
together, communicate ideas, and ultimately solve problems. Their discussion of those 
components emphasized that individuals must be active in their self-government, have 
access to information that is created by an independent media, and have access to 
spaces in which they can encounter one another and exchange ideas.190 Other 
philosophers put forth understandings regarding how computerized, networked 
communication has fundamentally altered the way people interact. Castells outlined the 
changes in power and identity that have arisen as a result of the shift to the network-
society social structure that has emerged in recent decades.191 Within this realm, Jenkins 
and Shirky focused on how online communication allows more people to participate in 
deliberation and, therefore, contribute their distinct knowledge to solve problems within 
a variety of communities.192 Together, these three streams of philosophical 
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conceptualizations showed themselves to be woven together as part of a broader 
understanding that communication is central to democratic society.  
Document Analysis 
The sections that follow use Altheide’s method of discourse analysis in a similar way to 
how it was employed in chapters Two and Three, but here the central components of 
discourse from each of the three streams of theoretical texts are discussed. The 
theoretical texts were analyzed concerning representations related to communication in 
democratic society and related considerations regarding particular concerns emphasized 
by the philosophers’ and scholars’ conceptual understandings. The remainder of this 
chapter is broken into three sections, which correspond with the organization of the first 
part of the chapter. The sections include Communication in Democracy; Networks, 
Communication, and Community; and Communication in the Network Era. Each 
section discusses the three themes that emerged through applying Altheide’s process of 
document analysis. Altheide defined themes as “mini-frames,” or central ideas within a 
text.193 He conceptualized a frame as “a kind of super theme” that carries a primary idea 
in a set of documents.194 
The themes identified through that analysis focused upon representations that 
framed the essential elements of those subjects in terms of (1) journalism as understood 
to be part of communication in a democratic society more broadly, (2) the roles of 
individuals in a democracy as engaged and reflective, and (3) individuals’ contributions 
to resolving societal problems as contingent to the groups in which they participate. 
  
                                                





Method and Sampling Rationale 
  
As detailed in Chapter One, this study is guided by Altheide’s methodological 
approach to qualitative document analysis. Utilization of “progressive theoretical 
sampling” allows materials for document analysis to be chosen based on “an emerging 
understanding of the topic under investigation.”195 In employing progressive theoretical 
sampling, the researcher begins by selecting a relatively large group of relevant 
documents. Its focus on capturing “the meanings, emphasis, and themes of messages”196 
can in some studies involving a wide set of relevant messages require the researcher to 
consider “practical limitations” on formally analyzing the entire mass of discourse 
involved.197   
The discussion of ideas regarding essentially relevant philosophical 
conceptualizations of communication in a democratic society provided in the first half 
of this chapter represents an initially thorough reading of a wider set of relevant 
documents that relate to this study’s broader concerns regarding how the courts should 
interpret the press clause in the network era. That initial reading, prior to formally 
applying that latter steps involved in Altheide’s discourse analysis, highlighted the 
broad emphasis throughout the body of discourse on the significance of communication 
in a democratic society, focusing particularly on the factors of information, engagement, 
access, and the interplay of identity and power in shaping such communication. 
Proceeding with Altheide’s method of qualitative theoretical sampling, the central idea 
from the reading and the conceptual pieces related to it were drawn upon for the 
fundamental criteria in identifying articles, chapters, and passages most essential to 
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philosophical conceptualizations of communication in democratic society. This 
sampling process is grounded in a manner methodologically consistent with Altheide’s 
emphasis that such selections be “based on [an] emerging understanding of the topic 
under investigation.”198 Through the process of identifying the central idea from the 
larger body of readings, twelve articles, chapters, and passages were selected. Those 
selections focused on the key elements that were most consistently articulated as central 
to philosophical conceptualizations of communication in a democratic society.  
The sample selected through that process includes two works from Habermas. A 
portion from the first chapter of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
was selected because it includes the philosopher’s initial articulation of the basic 
principles of the public sphere, which entail an accounting of information, engagement, 
and access concepts as he articulated them.199 A 2006 article by Habermas was also 
included because it brings together more recent understandings from the philosopher 
regarding the key elements of his ideas and relates them with the interplay between 
media and democracy.200 A substantial portion of the chapter titled “Searching for the 
Great Community” from Dewey’s The Public and its Problems, was also chosen 
because it includes a foundational articulation of his conceptualization of community 
and the role of communication in society.201 Dewey’s essay “Creative Democracy — 
The Task Before Us” was chosen for similar reasons. It explores how he conceptualized 
democracy and its relation to communication.202  
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Three passages from Castells’s books were selected for this chapter’s sample. 
The first part of the chapter titled “Communication in the Digital Age” from 
Communication Power, outlines the understandings that Castells articulated regarding 
the roles of interpersonal communication, mass communication, and mass self-
communication in the network society.203 Two passages from the chapter titled 
“Information Politics and the Crisis of Democracy” from The Power of Identity, were 
also selected. In the two passages, Castells put forth his essential arguments on how 
shifts in communication are influencing democratic processes and how people identify 
themselves in democratic society.204 Also, the chapter titled “From Blogosphere to 
Public Sphere” from Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalized 
World by McNair was included because it evaluates the possibility of a global-public 
sphere and, in doing so, outlines his understanding of the role of the media in society in 
the network era.205 
Two passages from Jenkins’s Convergence Culture, both from the chapter titled 
“Spoiling Survivor: The Anatomy of a Knowledge Community,” were selected for this 
sample because they detail his essential understanding of how individuals contribute to 
communities and how communities operate online.206 Finally, a complete chapter and a 
passage from another chapter in Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody were selected. The 
chapter titled “Publish, Then Filter” was selected because it provides his essential 
conceptualization of the roles and uses traditional-media content and user-generated 
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content fulfill in the network society.207 The second half of the chapter titled “It Takes a 
Village to Find a Phone” was selected for its articulation of Shirky’s argument that the 
elimination of traditional barriers to communication has enabled people to organize in 
order to solve problems and pursue interests in new ways.208  
Communication in Democracy 
 This subsection discusses the representations that emerged in the application of 
Altheide’s method of document analysis to the texts discussed just above regarding 
communication in democracy. The representations related to communication in a 
democratic society and similar considerations regarding particular concerns that were 
most consistently reflected in the conceptual understandings emphasized in those texts 
are examined. The texts discussed in this section include, as outlined just above, a 
portion of the first chapter of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and 
the article “Political Communication in Media Society,” both by Habermas, and a 
portion of Chapter Five of The Public and its Problems, and the essay “Creative 
Democracy — The Task Before Us,” both by Dewey. In Altheide’s articulation of the 
heart of the methodological approach, the “actual words and direct messages of 
documents carry the discourse that reflects certain themes, which in turn are held 
together and given meaning by a broad frame.”209 As introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter, the themes that this application of Altheide’s document analysis identified 
focused upon representations that framed the essential elements of those subjects in 
terms of (1) journalism as understood to be part of communication in a democratic 
society more broadly, (2) the roles of individuals in a democracy as engaged and 
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reflective, and (3) individuals’ contributions to resolving societal problems as 
contingent to the groups in which they participate. 
 
Journalism as a Part of Communication in a Democratic Society More Broadly 
 The body of discourse articulated an understanding of communication as 
occupying a central role in informing citizens within democratic society. It did not, 
however, represent journalistic media as acting as the sole providers of information that 
individuals require to inform themselves so they can deliberate with others in society. 
Instead, the framing emphasized communication as occurring in democratic society in 
two primary ways: via journalistic messages and through more personalized forms of 
communication, such as interpersonal communication and non-public newsletters and 
mailings. This dynamic was evident in the understandings that were communicated in 
this set of texts. Habermas’s work, in outlining the conditions that led to the creation of 
the public sphere, asserted that before there were “public” media — which were 
discussed in terms of messages intended for all who encountered them — there were 
newsletters and regular mail routes that circulated information intended for specific 
groups, which in this case were primarily the emerging merchant class. Habermas 
wrote, “The traditional letter carrying by merchants was for this reason organized into a 
kind of guild-based system of correspondence for their purposes.”210 As indicated, the 
intent of the messages was to inform a select few and no one else. To that end, 
Habermas concluded, “The recipients of private correspondence had no interest in their 
contents becoming public.”211 Habermas’s discourse conveyed an understanding that 
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the public press, something that resembled journalism, developed differently than the 
non-public correspondences between merchants and guilds. He asserted that “the press, 
in turn developed a unique explosive power. The first journals, in a strict sense, 
ironically called ‘political journals,’ appeared weekly at first, and daily as early as the 
middle of the seventeenth century.”212 These “political” journals, in the understanding 
put forth in Habermas’s work, were meant to be for the public. In describing the two 
forms of communication, the discourse conveyed a recognition that relationships exist 
between them, but overall both were understood as contributing information to society 
in distinctive ways. The two modes of communication provide information, Habermas 
asserted in the text, for different purposes and through different formats. In this sense, 
the framing characterized the early public sphere as developing with journalism and 
sharing an informing role with another, less-public form of communication. 
 In a conceptualization that is similar to the understandings articulated in 
Habermas’s discourse, Dewey’s work conveyed an understanding that journalism 
shared the informing role in society with other forms of communication. Dewey’s body 
of discourse within this area conceptualized that the guild-focused, intentionally private 
messages found in Habermas’s articulation of the underlying conceptual basis of this 
theme were replaced by interpersonal communication. Dewey’s articulation that 
journalism and interpersonal communication both played roles in informing people in a 
democratic society was evidenced when he wrote, “I am inclined to believe that the 
heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of neighbors on the street 
corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in 
gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely 




with one another.”213 In asserting this concept, Dewey’s narrative communicated the 
idea that citizens use journalistic information to inform their discussions with others in 
efforts to solve problems in society. Along with that understanding, however, it can also 
be seen that “gatherings of friends” was conceptualized as another form of information-
exchange that plays a role in informing members of society. This was conveyed in his 
discourse when he contended that the “free play of facts and ideas which are secured by 
effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free communication” are of 
central importance to democratic society.214 In this sense, “journalism,” or words that 
are commonly associated with journalistic practices, was not utilized to describe 
communication processes in society. More general terms were employed, such as 
“communication” and “assembly.” To that end, Dewey’s discourse conveyed a similar 
understanding that communication in general, not specifically journalism, fulfills a 
central role in society. He wrote: 
Without freedom of expression, not even methods of social inquiry can be 
developed. For tools can be evolved and perfected only in operation; in 
application to observing, reporting and organizing actual subject-matter; and this 
application cannot occur save through free and systematic communication.215 
 
In the passage, Dewey asserted that “communication,” not specifically 
journalism, plays a vital role in society. In the cases of both Habermas’s and Dewey’s 
conceptualizations of this theme, they did not communicate understandings that 
journalism is unimportant or of lesser value to other forms of communication. In fact, 
Habermas’s discourse emphasized that the public sphere required “professionals of the 
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media system — especially journalists” to function.216 The overall meanings that were 
carried by these texts, however, characterized journalism as an important informing tool 
in society, but not the only one. Habermas’s work, especially in the following passage, 
outlined how he conceptualized communication in the public sphere: 
Mediated communication need not fit the pattern of fully fledged deliberation. 
Political communication, circulating from the bottom up and the top down 
throughout a multilevel system (from everyday talk in civil society, through 
public discourse and mediated communication in weak politics, to the 
institutionalized discourses at the center of the political system), takes on quite 
different forms in different arenas.217  
 
 In this sense, Habermas’s writing communicated that he understood journalistic 
communication as part of a system that included other forms of communication. The 
meanings conveyed in this section indicated that journalism is understood as part of a 
communication system that is vital to communication in democratic society.  
 
The Roles of Individuals in a Democracy as Engaged and Reflective 
 The discourse contained within this set of documents characterized democracy 
as requiring individuals to be thoughtfully engaged in deliberations with others within 
society. The meanings put forth in the texts placed an emphasis on the need for 
members of communities to meaningfully step forward into society with the intent of 
contributing ideas and considering the ideas of others. Habermas’s foundational 
articulation of the concept of the public sphere asserted that the thoughtful engagement 
of individuals is a requirement for the sphere to function. He wrote that the public 
sphere is a “forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, readied 
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themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion.”218 The 
text repeatedly referred to democracy as a “deliberative process” and a “deliberative 
model,”219 and emphasized the “cooperative search of deliberative citizens for solutions 
to political problems.”220 In this sense, Habermas’s work conveyed meanings that 
individuals must deliberately choose to deliberate with others. The understandings 
conveyed in Dewey’s discourse similarly conceptualized that democracy is an idea, and 
not a set of mechanisms or governmental institutions. He wrote, “Democracy is a 
personal way of individual life.”221 The concept of engagement in democratic processes 
was not framed as relating to voter turnout or to people taking part in the mechanics of 
government; rather, it was communicated as an idea that demands that people come 
together with others to discuss and consider problems and issues. Dewey wrote that 
citizens in a democracy must “get rid of the habit of thinking of democracy as 
something institutional and external and to acquire the habit of treating it as a way of 
personal life.”222 In relation to this concern, Dewey’s discourse emphasized 
deliberation, and characterized democracy as a “deliberate and determined endeavor”223 
and as a process that required “rational consideration.”224 
To that end, Dewey communicated that democracy not only requires 
engagement, but also within that engagement, something that is a way of life that 
necessitates that individuals step forth with the intent of listening, considering, and 
discussing. The meanings carried within the narrative emphasized that freedom of 
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expression and other governmental protections are not enough to assure that the idea of 
democracy will flourish. Dewey wrote, “The belief that thought and its communication 
are now free simply because legal restrictions which once obtained have been done 
away with is absurd.”225 The texts asserted that communication in democracy requires 
freedom of expression, but freedoms are not by themselves enough. Citizens must make 
use of those freedoms by deliberately stepping forward and engaging in democratic 
processes. 
 
Individuals’ Contributions to Resolving Problems as Contingent to Group Participation 
 The discourse contained within the texts underlined an understanding that group 
activity is the ideal method through which the problems facing society could be 
addressed and solved. Dewey and Habermas constructed this theme upon two primary 
assertions. The texts emphasized that knowledge is generated through communication 
among members of society, and that each person, as an individual, has the ability to 
contribute to discussions regarding societal problems. These two intertwined 
characterizations of the theme were communicated as being central to how the 
philosophers conceptualized group participation. To that end, Dewey wrote, 
“Knowledge is a function of association and communication.”226 Similarly, Habermas 
articulated his understanding of the emergence of the public sphere as something that 
included the “critical judgment of the public making use of its reason.”227   
 The body of discourse placed an emphasis upon the role of the individual and 
his or her unique contributions to deliberation, and the subsequent benefits received 
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from participating in collective action. The understandings Dewey communicated 
related liberty to working in association with others. He wrote, “Liberty is that secure 
release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and 
manifold association with others: the power to be an individualized self making a 
distinctive contribution.”228 To this end, the text communicated that liberty did not 
mean being free from social ties. Instead, the meanings that were conveyed 
conceptualized individuals as realizing their potential by interacting with others. In this 
way, Dewey indicated that the individual, his or her values and unique traits, are not to 
be lost in the efforts of a community. Instead, individuality was characterized within the 
narrative as relating to the primary contribution each person can make in society. This 
understanding can be read in relation to the preceding theme that individuals must 
engage in discussions with others in society in a deliberative way. Dewey 
communicated that something would be lost if each person did not engage purposively 
in deliberations in society because each person has something unique to contribute. He 
wrote that “to learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of 
communication an effective sense of being an individually distinct member of a 
community.”229  
The meanings Dewey communicated regarding this theme related with 
Habermas’s work, which asserted that one of the key shifts in society during the 
seventeenth-century period that marked the emergence of the public sphere in Europe 
was that the older model of the nobility managing the people and production of estates 
was replaced by a class of people who gathered to make decisions regarding what was 
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best for them. He wrote, “Civil society came into existence as the corollary of a 
depersonalized state authority. Activities and dependencies hitherto relegated to the 
framework of the household economy emerged from this confinement into the public 
sphere.”230 In making this observation, Habermas conveyed an understanding of this 
shift toward group efforts to solve societal problems is significant. To that end, his 
discourse contended that people coming together to communicate is a central element of 
the public-sphere idea.  
In a related sense, Dewey’s discourse represented the need for communication 
as both an imperative and a challenge to the effectiveness of group efforts to solve 
problems in society. Dewey wrote, “Participation in activities and sharing in results are 
additive concerns. They demand communication as a prerequisite.”231 Habermas’s work 
conveyed a similar concern, asserting, “Deliberation is a demanding form of 
communication, though it grows out of inconspicuous daily routines of asking for and 
giving reasons.”232 The meanings conveyed within the narrative contended that in order 
for the benefits of group deliberation to be realized, individuals must adopt daily habits 
that include purposeful engagement with others. Dewey’s work carried a concern that 
the demands of communication in society would weaken the ability of groups to come 
together to deliberate and solve problems. His writing referred to the public as 
“inchoate” and communicated that the greatest challenge for deliberation in society is 
“discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile, and manifold public may so 
recognize itself as to define and express its interests.”233 In addition to these ideas, the 
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discourse carried concern regarding how different groups within society would 
communicate with each other. He wrote, “Since every individual is a member of many 
groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact 
flexibly and fully in connection with other groups.”234 
While the overall meanings that were conveyed by the texts in this section 
recognized that deliberative-group efforts to solve problems in society are not without 
their challenges, the narrative carried a clear understanding that collective deliberation 
is a centrally important component in democratic society. The texts characterized each 
individual as offering something distinctive to a form of group deliberation that is 
essentially valuable. As part of this understanding, the texts included an emphasis on 
the need for individuals to purposively engage in deliberation with others. Finally, 
Dewey and Habermas asserted in this body of discourse that information that helped to 
inform deliberations among people arises from journalistic media and other forms of 
communication. The next subsection discusses the manner in which this process of 
document analysis identified similar themes in the discourse put forth by McNair and 
Castells on the influence of the emergence of the network society on community and 
communication. 
Networks, Communication, and Community 
 This subsection discusses the representations that emerged through the 
application of Altheide’s method of document analysis to the texts that were discussed 
in the first half of this chapter regarding networks, communication, and community. 
The representations related to communication in a democratic society and related 
considerations regarding particular concerns that were most consistently reflected in the 
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conceptual understandings emphasized in those texts. The texts discussed in this 
section, as outlined earlier in the chapter, include two passages from Chapter Six of The 
Power of Identity, and a passage from Chapter Two of Communication Power, both 
books by Castells. The section also discusses Chapter Nine of McNair’s Cultural 
Chaos. In Altheide’s articulation of the heart of the methodological approach, the 
“actual words and direct messages of documents carry the discourse that reflects certain 
themes, which in turn are held together and given meaning by a broad frame.”235 As 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the themes that this application of Altheide’s 
document analysis identified focused upon representations that framed the essential 
elements of those subjects in terms of (1) journalism as understood to be part of 
communication in a democratic society more broadly, (2) the roles of individuals in a 
democracy as engaged and reflective, and (3) individuals’ contributions to resolving 
societal problems as contingent to groups in which they participate. 
 
Journalism as a Part of Communication in a Democratic Society More Broadly 
 The discourse within the texts in this subsection communicated an 
understanding that the provision of information to citizens in a democratic society is 
maintained by different but merging forms of communication. Broadly, the discourse 
characterized journalism as occupying a valuable role in society, but also credited other 
forms of communication, such as blogs and personal websites, along with interpersonal 
interactions, as contributing information to individuals in society. McNair’s work put 
forth an understanding of the word “media” as referring to all mediated communication 
and, therefore, not as a term that specifically related to journalistic communication. He 
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wrote, for example, that “it is possible to speak of a truly global community of media 
users and producers, linked by their shared consumption of movies, pop music, 
journalism and other cultural commodities.”236  By contending this, McNair’s text 
communicated that he understood journalistic media and other forms of communication 
as contributing information to the public. In a related way, the discourse carried by 
Castells’s texts characterized journalism as part of a broader communication structure. 
He wrote, “The combination of online news with interactive blogging and e-mail, as 
well as RSS feeds from other documents on the web, have transformed newspapers into 
a component of a different form of communication: what I have conceptualized above 
as mass self-communication.”237 In listing journalism as a “component,” the narrative 
indicated that journalism works with other forms of communication to inform citizens.  
 In the understanding put forth in Castells’s narrative, communication takes three 
forms: interpersonal communication, mass communication, and mass self-
communication. The three forms were conceptualized as being coexistent and 
complementary to each other. Much like the discourse that was communicated by 
Dewey and Habermas in the previous section, the texts in this body of discourse 
indicated that journalism is important, but is only part of the communication spectrum, 
because people use all three forms of communication to inform themselves and to share 
information with others. Castells wrote that “individual citizens around the world are 
using the new capacity of communication networking to advance their projects, to 
defend their interests, and to assert their values.”238 
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McNair’s discourse, using a different model than Castells, characterized this 
understanding in terms of a three-tiered media system that contributes to the formation 
of a global-public sphere. In this sense, the journalistic media’s role in society was 
represented as more distinctively separate from other modes of communication than 
Castells asserted in his work. McNair’s discourse characterized local and regional 
television, radio, and newspapers as informing citizens about their immediate 
geographic areas, which allows deliberation to occur on the community level. The 
satellite-news outlets were conceptualized as crossing international boundaries that 
“enveloped the public spheres of nation-states.”239 On a separate, third tier, McNair 
represented online journalism, blogs, and other personal web-based communications as 
working together to connect the various sub-spheres that he understood as making up a 
global-public sphere. The broader meanings that were carried by the texts regarding this 
model, characterized journalism-based media and other forms of mediated 
communication as having specific, often geographically oriented, roles in informing 
citizens. 
 
The Roles of Individuals in a Democracy as Engaged and Reflective 
 The meanings that were carried by the texts indicated that new technologies are 
fostering deliberation and engagement, but also included concerns regarding whether 
individuals are choosing to take part in deliberation within central spaces in society 
regarding matters of public concern, or if they are turning to personal-interest groups 
that are not connected to broader deliberations in society. While the growth of new 
ways that individuals can engage in deliberation with others was emphasized within the 
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discourse, the changes that created these opportunities was characterized as creating 
threats to democratic citizens’ engagement. In addressing these factors in light of his 
idea of an emerging global-public sphere, McNair wrote, “Does the transnational public 
sphere allow individuals and organizations to exercise effective communicative power 
on national, transnational and global decision-making bodies?”240 By posing this 
question, the discourse communicated an understanding that individuals must 
“exercise” power and that the changes brought about by the network society raised 
questions about how citizens engage in deliberation. 
 This body of discourse focused on particular concerns regarding whether 
individuals in the network-society era are choosing to engage in deliberation with their 
broader communities rather than only communicating with personal-preference groups. 
The narrative carried an understanding that networked communication technologies 
allow individuals to engage in a variety of ways, and, with that understanding, the 
discourse also conveyed concerns that people are turning to small, fragmented, 
personal-preference groups, rather than stepping intentionally into a public sphere 
where diverse people can interact regarding societal problems. Castells wrote, “On-line 
politics could push the individualization of politics, and of society, to a point where 
integration, consensus, and institution building would become dangerously difficult to 
reach.”241 To that end, the discourse reflected concern that democratic government will 
struggle to function if individuals do not purposively engage in what the texts 
characterized as a broad, public deliberation. In a related manner, the narrative 
represented an understanding that individuals have always engaged in fragmented sub-
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spheres of communication. McNair wrote, “The public sphere is now, and always has 
been segmented into sub-spheres organized by demography, political viewpoint, 
lifestyle and ethnicity, to name just four categories of readership into which media are 
typically grouped.”242 The sub-spheres were discussed in terms of overlapping and 
intersecting spaces in which people identify and communicate with different groups. All 
of these understandings, however, were grounded in an assertion that was carried in the 
texts that people within these sub-spheres make decisions to step forward into the many 
discussions going on around them.243 Instead of sharing the concern communicated 
within Castells’s work regarding fragmented, inward-turning citizens, McNair’s 
discourse considered whether people are receiving the education they need or have the 
requisite media literacy to purposively engage in deliberation in their communities. He 
wrote, “Today literacy in print and audio-visual media is a prerequisite of the public 
sphere’s accessibility.”244 In this sense, the concern put forth by McNair was distinctive 
because it considered whether other parts of society, such as educational institutions, are 
in place to ensure that people can engage. 
 Castells’s discourse, in a related concern, focused on how people are using new 
technologies to engage in deliberation. Within the understandings contained in the 
narrative, Castells included assumptions of engagement, and that the new technologies 
are facilitating different forms of engagement than have been seen in the past. The texts 
represented online technologies as allowing messages that are “self-generated in 
content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many who 
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communicate with many.”245 Networks were discussed in terms of being built around 
“people’s initiatives, interests, and desires.”246 Castells, in these passages, conveyed an 
understanding that online technologies are enabling engagement in new ways.  
The meanings that were conveyed in these texts characterized engagement in 
society as both enabled and endangered by the emergence of the network society. In 
exploring both aspects of this idea, the texts articulated that individual engagement and 
deliberation are important parts of democratic societies. 
 
Individuals’ Contributions to Resolving Problems as Contingent to Group Participation 
 McNair’s and Castells’s texts constructed the theme that knowledge is generated 
through communication, which emanates from individuals who form groups to address 
problems in society. Castells, for example, wrote, “Meaning can only be understood in 
the context of social relationships in which information and communication are 
processed.”247  In the same passage, Castells defined communication as “the sharing of 
meaning through the exchange of information.”248 Similarly, the public sphere, as 
characterized in McNair’s work, was understood as something that “encompasses the 
set of media outlets by means of which particular groups of individuals are provided 
with the information they need to participate in political processes that affect their 
lives.”249 The representations that were communicated within theses texts regarding this 
theme are similar to those that were articulated in Dewey’s and Habermas’s discourse. 
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McNair’s and Castells’s narrative, however, focused more on the role of online 
communication in enabling individuals to take part in deliberative processes in society. 
 The meanings communicated by these authors conveyed an understanding that 
they saw the emergence of the network society as enhancing the potential for 
individuals in society to step forward and take part in deliberations with others 
regarding problems in society. Castells wrote that “on-line information access and 
computer-mediated communication facilitate the diffusion and retrieval of information, 
and offer possibilities for interaction and debate in an autonomous, electronic forum, 
bypassing the control of the media.”250 In this sense, the discourse carried an emphasis 
that people can use new technologies to gather and communicate information, therefore 
engaging in group deliberations, which were understood as the avenue through which 
understanding and meaning are created.251 The discourse put forth in Castells’s work 
characterized online communication as allowing individuals to communicate with 
others to solve problems in society on global levels. He wrote that “social actors and 
individual citizens around the world are using the new capacity of communication 
networking to advance their projects, to defend their interests, and to assert their 
values.”252 In representing group participation in this way, the value of individuals 
working together to resolve problems was related with the idea that online 
communication is making this practice possible on a global level. By discussing this 
concept in terms of the possibility of a global-public sphere, McNair’s work 
communicated a similar understanding in that it contended that the global 
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communication system enabled by the Internet allows individuals to take part in public 
debate across international boundaries.253  
The narrative put forth by McNair asserted that online communication carries 
the potential to allow individuals to come together on a global level to deliberate upon 
problems. Included in this characterization was the implication that solutions to 
problems will emanate from global communication. This conceptualization was also 
reflected in other parts of McNair’s text, which framed understanding and meaning as 
benefits that emerge from individuals’ taking part in interactions with others within the 
public sphere. He wrote, “A healthy public sphere must be able to accommodate a 
plurality of voices and perspectives broadly representative of the public it serves.”254 In 
this sense, the meanings conveyed in the narrative characterized the public sphere as a 
place that brings together a diversity of voices; so many ideas can be considered in 
regard to the societal problems. This idea was further articulated in the text when 
McNair explained that the public sphere was needed for “creating a common space for 
knowledge formation and debate.”255 
 In carrying understandings that knowledge and meaning are created through 
communication among groups of individuals, the texts in this subsection focused on the 
ways in which online communication is changing how such deliberation occurs and on 
how traditional conceptualizations of the public sphere are understood as calling for 
diverse exchanges of ideas among groups of people in regard to solving societal 
problems. The exchanges of ideas that are represented in this narrative relate to how 
online communication both empowers and endangers deliberation in society. The 
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narrative further conveyed the understanding that the information individuals use to 
inform themselves comes from journalistic and other forms of communication. The next 
subsection discusses the manner in which this process of document analysis identified 
similar themes, this time within the narrative put forth by Shirky and Jenkins in regard 
to how online communication allows more individuals to engage in deliberation and to 
contribute to solving problems in society. 
Communication in the Network Era 
 This subsection discusses the characterizations that emerged through the 
application of Altheide’s method of document analysis to the texts that were discussed 
in the first half of this chapter regarding communication in the network era. The 
representations related to communication in a democratic society and related 
considerations regarding particular concerns that were most consistently reflected in the 
conceptual understandings emphasized in those texts. The texts discussed in this 
section, as outlined earlier in the chapter, include two passages from Chapter Two of 
Jenkins’s Convergence Culture, and a passage of Chapter One and all of Chapter Four 
of Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody. In Altheide’s articulation of the heart of the 
methodological approach, the “actual words and direct messages of documents carry the 
discourse that reflects certain themes, which in turn are held together and given 
meaning by a broad frame.”256 As introduced at the beginning of the chapter, the themes 
that this application of Altheide’s document analysis identified focused upon 
representations that framed the essential elements of those subjects in terms of (1) 
journalism as understood to be part of communication in a democratic society more 
broadly, (2) the roles of individuals in a democracy as engaged and reflective, and (3) 
                                                
256 Altheide, Qualitative Media Analysis, 31. 
 
 242 
individuals’ contributions to resolving societal problems as contingent to the groups in 
which they participate. 
 
Journalism as a Part of Communication in a Democratic Society More Broadly 
 The meanings carried within the texts communicated an understanding that the 
traditional media’s role has changed since the emergence of the network society and 
that journalism-oriented communication operates alongside the virtual interactions that 
occur in a variety of forms across the Internet. Specifically, the narrative represented 
both the small-group conversations on the Internet and journalism-based messages as 
different means to informing citizens in the network society. Shirky wrote, “The two 
patterns shade into each other, and now small group communications and large 
broadcast outlets all exist as part of a single interconnected ecosystem.”257 While the 
discourse characterized journalistic communication and small-group communication as 
both working to inform individuals in the network-society era, it represented the small-
group interactions that occur online as becoming increasingly important. Jenkins, for 
example, wrote that “knowledge communities [are] central to the task of restoring 
democratic citizenship.”258 The Internet, as conceptualized in Shirky’s work, was 
characterized as shifting greater communicative power to small groups. Shirky wrote,  
“Now that there is competition to traditional institutional forms for getting things done, 
those institutions will continue to exist, but their purchase on modern life will weaken 
as novel alternatives for group action arise.”259 In this sense, the narrative framed 
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representations regarding the changes brought about by the network society as including 
a shift in the importance of small-group communication.  
Journalistic messages were conceptualized as playing a lesser role than they did 
in the mass-media era. Shirky’s work outlined this understanding within the framework 
of how a group came together to solve a problem, which, in this case, was finding a 
stolen cell phone. The passage represented journalistic media as a type of connector that 
can be used to call attention to otherwise small-group-based interactions. Regarding 
efforts to recover the lost cell phone, Shirky wrote: 
People became interested in the story, and they forwarded it to friends and 
colleagues, who became interested in turn and forwarded it still further. This 
pattern of growth was both cause and effect for mainstream media getting 
involved — it’s unlikely that The New York Times or CNN would have covered 
the story of a lost phone, but when it was wrapped in the larger story of national 
and even global attention, they picked it up, which led to still more visitors to 
Evan’s site and still more media outlets tuning in.260 
 
The narrative, especially in the preceding passage, carried the understanding that 
traditional media, in this case The New York Times and CNN, use their abilities to reach 
larger audiences to bring awareness, and greater participation and interaction to the non-
journalistic communication that occurs online. In a similar sense, in Jenkins’s work, 
mass-media-era communication was discussed in terms of being more individualistic 
than the more community-focused interactions that are enabled by the Internet. The 
narrative also indicated that small-group, online interactions occupy an increasingly 
important role in communication in the network society. Jenkins, for example, wrote, 
“The age of media convergence enables communal rather than individualistic, modes of 
reception.”261 In this sense, the narrative carried an understanding that traditional, 
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journalistic media are “individualistic” and that online, small-group communication is 
more community-based.  
In regard to journalistic communication, this body of discourse conveyed an 
understanding that traditional media provide layers of information filtering for audience 
members, greater depth of knowledge regarding the information provided, and more 
expertise in how information is communicated to audiences. Jenkins’s work framed 
journalists as “experts,” defining them as people who “have often gone through some 
kind of ritual that designates them as having mastered a particular domain.”262 The 
discourse identified online groups as not possessing the same characteristics, instead 
representing them as having erratic memberships and often-temporary existences.263 
The small groups that share user-generated content and other messages online also lack 
the structure of journalistic operations. The narrative, however, did not frame these 
characteristics of online, small-group communication as entirely negative or as issues 
that would take away from web-based technology’s value as a communication tool in 
society. Shirky’s discourse discussed this idea in terms of the public benefitting from 
the filtering journalists employ when preparing information, “because we have 
historically relied on the publisher’s judgment to help ensure minimum standards of 
quality.”264 The text went on to explain, however, that such an approach was no longer 
needed in the network era. Instead, Shirky’s work contended that, in the network era, 
information should be published and then filtered by audiences.265 In this sense, these 
texts conveyed a recognition that journalistic media are only one type of communication 
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utilized by citizens to gather information in the network society. The narrative carried 
by these texts specifically identified changes brought about by the shift to the network 
society as lessening journalistic communication’s role and as elevating the importance 
of online, small-group interactions. 
 
The Roles of Individuals in a Democracy as Engaged and Reflective 
 The discourse within these texts framed the network society in terms of a new 
era of individual engagement in society via interaction with online communities that 
represent varying interests and focus on different issues. The meanings conveyed within 
the texts carried an understanding that people are using the Internet to purposively 
engage in discussions with others. Jenkins’s work characterized this concept in terms of 
people “harnessing their individual expertise toward shared goals and objectives,” for 
example.266 Shirky’s discourse framed the effort to mobilize a group online to find and 
recover a stolen cell phone as exemplifying the “power of group action.”267 In both of 
these examples, the narrative characterized the Internet as facilitating individual 
engagement.  
Shirky’s and Jenkins’s discourse highlighted assertions of the Internet’s power 
to enable people to voluntarily come together to engage in discussions. In this sense, the 
discourse within the texts did not articulate specific ideas regarding engagement as 
being something reflective. Instead, deliberation and the resulting resolution of 
problems were integrated into the understandings that were communicated regarding the 
value of people coming together to solve problems. Jenkins’s text related engagement 
and democracy by contending, “The knowledge [that] gets produced and evaluated is 
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more democratic.”268 Jenkins also wrote, “We can see such knowledge communities as 
central to the process of grassroots convergence.”269 Through assertions such as these, 
Jenkins’s discourse articulated an understanding of engagement as a central part of 
deliberation in a democratic society.  
 The narrative conceptualized engagement from the perspective that individuals 
in the network society use new technologies to purposively move in and out of different 
groups. Shirky’s work characterized traditional institutions in society as having been 
created to provide forums for and to help enable public engagement in societal 
affairs.270 The institutions, through the geographic and other physical requirements 
necessary to maintain order within them, placed barriers at times on who could be 
involved and to what extent. The Internet, as conceptualized in the narrative, removed 
those barriers, allowing individuals to be “free to explore new ways of gathering 
together and getting things done.”271 The understandings conveyed within Jenkins’s 
work articulated a similar conceptualization of the opportunities the Internet creates for 
engagement. He wrote, “These new communities are defined through voluntary, 
temporary, and tactical affiliations, reaffirmed through common intellectual enterprises 
and emotional investments.”272 To that end, Jenkins’s discourse emphasized that people 
are not only engaging in discussions, but are exercising greater freedom and 
intentionality in the groups through which they choose to affiliate and deliberate with. 
 Within the idea that people have more power to choose the groups they engage 
in, the meanings that are carried within these texts characterized online communication 
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as enabling engagement in ways that were not possible in the eras that preceded the 
network society. This body of discourse conceptualized individuals as being capable of 
engaging at new levels because of technological changes and that people are taking 
advantage of these opportunities to take part in discussions regarding issues, problems, 
and interests in society. 
 
Individuals’ Contributions to Resolving Problems as Contingent to Group Participation 
 This body of discourse communicated an understanding that when people come 
together, they are more able to solve problems than when they are working alone. 
Within the texts in this section, the authors’ conceptualization of this theme was 
interwoven with an understanding of the Internet as facilitating the ability of individuals 
to work with others to take advantage of each person’s knowledge and abilities to solve 
problems or pursue interests. In this sense, the discourse emphasized that each 
individual, as a unique person, had the ability to contribute something of value. That 
contribution might not, however, be constant. Jenkins wrote, “A collective intelligence . 
. . assumes that each person has something to contribute, even if they will only be called 
upon on an ad hoc basis.”273 To that end, the narrative characterized collective effort as 
something that upholds each person’s individuality. 
In articulating the idea of using group effort to solve problems, Jenkins’s work 
asserted that “people harness their individual expertise toward shared goals and 
objectives.”274 Jenkins’s text identified this idea “collective intelligence,” which “refers 
to the ability of virtual communities to leverage the combined expertise of their 
                                                
273 Ibid., 53. 
274 Ibid., 27.  
 
 248 
members. What we cannot know or do on our own, we may now be able to do 
collectively.”275 In this sense, this body of discourse discussed the Internet as having 
enabled individuals to contribute their unique knowledge bases to solving problems in 
ways that were not possible before the emergence of the network society. The narrative 
characterized online communication as not being limited by the physical time-and-space 
boundaries that hindered individuals’ access to groups in previous eras. In a similar 
way, the meanings carried by Shirky’s work represented this change in terms of cost. 
The cost, in time and money, of creating or joining a group has dropped substantially as 
a result of online communication tools. Shirky wrote that “getting the free and ready 
participation of a large, distributed group with a variety of skills . . . has gone from 
impossible to simple.”276 
 The texts conveyed an understanding that the characteristics of the Internet not 
only make it easier for individuals to participate in working with groups to solve 
problems, but that the dynamics of communication on the Internet create a more-
horizontal structure for interaction between individuals. In the understandings put forth 
by Shirky, institutions that were created to help harness the ability of individuals to 
work together to accomplish tasks, such as a corporation or an army, helped to channel 
and guide the effort, but also at times limited individuals’ abilities to contribute and the 
opportunities for outsiders to take part.277 The more-horizontal structure of online 
communication that was discussed in these texts characterized solving problems as a 
group as being more open-ended and diverse.278 Jenkins’s discourse conceptualized the 
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traditional, pre-network-society approach to managing groups of people to complete 
tasks as the “expert paradigm.” The expert paradigm requires that those solving the 
problem have professional-like credentials, and it creates in-group and out-group 
dynamics in which those who do not meet certain criteria cannot participate. Jenkins 
wrote, “What holds a collective intelligence together is not the possession of 
knowledge, which is relatively static, but the social process of acquiring knowledge, 
which is dynamic and participatory, continually testing and reaffirming the group’s 
social ties.”279 In articulating this idea, Jenkins’s discourse represented group activity as 
an efficient way to solve problems and something that has been substantially 
empowered by the emergence of the network society.  
Overall, in constructing this theme, the authors articulated an understanding of 
the Internet and the dynamics of how communication is conducted online as a 
phenomenon that enhances the ability of individuals to use their individual knowledge 
bases and talents to form or participate in groups in efforts to solve problems or 
deliberate on issues. In a related sense, the thematic emphasis of Shirky and Jenkins 
consistently reflects assertions that online communication is empowering individuals to 
engage in deliberation in new ways. The discourse within this subsection also 
contended that the information individuals are using to inform themselves is originating 
more from online, small-group interactions than from journalistic media. In the 
understandings proposed in this body of discourse, the small-group interactions are 
transforming the provision of information needed for deliberation and engagement with 
others into a unified process. 
 
                                                




The authors in this chapter focused on philosophical conceptualizations of 
communication in democratic society. While the authors’ ideas can all be broadly tied 
to the notion that informed deliberation plays a central role in democratic society, their 
areas of interest and focus within this broader idea varied. Dewey and Habermas 
outlined foundational understandings regarding the formation of publics and the 
necessity that individuals within a democracy have access to information and to a space 
where they can meet to discuss the challenges facing their communities. Castells and 
McNair built upon Dewey’s and Habermas’s ideas. McNair proposed that a global-
public sphere, tied together by traditional media and online communities, is emerging. 
Castells examined the shifting interplay between interpersonal communication, mass 
communication, and mass self-communication. Shirky and Jenkins focused on how 
online communication has lowered and removed barriers that have traditionally limited 
individuals from taking part in deliberations with others regarding issues or their 
interests. While these three streams of discourse were separated for the purposes of the 
analysis in this chapter, they are linked in that they share a broader understanding that 
communication is central to democratic society. 
The next chapter draws upon the themes that emerged in the respective 
document analyses that have been summarized in chapters Two through Four. Moving 
on through that process, as detailed in Chapter One, this study proceeds to advance its 
objective of constructing a unified framework from which the courts can ground 
questions concerning the press clause in the network society in a conceptual rationale 
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that integrates historical understandings with those of a dramatically transformed media 
environment.   
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 The emergence of the network society has raised substantial questions regarding 
how the press clause of the First Amendment should be interpreted in an era when 
anyone with an Internet connection and a computer or mobile device has the ability to 
communicate messages to potentially large audiences. In this study’s effort to consider 
how the press clause can most meaningfully be understood in the network-society era, 
the analyses presented in the preceding chapters focused upon thematic theoretical 
insights derived from three distinct bodies of discourse using Altheide’s method of 
document analysis. The lower-court cases that considered questions involving citizen 
publishers’ claims for protections that have traditionally been reserved for journalists, 
the United States Supreme Court decisions that examined Internet questions that relate 
to the First Amendment, and the philosophical conceptualizations of the role of 
communication in a democratic society each provided insights and understandings that 
are central to this study’s ultimate objective. Addressing that objective — articulating a 
unified framework in which the courts can ground complicated questions concerning 
interpretations of the press clause in the network society through a conceptual rationale 
that integrates historical understandings with those of a dramatically transformed media 
environment — is the focal point of this chapter. 
 It begins by bringing together and briefly summarizing all of the themes that 
emerged through the document analyses of the philosophical and legal bodies of 
discourse presented in chapters Two, Three, and Four, before addressing each of the 
five research questions that guided this study. After that, this chapter proposes a  
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framework for how the press clause may be most justifiably interpreted in the network-
society era in terms of the guidance provided by this study’s analysis when considered 
in relation to historical understandings of the press clause. 
Thematic Insights from Conceptual Rationales of the Lower Courts 
 Chapter Two’s analysis considered lower-court decisions in which judges 
developed conceptual rationales for deciding cases involving bloggers or other citizen 
publishers arguing for protections historically more associated with the institutional 
press under the press clause. The themes identified through that analysis focused upon 
representations that framed the essential elements of those rationales in terms of: (1) 
concern with the way a message is delivered more than with the content of a message, 
(2) concern with whether messages are delivered according to accepted rules of 
journalism, (3) concern with exercise of the First Amendment’s speech clause more 
than with exercise of its press clause, and (4) preference for organizations and groups 
over individual citizen publishers. 
 Concern with the way a message is delivered more than with the content of the 
messages: In the courts’ evaluations of the citizen publishers’ claims in those cases, 
judges emphasized that the vehicle through which a message was sent, rather than the 
content of the actual message, was of greater importance in determining whether or not 
privileges that have traditionally been associated with journalism should be extended to 
online communicators. In evaluating the vehicles of communication utilized by citizen 
publishers, the courts commonly drew upon their understandings of such vehicles as 
characteristic with traditional media outlets. As that concern was expressed in Too 
Much Media v. Hale, “New Jersey’s Shield Law provides broad protection to the news 
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media and is not limited to traditional news outlets. . . . But to ensure that the privilege 
does not apply to every self-appointed newsperson, the Legislature requires that other 
means of disseminating news be ‘similar’ to traditional news sources.”1 Overall, the 
manner in which the courts articulated their conceptual rationales in these cases 
relatively consistently reflected an understanding in which the content of the message, 
regardless of its potential for informing discussion in a democratic society, was not 
represented as a central factor in assessing the petitions of citizen publishers who sought 
protections traditionally reserved for journalists. And what was represented as a central 
factor was whether the messages involved were communicated through vehicles that 
resembled those of traditional media outlets. 
 Concern with whether messages are delivered according to accepted rules of 
journalism. In that thematic emphasis, the framing in this body of discourse emphasized 
evidence of journalism practices and processes as significant — whether, for example, 
citizen publishers gathered information, employed editorial decision-making, had their 
work vetted by editors, conducted interviews, attributed information, and produced 
original content.2 In opinion after opinion, the conceptual rationales in which decisions 
were grounded found dispositive significance — as, for example, in Too Much Media 
— in considerations such as the fact that the “defendant has exhibited none of the 
recognized qualities traditionally associated with the news process, nor has she 
demonstrated connector or affiliation with any news entity.”3  
                                                
1 206 N.J. 209, 216 (N.J. 2011) (emphasis added). 
2 O’Grady v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1458 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 6th Dist. 2006); Kaufman v. Islamic Society of Arlington, 291 S.W.3d 130, 137 (Tex. App. 2009); 
Obsidian Financial Group v. Cox, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43125, 20 (P.D. Or., 2012). 
3 413 N.J. Super. 135, 160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
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 Concern with exercise of the First Amendment’s speech clause more than with 
exercise of its press clause: This body of legal discourse also consistently represented 
citizen publishers’ work as a form of speaking in a virtual space, rather than a type of 
publication and thus a form of expression most squarely grounded in the protections of 
the speech clause. In Nexus v. Swift, for example, the opinion declared that it found 
“nothing in the text or implication of the statute [concerning state protections granted 
for communication considered “public participation”] to suggest that it demarcates 
Internet speech from other forms of speech. Internet speech is speech protected by the 
First Amendment.”4 Similarly, in Bailey v. State, the opinion emphasized that the “press 
exemption does not prohibit speech, but only reduces the requirements which the press 
must meet in order to speak.”5 Beyond framing individual citizen publishers’ messages 
as relating more to traditional understandings of the speech clause, it was noteworthy 
that even the expressions of groups of citizen publishers who shared characteristics with 
traditional media — such as the two large-audience websites in the O’Grady v. Superior 
Court case or the online magazine in the Kaufman v. Islamic Society of Arlington case 
— was also seen as relating to the speech clause and not the press clause.6   
 Preference for organizations and groups over individual citizen publishers: The 
understandings emphasized in this body of discourse consistently represented citizen 
publishers as speakers and their messages as “posts” or “statements,” rather than in 
journalistic terms as stories. Conversely, groups involved in these cases were 
represented in comparable ways to news organizations, with their messages being 
referred to as “articles” and “reports.” When considered in relation to each other, the 
                                                
4 785 N.W.2d 771, 786 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
5 900 F. Supp. 2d 75, 87 (D. Me. 2012). 
6 O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1460; Kaufman, 291 S.W.3d at 138-139. 
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themes that emerged through the document analysis of this body of discourse strongly 
suggest that the rationales in which lower courts ground their decisions concerning 
citizen publishers seeking privileges traditionally granted to journalists are likely to be 
conceptualized in terms that emphasize the degree to which citizen publishers gather 
and communicate their work in manners similar to judicial understandings of 
journalism. 
Thematic Insights from Supreme Court Internet First Amendment Reasoning 
 Chapter Three’s analysis considered Supreme Court decisions in which justices 
articulated conceptual rationales they have developed for deciding Internet questions 
that relate to the First Amendment. The themes identified through that analysis focused 
on representations that framed the essential elements of those rationales in terms of the 
Internet as: (1) an idealized public sphere, (2) a vehicle connected to the speech clause 
and not the press clause, and (3) a socially and technologically unique form of 
communication. 
 The Internet as idealized public sphere: This body of legal discourse 
consistently represented the Internet in terms conceptually consistent with 
understandings of public-sphere theory as a phenomenon enabling deliberation in 
society. In Reno v. ACLU, for example, the Court spoke in terms of “the vast 
democratic fora of the Internet” as a form of communication characterized to be not at 
all “subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended the 
broadcast industry.”7 The Reno opinion declared the Internet to be a “unique new 
medium” that allows people to interact and deliberate in new ways.8 It declared that via 
                                                
7 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). 
8 Ibid., 851.  
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the Internet, “any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox,” and through “Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”9 Those 
considerations led the Court to categorize the Internet as such an ideal forum that “our 
cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should 
be applied to this medium.”10 The Court’s emphasis on protecting engagement, access, 
and deliberation in its Internet First Amendment cases can be read as resonant of 
Habermas’s understanding of the public sphere, which he conceptualized as providing a 
space in society where individuals can come together to engage in deliberation about 
matters of concern.11  
 The Internet as a vehicle connected to the speech clause and not the press 
clause: Supreme Court discourse on this subject also represented the Internet as relating 
to the speech clause rather than the press clause, asserting an understanding that framed 
online communicators not as publishing messages but as speaking in a virtual space. 
The Reno opinion compared the online speaker to a “town crier” and characterized the 
Internet as more powerful than a “soap box.”12 Similarly, the Court, in all of the cases, 
primarily referred to Internet communications as forms of speech. The Court employed 
terms such as “Web speakers” and “collateral speech,” rather than representations of 
messages as being published or written.13  
                                                
9 Ibid., 870. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 16-26. 
12 521 U.S. at 870. 
13 Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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 The Internet as a socially and technologically unique form of communication: 
This body of legal discourse also consistently represented the Internet as a distinct form 
of media.14 As the opinion in Reno declared: “Taken together, these tools constitute a 
unique new medium — known to it users as ‘cyberspace’ — located in no particular 
geographical location but available to anyone anywhere in the world, with access to the 
Internet.”15 This idea was also demonstrated, for example, by the way the Court’s 
opinions placed the Internet at the center of the United States v. Williams and Doe v. 
Reed cases, despite the fact that none of the laws in question in those cases dealt 
specifically with online communication. In this sense, the Court expressed an 
understanding that the Internet required new approaches and new considerations 
regarding regulation of a socially and technologically distinct form of communication. 
When considered in relation to each other, the themes that emerged through the 
document analysis of this body of discourse suggest that the rationales in which the 
Supreme Court grounds its decisions concerning Internet issues involving the First 
Amendment are likely to be conceptualized in terms that consider the Internet as a new 
form of public sphere — apparently independent of any restrictive interpretation of the 
press clause — through which individuals can come together to deliberate with 
maximum speech-clause protections. 
 Thematic Insights from Philosophical Concepts of Democratic Communication 
Influential philosophical conceptualizations of the role of communication in a 
democratic society were considered in the analysis conducted in Chapter Four. The 
themes identified through that analysis focused upon representations that framed the 
                                                
14 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 594 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
15 521 U.S. at 851. 
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essential elements of those conceptualizations in terms of: (1) journalism as understood 
to be part of communication in a democratic society more broadly, (2) the roles of 
individuals in a democracy as engaged and reflective, and (3) individuals’ contributions 
to resolving societal problems as contingent to the groups in which they participate. 
Journalism as understood to be part of communication in a democratic society 
more broadly: This body of philosophical discourse advanced understandings of 
journalistic communication as providing a valuable contribution to democratic society, 
but a contribution that is only a part of the overall informational process. The discourse 
of Dewey and Habermas represented gatherings between individuals and internally 
focused written messages, such as letters and newsletters, as working with journalistic 
messages to provide the information individuals need to take part in democratic 
communication.16 Castells represented journalistic media as a “component” of a broader 
communication mosaic that also includes interpersonal and mass self-communication.17 
The discourse of Shirky and Jenkins served to effectively place journalistic media in a 
lesser role, one in which journalistic communication was characterized as a type of 
megaphone that can be used to connect conversations occurring in virtual and physical 
worlds regarding issues and problems in society.18  
The roles of individuals in a democracy as engaged and reflective: This body of 
philosophical discourse also advanced understandings of individuals using information 
to engage in deliberation with others regarding problems and issues in society, 
                                                
16 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 16; John Dewey, “Creative 
Democracy,” in The Essential Dewey, Vol. 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy, ed. Larry A. Hickman 
and Thomas M. Alexander (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998), 341, 342. 
17 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65. 
18 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: Revolution Doesn’t Happen When Society Adopts New 
Technology, It Happens When Society Adopts New Behaviors (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 9. 
 
 260 
emphasizing that individuals in a democracy should be engaged and reflective. Dewey’s 
work characterized democracy as a way of life requiring intentional engagement, not a 
set of governmental mechanisms.19 The discourse of Castells, Shirky, and Jenkins 
represented engagement as something that comes almost automatically as a result of 
networked technology, asserting that people are using new technologies to engage in 
deliberations that make purposive democratic activity, as envisioned by Dewey, more 
possible than in the past. 
Individuals’ contributions to resolving societal problems as contingent to the 
groups in which they participate: Advancing understandings of knowledge as emerging 
through communication in society, this body of discourse emphasized representations in 
which each individual is seen as making a contribution to knowledge-yielding 
deliberations in a democratic society. This idea is central to Habermas’s 
conceptualization of the public sphere, which focuses on the creation of a space where 
people together can generate knowledge and, ultimately through communication and the 
creation of understanding, solve problems and address issues in their communities, a 
“forum in which the private people, come together to form a public.”20 In Jenkins’s 
articulation, “A collective intelligence . . . assumes that each person has something to 
contribute, even if they will only be called upon on an ad hoc basis.”21 Dewey 
represented communication in communities as allowing each individual to realize his or 
her potential through engaging in group deliberation.22 When considered in relation to 
each other, the themes that emerged through the document analysis of this body of 
                                                
19 John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1954), 148. 
20 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 24-26. 
21 Jenkins, Convergence Culture, 53. 
22 Ibid., 154. 
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discourse highlight the manner in which these influential conceptualizations of the role 
of communication in a democratic society focus on its mosaic essence. Journalists and 
individuals are both elements of that mosaic who are crucial to generation of knowledge 
derived through conditions that allow all individuals to freely engage with all others and 
generate the greater collective intelligence that emerges through such a process. 
Conclusions from Research Questions 
• What understandings are dominant in this study’s analysis of the relevant 
bodies of legal and philosophical discourse?    
The analysis of the bodies of discourse in this study revealed understandings in 
which journalistic communication is represented as legally and philosophically distinct 
from other forms of communication. The philosophical and legal bodies of discourse 
did not, however, elevate journalism-related messages above those of others in terms of 
their value to society, but rather recognized that certain professional practices and 
processes are considered intrinsic to journalistic communication — qualities which 
distinguish it from other forms of communication. In the philosophical literature, this 
understanding represents journalism as part of the broader system of communication 
utilized by citizens to gather information so they can take part in deliberations with 
others in a democratic society. That body of discourse further reflected understandings 
that online communication creates new opportunities for individuals to gather and share 
information, but such engagement with information and with others on the Internet was 
not represented as equivalent to journalism. Rather, scholars such as Castells and Shirky 
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articulated conceptualizations in which journalism and other forms of communication 
are seen as both distinct from and interacting with one another.23  
The discourse in the lower-court rulings reflected conceptual rationales in which 
citizen publishers arguing for constitutional protections traditionally associated with the 
institutional press are more likely to succeed in that effort if their messages are prepared 
and communicated in ways that are similar to those traditionally associated with 
journalists. By considering citizen publishers’ claims for press-related protections in 
terms of judicial understandings of journalistic composition and communication 
practices, that body of discourse represented journalism as a distinctive form of 
communication that is not characteristic of everyone who communicates. The lower-
courts’ discourse also framed consideration of claims for press-related protections made 
by citizen publishers in terms of the First Amendment’s speech-clause provisions and 
not those of its press clause, representing the expression in question as a form of virtual 
speech, rather than publication.  
The discourse of the Supreme Court in Internet First Amendment cases also 
framed consideration of online communication in terms of the speech clause, rather than 
the press clause, suggesting similar understandings of journalism as a form of 
communication distinct from the broader body of communication conveyed by 
individuals using the Internet to gather information and send messages. Historically, the 
Court has considered the press clause as relevant only to cases involving the 
institutional press as traditionally understood.24 By declining to bring the press clause 
                                                
23 Castells, Communication Power, 54-55; Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 9-10. 
24 See for example: Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. 547 (1978); and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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into its jurisprudence considering Internet questions involving the First Amendment, the 
Court’s discourse framed the broader, more general communication engaged upon by 
individuals online as something distinct from journalism. Thus the Supreme Court’s 
discourse further contributed to a dominant understanding of journalism as distinct from 
other forms of communication.  
 
• Are there significant commonalities among dominant understandings identified 
in the respective bodies of legal and philosophical discourse?    
The strongest commonality across the bodies of philosophical and legal 
discourse related to the articulation of understandings in which online communication 
was represented as similar to speaking and falling within the constitutional purview of 
the speech clause — rather than similar to publishing and of press-clause concern. The 
bodies of discourse from the Supreme Court and lower-court cases strongly reflected 
that commonality, as discussed to some extent just above. While the discourse from the 
philosophical literature did not express this distinction in terms of the speech and press 
clauses specifically as such, it can be read as advancing a similar understanding in terms 
of the manner in which online communication was framed as separate from the work of 
journalists. The philosophical discourse conveyed the idea that online communication is 
more similar to individuals coming together in a virtual space than like citizens using 
Internet technology to produce journalism-related content.  
The dominant understandings in the bodies of philosophical and Supreme Court 
discourse also reflected commonality in terms of their respective conceptualization of 
the Internet as an idealized form of the public sphere. The philosophical texts advanced 
that understanding through the ways the authors highlighted both the lower barriers to 
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engagement and information access that characterize online communication and the 
assertion that the lower barriers result in greater interaction, via online communities, 
among individuals.25 Similarly, in the understandings advanced by the Supreme Court, 
the Internet is represented as providing a completely new type of forum or fora through 
which people can come together to deliberate. The Court referred to such online 
discussions as “the vast democratic fora,” and highlighted the manner in which the 
phenomenon provides people greater opportunities than ever to step forward into 
conversations in public spaces on the Internet.26  
The bodies of philosophical and lower-court discourse also shared overlapping 
understandings suggesting that group efforts reflect greater value than work done by 
individuals. The philosophical discourse emphasized understandings in which greater 
knowledge emerges from individuals coming together to deliberate regarding problems 
or issues in their communities. The work of Dewey, for example, was highlighted by 
assertions that democracy cannot function without individuals purposively engaging in 
deliberations with other individuals.27 These arguments can be seen to some extent as 
reflecting commonality with the discourse of the lower courts in which claims for press-
related protections were framed as more greatly justified when raised by groups of 
citizen publishers, on the reasoning that groups (such as online magazines, for example) 
include layers of editing, evidence of editorial decision-making, and more journalistic 
organization in their content than individual citizen publishers typically do.28  
                                                
25 See for example: Brian McNair, Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a 
Globalised World (London: Routledge, 2006), 143; Shirky, Here Comes Everybody, 21-22; and Jenkins, 
Convergence Culture, 27. 
26 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-869; Williams, 553 U.S. at 291-292. 
27 Dewey, “Creative Democracy, 342. 
28 See for example: O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1423; Kaufman, 291 S.W.3d at 130; Too 




• Are there significant conflicts among dominant understandings identified in 
the respective bodies of legal and philosophical discourse?    
A conflict can be seen between the understandings emphasized by the lower 
courts concerning the ways messages are composed and delivered and the 
understandings highlighted in the philosophical and Supreme Court bodies of discourse 
regarding the value of information and deliberation in society. By constructing 
understandings in which the content of the messages was less relevant than the manner 
in which the information was composed and delivered, the lower courts can be argued 
to have established a conceptual rationale for holding citizen publishers to a different 
set of expectations than those applied to journalists. As discussed, the bodies of 
philosophical and Supreme Court bodies of discourse consistently represented the 
Internet as an idealized form of the public sphere. The philosophical discourse also 
conceptualized both journalism-related messages and other forms of communication as 
providing information needed for individuals to engage in deliberations with others in a 
democratic society. By establishing a conceptual rationale that suggests a basis for 
holding citizen publishers to a standard that does not seem to account for the potential 
contributions of their messages, the lower courts’ rulings conflict with that of the body 
of philosophical and Supreme Court discourse, in which no distinction was articulated 





• To the extent that significant commonalities and conflicts can be identified in 
the respective bodies of legal and philosophical discourse, how do they critically relate 
to historical understandings of the press clause?    
Substantial relationships were found between historical understandings of the 
press clause and some of the commonalities and conflicts identified among the bodies 
of discourse that were the focus of this study. Specifically, the fact that all of the bodies 
of discourse carried understandings in which individuals’ online communications were 
represented as related to speaking and the speech clause rather than to publication and 
the press clause can be seen as critically related to historical understandings articulated 
by the Supreme Court and legal scholars regarding the meaning of the press clause. 
Similarly, the conflict discussed just above regarding the understandings related to 
composition and delivery of messages versus their content also relates with historical 
understandings of the press clause. 
The broad narratives that are represented by the bodies of discourse focused 
upon in this study and historical understandings of the press clause discussed in Chapter 
One rather consistently advance understandings that assert the press clause was created 
to protect the press as an institution. The Supreme Court emphasized the role of the 
press and the press clause, for example, in cases such as New York Times v. United 
States (the “Pentagon Papers” case) and Near v. Minnesota.29 In both cases, the Court 
was asked to address significant questions regarding the extent of protections provided 
to the institutional press by the press clause. Cases such as those have led many legal 
scholars, including Justice Potter Stewart, to postulate that the press clause was enacted 
                                                
29 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 715-716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Near, 283 U.S. at 697. 
The Near case emanated from a state law that halted “nuisance” publications. 
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to protect the media as an industry.30 That idea is supported by decisions such as 
Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, both post-World War I sedition 
cases, in which the Court adjudicated the constitutional questions before it regarding 
whether individuals could be punished by the government for distributing anti-war 
material as matters relating to the speech clause.31 The cases involved information that 
was distributed in printed form by individuals, rather than by media organizations, so 
the Court did not invoke the press clause in reaching its rulings. Similarly, the bodies of 
discourse that were the focus of this study’s document analysis consistently advanced 
understandings in which messages that are communicated by individuals on the Internet 
were represented as forms of speech because they do not relate to a traditional media 
outlet or generally to traditional journalistic practices and processes. In this sense, the 
understandings that were dominant in those bodies of the philosophical and legal 
discourse critically relate to historical understandings of the press clause. 
The conflict that was identified regarding the understandings related to 
composition and delivery of messages versus their content also relates to historical 
understandings of the press clause. That conflict is rooted in the fact that a number of 
federal and state laws have been created that specifically provide journalists with 
protections generally not available to other citizens (as examples involved in case 
discussions in Chapter Two illustrate). In terms of constitutional protections, however, 
the Supreme Court has generally declared that the press clause does not provide 
journalists greater rights than those of individual citizens. As detailed in Chapter One, 
                                                
30 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” Hastings Law Journal 26 (1975): 633-634; C. Edwin Baker, 
“The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law,” Hofstra Law Review 35 (2007): 
957-958; and Melville B. Nimmer, “Introduction — Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it 
Add to Freedom of Speech,” Hastings Law Journal 26 (1975): 639. 
31 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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in a series of contentious decisions in the 1970s, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
press clause does not provide journalists any more protections or access to information 
than other citizens.32 What can be read as a conflicting narrative in the discourse of the 
lower courts that is the focus of this study’s document analysis, however, derives from 
the courts’ efforts to adjudicate cases brought before them in which specific state and 
federal statutory provisions that do in fact provide news media with such protections 
were central to the questions being litigated. Thus that crucial difference between 
constitutional and statutory questions can be seen as perhaps inevitably leading the 
discourse of the lower courts to focus on the way messages were composed and 
delivered, rather than on their content.  
• What does this analysis suggest regarding how understandings dominant in 
this study’s examination of the relevant bodies of legal and philosophical discourse can 
provide grounding for interpreting the press clause in the network society? 
The philosophical and legal bodies of discourse in this study articulated a 
dominant understanding in which journalism is represented as distinct from other forms 
of communication and in which journalists operate with other types of messengers as 
essential contributors to deliberation in a democratic society. Also significant was the 
advancement of the dominant understanding in which individuals’ online 
communications are represented as relating to the speech clause of the First 
                                                
32 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), dealt with a newspaper reporter’s claim that the 
press clause protected him from having to reveal his confidential sources to a grand jury. In its opinion, 
the Court explained that the press clause applied to lecturers, novelists, dramatists, scholars, and the 
“lonely pamphleteer.” Two years later, in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), a case in which 
reporters argued against a prison policy that banned requests for interviews with specific inmates, the 
Court concluded, “The Constitution does not . . . require government to accord the press special access to 




Amendment, rather than the press clause. All these dominant understandings can 
provide grounding for interpreting the press clause in the network society. 
By articulating understandings that emphasized the manner in which journalism 
involves certain practices and processes that are distinctive from other forms of 
communication in democratic society, the bodies of discourse in this study highlighted 
potential elements through which to integrate historical understandings of the press 
clause with those of a dramatically transformed media environment. In a related sense, 
the dominant understandings suggest that journalism’s distinctive contribution in 
society may likely be best understood as part of the information and deliberation-
enabling communication that is needed in a democratic society, particularly in the 
network age when other forms of communication, such as virtual communities and 
interpersonal interactions, appear increasingly likely to be legally recognized as 
providing similarly valuable but different contributions. That suggests that future 
conceptualizations of the press clause can be argued as justified in avoiding limits on 
the First Amendment rights of other types of communicators who may not be formally 
part of the institutional press but whom technology now has enabled to communicate 
with audiences in ways that are similar to the manner in which the press does.  
Finally, the bodies of philosophical and legal discourse contended that 
individual online communicators’ messages related to the speech clause. This insight 
provides direction regarding how the press clause should be interpreted in the network 
society because it further indicates, along with support from legal scholars, that the 
press clause can be best understood as protecting communication that includes 
processes and practices with commonalities historically associated with journalism. 
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While the bodies of discourse conveyed understandings that journalism and other forms 
of communication work together to inform deliberation in a democratic society, and are 
therefore both valuable, they also asserted that journalism’s processes and practices 
make it distinctive, providing a grounding that democratic deliberation requires a form 
of communication that follows processes and practices that have traditionally been 
associated with journalism. 
A Proposed Framework for Interpreting the Press Clause in the Network Society 
The bodies of philosophical and legal discourse that formed the foundation for 
the analysis upon which this study has focused advanced understandings that represent 
communication as central to democratic society. The highlighted understandings 
emphasized in the bodies of discourse represented journalism and other forms of 
communication, such as interpersonal and online communication, as working in 
different ways toward the same goal of informing democratic deliberation. As also 
discussed, the bodies of discourse advanced representations of journalism as distinctive 
in regard to certain practices and processes that distinguish it from other forms of 
communication. Finally, the bodies of philosophical and legal discourse analyzed in this 
study framed the online communications of individuals who are not formally part of the 
institutional press in terms of the First Amendment’s speech-clause provisions rather 
than those of the press clause. Therefore, this proposal for a unified framework in which 
the courts can ground complicated questions concerning interpretations of the press 
clause in the network society draws particularly upon those understandings in asserting 
a conceptual rationale that seeks to integrate historical understandings with those of a 
dramatically transformed media environment. 
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In order to integrate those understandings with the historical understandings of 
the press clause summarized above and detailed in Chapter One, the framework 
proposed here centers on the assertion that courts seeking to interpret the press clause in 
the network society in a manner consistent with those unified understandings must 
focus most essentially and fundamentally on the process through which the messages in 
question were composed and delivered.  
Thus, this study proposes a process-based framework through which the 
Supreme Court should conceptualize the press clause in the network-society era. As 
emphasized, this dissertation’s collective analysis clearly highlights the understanding 
that journalism is distinctive and that it works with other forms of communication to 
inform deliberation in society. By focusing on the process through which messages 
were composed and delivered — rather than on their content or their creator — the 
courts can ensure that the distinctive nature of journalism as emphasized in the bodies 
of discourse focused upon in this study remains a vital part of the informational mosaic 
also emphasized as critical in a democratic society.  
The process-based approach cannot be rigid in the sense that a group of steps or 
actions must have been taken by the person who is claiming press-clause protections. 
Rather, the Court should utilize a list of journalistic processes as a guide in its rulings, 
requiring that a majority of the elements outlined be present. Such an approach is 
consistent with how the Supreme Court has conceptualized the press clause in that it has 
often considered journalistic processes and practices when making rulings.33 The 
                                                
33 Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978); Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) all 
represent instances when the Court incorporated considerations of journalistic practices and processes 
into its deliberations. 
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approach is also supported by the lower courts’ rationales in that the judges consistently 
articulated that whether a message was delivered according to accepted rules of 
journalism was a central concern in their deliberations.34 Such concerns would likely 
include, though not necessarily be limited to, whether: 
• The material involved in the message was original and not copied from 
another source. 
• Preparing the message incorporated interviews or other primary sources. 
• The author made direct observations of events relating to the message. 
• The message included attributed information. 
• Another person edited the message before it was communicated. 
• The message is accurate or that efforts were made to verify the accuracy of 
information. 
• The author acted independently, having not been influenced by the interests 
of a political faction, corporation, or other organization, in composing the 
message. 
Since historically, as discussed, the Supreme Court has declined to interpret the 
press clause so as to provide journalists greater protections than others, utilizing an 
approach along these lines would maintain consistency with that cornerstone of press-
clause jurisprudence. In cases such as Branzburg, Pell, and Saxbe, for example, the 
Court emphasized that it did not understand the press clause as extending rights to 
journalists that were otherwise not available to others. In Branzburg the Court wrote, 
“Citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas; and 
                                                
34 See for example, O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1468; Forensic Advisors v. Matrixx 




neither the First Amendment nor any constitutional provision protects the average 
citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in 
confidence.”35 Furthermore, in Pell, the Court concluded that “Newsmen have no 
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the 
general public.”36 The process-based approach does not provide rights to journalists that 
are not otherwise available to others. In this sense, such a framework also crucially 
avoid limiting the First Amendment rights of other types of communicators who may 
not be formally part of the institutional press but whom technology now has enabled to 
communicate with audiences in ways that are similar to the manner in which the press 
does.  
Such an approach also avoids problems that would be created by a framework 
that is based on who is or is not a journalist. Bills proposing a federal shield law have 
failed to succeed during the past ten years because of a lack of a consensus in Congress 
regarding who would be protected by such a law.37 The most recent congressional effort 
to author a federal shield law advanced through the Senate Judiciary Committee only 
after a complex and limiting definition of who is a journalist was written.38 The law, for 
example, defines a “covered journalist” as someone who was paid by a news service for 
one year within the past two decades or for three months during the past five years or a 
person who has “substantially contributed . . . to a significant number of articles, stories, 
programs, or publications by a medium” outlined within the law.39 A process-based 
                                                
35 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. 
36 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. 
37 William E. Lee, “The Demise of the Federal Shield Law,” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law 
Journal 30, 35-37 (2012). 
38 Sari Horwitz, “Media Shield act moves on to the full Senate,” Washington Post, September 
12, 2013. 
39 Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013).  
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framework not only avoids the pitfalls of such attempts to define who is a journalist, but 
for the same reasons maintains consistency with historical press-clause understandings 
in that efforts to make such determinations long have been recognized by the courts as 
problematic.40 The Court firmly articulated the constitutional concerns associated with 
defining who is and is not a journalist in Branzburg, when it concluded: 
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such 
an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional newsman’s 
privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. 
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen 
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the 
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press.41 
 
Thus, integral to this proposed framework is the assertion that it should not 
include consideration of characteristics such as whether the messenger has a journalism 
education, works for a traditional news entity, etc. The process-based approach neither 
denies nor contradicts any historical understandings of potential press-clause 
protections, while ensuring that those protections as interpreted in the network society 
will encompass both the institutional press as well as individuals working outside it but 
contributing what this analysis emphasized as relevant bodies of discourse as essential 
to deliberation in a democratic society.  
Limitations 
 Any study such as this one includes limitations. A central portion of this study 
addresses philosophical conceptualizations of communication in a democratic society. 
While the philosophical discourse chosen for this study represents influential thinkers 
whose ideas bear undeniably significant relevance to the topic of this dissertation, the 
breadth of philosophical considerations regarding communication in a democratic 
                                                
40 See for example, Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704; O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1457. 
41 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703-704. 
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society is wide. Constructing the study required that some philosophers who could have 
been argued as also relevant were not among those who were included in the analysis, 
due to considerations discussed in Chapter Four. While this can be asserted as a 
limitation, it also provides potential opportunities to examine the central ideas in this 
study through the concepts put forth by other philosophers in the future. Similarly, 
while this study involved rigorous and extensive search efforts to identify the body of 
relevant lower-court and Supreme Court cases that were utilized in the document 
analysis, it is at least theoretically possible that relevant rationales may also exist in the 
discourse of some cases that were not identified for this study — given that courts on at 
least some occasions may draw upon rationales within the text of opinions for rulings 
with case names and/or summaries that seem unrelated to the focus of this study. 
Finally, any study of this sort will bear some influences resulting from the author’s 
necessary role in the qualitative methodological approach employed here. While 
Altheide’s method of document analysis represents a widely respected and relatively 
systematic approach, it is always possible that alternative readings of the bodies of 
discourse focused upon in this study could be developed through other methodological 
approaches. 
Conclusion 
 The emergence of the network-society era has shifted the way people 
communicate in a democratic society. It has allowed individuals to communicate 
messages to audiences of varying sizes and, in doing so, created uncertainty regarding 
how the protections of the press clause should be understood. This dissertation 
contributes a well-supported framework that seeks to pull the discussion away from the 
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traditionally problematic questions that emerge with approaches that focus on 
determining who is and is not a journalist. Instead, a process-oriented framework that is 
based upon how a message is composed and delivered, rather than on who 
communicated it is proposed. The framework in this dissertation was designed both 
theoretically and methodologically to arrive at conclusions that provide a conceptual 
basis in which courts can ground such challenging questions concerning interpretations 
of the press clause in the network society.  
The process-based framework put forth in this dissertation draws upon 
narratives represented within lower-court rulings concerning instances in which citizen 
publishers argued for protections that have traditionally been reserved for journalists, 
Supreme Court decisions in which justices articulated rationales they developed for 
deciding Internet questions relating to the First Amendment, and essential theoretical 
conceptualizations of the role of communication in democratic society, as well as 
historical understandings of the press clause. The thematic insights that emerged 
through the analysis of these bodies of discourse resulted in a framework that aligns 
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